Enhancing Patent Damages by Karshtedt, Dmitry
GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works Faculty Scholarship 
2017 
Enhancing Patent Damages 
Dmitry Karshtedt 
George Washington University Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.gwu.edu/faculty_publications 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Karshtedt, Dmitry, Enhancing Patent Damages (April 3, 2017). 51 UC Davis Law Review 1427 (2018); GWU 
Law School Public Law Research Paper No. 2017-25; GWU Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2017-25. 
Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2945696 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Scholarly Commons. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works by an authorized administrator of 
Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact spagel@law.gwu.edu. 
  
 
1427 
Enhancing Patent Damages 
Dmitry Karshtedt* 
Many policymakers, judges, and scholars justify patent law on 
economic-utilitarian grounds. It is therefore unsettling that when it comes 
to damages for patent infringement in excess of the compensatory baseline, 
courts have followed an approach that reflects primarily moral, rather 
than economic, considerations. In order to obtain enhanced damages, the 
prevailing plaintiff must show — among other things — that the 
defendant actually knew of the existence of the patent-in-suit. This 
subjective standard stems from pre-industrial tort actions designed to 
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punish egregious interpersonal behaviors such as assault, piracy, libel, 
and seduction, and to preserve the public order. But as the law developed 
to cover “depersonalized” torts committed by corporate defendants and 
expanded from its moral foundations to embrace economic reasoning to a 
greater degree than before, the range of cases in which punitive damages 
could be awarded broadened significantly. Specifically, courts relaxed the 
culpability standard by making it less subjective, allowing punitive 
damages for generalized reckless disregard for the rights of others. The 
recklessness framework is now dominant in the fields of negligence and 
products liability, which typically allow for punitive damages without 
actual knowledge of a specific victim or defect, and in other civil actions 
— including copyright and trademark infringement. Patent law, however, 
continues to be an outlier by requiring actual, subjective knowledge of the 
plaintiff’s patent and, in so doing, in effect clings to the old moral-
opprobrium model of punitive damages. 
Not surprisingly, this standard has led to anomalous results. For one 
thing, the actual-knowledge approach to enhanced damages discourages 
firms from searching for and reading relevant patents, an unfortunate 
result given the widely recognized notion that disclosure is a core function 
of the patent system. Indeed, this rule errantly treats potential infringers 
who make good-faith attempts to ascertain the nature of the patent 
landscape in the fields in which they operate worse than those that decide 
to bury their heads in the sand and do no patent searching whatsoever. But 
there is a prospect for improvement in the law. A recent Supreme Court 
decision, Halo Electronics v. Pulse Electronics, arguably pushed a reset 
button on the jurisprudence of enhanced damages in patent cases. 
Although it accepted the pre-industrial, subjective conception of punitive 
damages in its discussion of “deliberate” and “wanton” infringements, the 
Court also pointed to the modern trend when it referred to recklessness as 
an acceptable standard of culpability for enhanced patent damages. 
I argue that, in failing to embrace Halo’s endorsement of recklessness, 
the lower courts are making a mistake. I contend that installing 
recklessness toward patent rights of others as the threshold level of 
culpability for enhanced damages is consistent with the modern conception 
of punitive damages in tort — which, at least to some degree, reflects a 
shift away from the moral grounding of this remedy and toward economic 
analysis. Accordingly, I propose a recalibration of the willfulness doctrine 
to include reckless failures to search for patents as a route to making 
infringers eligible for enhanced damages. If applied properly, the new 
standard would mitigate the current doctrine’s perverse effect of 
discouraging reading of patents, promote cost-effective patent searches, 
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and take account of significant differences in patent landscapes between 
various industries. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Patent Act, like many other statutes setting forth civil causes of 
action,1 allows prevailing plaintiffs to obtain retrospective relief in the 
form of monetary damages.2 As in other areas of law, damages for past 
tortious acts can come in two forms — compensatory damages and 
additional damages that might generically be described as “supra-
compensatory” or “enhanced.”3 In recent years, rules for determining 
compensatory damages in patent cases have been the focus of many 
important court decisions4 and scholarly work.5 Although controversy 
 
 1 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2520(b) (2018) (authorizing awards of compensatory and 
punitive damages for intercepting communications); 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b) (2018) 
(authorizing awards of compensatory and punitive damages for employment 
discrimination).  
 2 See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2018) (“Upon finding for the claimant the court shall 
award the claimant damages adequate to compensate for the infringement . . . .”).  
 3 Id. (“[T]he court may increase the damages up to three times the amount found 
or assessed.”); see G. Robert Blakey, Of Characterization and Other Matters: Thoughts 
About Multiple Damages, 60 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 97, 106-11 & nn.47–51 (1997) 
(discussing “accumulative,” “enhanced,” and “punitive” damages); Catherine M. 
Sharkey, Economic Analysis of Punitive Damages: Theory, Empirics, and Doctrine, in 
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF TORTS 486, 486 (Jennifer Arlen ed., 2012) 
[hereinafter Sharkey, Economic Analysis of Punitive Damages] (“Punitive damages have 
been a part of the civil law landscape in the United States since the nineteenth 
century, but the past two decades have witnessed a firestorm of renewed interest and 
debate over this supra-compensatory remedy, whose goals are to punish and to deter 
wrongful behavior.”). 
 4 Mentor Graphics Corp. v. EVE-USA, Inc., 851 F.3d 1275, 1283-90 (Fed. Cir. 
2017); Commonwealth Sci. & Indus. Research Org. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 809 F.3d 1295, 
1301-07 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Sys., Inc., 773 F.3d 1201, 1225-35 
(Fed. Cir. 2014); VirnetX, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 767 F.3d 1308, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 
2014); WhitServe, LLC v. Comput. Packages, Inc., 694 F.3d 10, 26-27 (Fed. Cir. 
2012); Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2011); 
ResQNet.com, Inc. v. Lansa, Inc., 594 F.3d 860, 868-73 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Lucent 
Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2009); see Jonas 
Anderson, Congress as a Catalyst of Patent Reform at the Federal Circuit, 63 AM. U. L. 
REV. 961, 1000-02 (2014) (discussing some of these decisions). 
 5 See, e.g., Daniel Harris Brean, Ending Unreasonable Royalties: Why Nominal 
Damages Are Adequate to Compensate Patent Assertion Entities for Infringement, 39 VT. 
L. REV. 867 (2015); Bernard Chao, Lost Profits in a Multicomponent World, 59 B.C. L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3016814; Tun-Jen Chiang, The 
Information-Forcing Dilemma in Damages Law, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 81 (2017); 
Daralyn J. Durie & Mark A. Lemley, A Structured Approach to Calculating Reasonable 
Royalties, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 627 (2010); Dmitry Karshtedt, Damages for 
Indirect Patent Infringement, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 911 (2014) [hereinafter Karshtedt, 
Damages for Indirect Patent Infringement]; William F. Lee & A. Douglas Melamed, 
Breaking the Vicious Cycle of Patent Damages, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 385 (2016); Oskar 
Liivak, When Nominal Is Reasonable: Damages for the Unpracticed Patent, 56 B.C. L. 
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over proper legal frameworks for damages to compensate for patent 
infringement continues,6 there is at least a consensus with respect to 
the notion that such damages should reflect economic considerations, 
however they are to be translated into the actual rules that courts 
should use.7 The proposition that careful calibration of damages is 
important for the fulfillment of the patent system’s purpose of 
optimizing innovation incentives is difficult to contest,8 and thanks to 
the attention that compensatory damages in patent law have received 
of late, courts have been making progress toward achieving the goal of 
economically rational awards.9 There is more work to be done, 
perhaps much more,10 but the problem of compensatory damages for 
patent infringement has undoubtedly benefited from recent 
engagement of courts and scholars. 
Supra-compensatory damages in patent law present a very different 
picture. To begin, although the section of the Patent Act governing 
damages, 35 U.S.C. § 284, at least states the function of compensatory 
damages — unsurprisingly, they must be “adequate to compensate for 
the infringement”11 — that section says nothing about the purpose of 
enhanced damages or the standard for awarding them. The only 
“guidance” given by Congress is that “the court may increase the 
damages up to three times the amount found or assessed” beyond the 
damages clearly denominated as compensatory.12 In an effort to give 
content to the statutory authorization to award these so-called “treble 
 
REV. 1031 (2015); Brian J. Love, The Misuse of Reasonable Royalty Damages as a Patent 
Infringement Deterrent, 74 MO. L. REV. 909 (2009); David W. Opderbeck, Patent 
Damages Reform and the Shape of Patent Law, 89 B.U. L. REV. 127 (2009); Michael 
Risch, (Un)Reasonable Royalties, 98 B.U. L. REV. 187 (2018); David O. Taylor, Using 
Reasonable Royalties to Value Patented Technology, 49 GA. L. REV. 79 (2014). 
 6 See supra note 5. See generally Ted Sichelman, Purging Patent Law of “Private 
Law” Remedies, 92 TEX. L. REV. 517 (2014) (advancing a broad criticism of the Patent 
Act’s remedial schemes). 
 7 Compare, e.g., Sichelman, supra note 6, at 554-60 (rejecting the tort-law 
framework for compensatory damages in patent law), with, e.g., Robert D. Blair & 
Thomas F. Cotter, Rethinking Patent Damages, 10 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 1, 4 (2001) 
(arguing that tort rules are appropriate for patent damages).  
 8 See, e.g., Lee & Melamed, supra note 5, at 439-45.  
 9 See, e.g., Commonwealth Sci. & Indus. Research Org., 809 F.3d at 1303-04; 
Uniloc, 632 F.3d at 1313-17. 
 10 See, e.g., Lee & Melamed, supra note 5; Risch, supra note 5; see also Erik 
Hovenkamp & Jonathan Masur, How Patent Damages Skew Licensing Markets, 36 REV. 
LITIG. 379, 414-15 (2017). 
 11 See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2018). 
 12 Id. 
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damages,”13 courts have sometimes looked to private law, and 
particularly to the common law of torts, to see how courts handle 
enhanced damages in those cases.14 This instinct is understandable, 
and seems sound as a matter of statutory interpretation.15 After all, the 
various iterations of the Patent Act have been passed with little 
indication that, when it comes to issues shared with other areas of law, 
courts in patent cases are to develop rules that are unique and patent-
specific.16 Indeed, there is much evidence to the contrary — that 
 
 13 The term “treble” refers to the maximum allowable enhancement — total 
damages up to treble the compensatory damages. Under appropriate circumstances, 
trial courts can award less than treble damages. See, e.g., Datascope Corp. v. SMEC, 
Inc., 14 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1071, 1074 (D.N.J. 1990) (“A fifty-percent enhancement of 
damages is appropriate here. Although SMEC’s infringement was willful, it was not 
blatant.”); see also infra Section III.D.  
 14 See, e.g., Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 827-28 & n.8 (Fed. Cir. 
1992) (citing Hodges v. S.C. Toof & Co., 833 S.W.2d 896, 900-01 (Tenn. 1992)); see 
also Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1933 (2016) (relying on the 
Restatement of Torts and precedent that was in turn based on tort sources in 
determining the proper level of culpability for enhanced damages); Hoechst Celanese 
Corp. v. BP Chems. Ltd., 78 F.3d 1575, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1996); infra Section I.A. 
 15 See William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, The Law of Interpretation, 130 HARV. L. 
REV. 1079, 1105, 1112 (2017) (observing that the common law routinely provides 
unwritten “substantive rules” for interpreting federal legislation); Dmitry Karshtedt, 
Causal Responsibility and Patent Infringement, 70 VAND. L. REV. 565, 586 (2017) 
(discussing this mode of interpretation in the context of non-performer liability in 
patent law) [hereinafter Karshtedt, Causal Responsibility and Patent Infringement]; 
Adam J. MacLeod, Patent Infringement as Trespass, 69 ALA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) 
(manuscript at 19), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3029708 (“[T]he original Patent Act 
could just as plausibly have codified the common law of trespass for patent 
infringement generally.”); Lynda J. Oswald, The “Strict Liability” of Direct Patent 
Infringement, 19 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 993, 999-1005 (2017) (discussing the role of 
trespass in interpreting various provisions of the Patent Act); Jason A. Rantanen, An 
Objective View of Fault in Patent Infringement, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 1575, 1592-96 (2011) 
[hereinafter Rantanen, An Objective View] (discussing the influence of aiding and 
abetting principles in tort law on indirect liability in patent law). For case law 
examples applying this principle outside patent law, see Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & 
Sons, Inc., 568 U.S. 519, 538 (2013) (“When a statute covers an issue previously 
governed by the common law, we must presume that Congress intended to retain the 
substance of the common law.” (alterations and quotation marks omitted)); Staub v. 
Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411, 417 (2011) (“start[ing] from the premise that when 
Congress creates a federal tort it adopts the background of general tort law”); United 
States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529, 534 (1993) (“In order to abrogate a common-law 
principle, the statute must ‘speak directly’ to the question addressed by the common 
law.” (quoting Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 625 (1978))). 
 16 See, e.g., SCA Hygiene Prods. Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby Prods., LLC, 137 
S. Ct. 954, 964 (2017) (holding that general laches rules apply to patent law and 
explaining that “[p]atent law is governed by the same common-law principles, 
methods of statutory interpretation, and procedural rules as other areas of civil 
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Congress meant for background common-law principles to apply to 
cognate patent law issues.17 Accordingly, courts in patent cases have 
drawn on the law of torts to deal with problems ranging from mental 
states for indirect infringement,18 to proximate cause limits on the 
scope of the defendant’s liability,19 to — reasonably enough — the 
but-for causation requirement for awarding compensatory damages.20 
This move has not always enabled dispute-free resolutions of these 
various aspects of patent infringement claims,21 but it has at least 
given courts a starting point for interpreting the sometimes sparse 
language of the Patent Act. 
When it comes to treble damages, however, examination of other 
areas of law has not yielded a clear answer even with respect to the 
 
litigation” (quoting SCA Hygiene Prods. Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby Prods., LLC, 
807 F.3d 1311, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc) (Hughes, J., dissenting))); Teva 
Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 837-40 (2015) (rejecting a patent-
specific rule for the standard of review of trial judges’ fact findings underlying claim 
construction); Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1744, 
1748-49 (2014) (similar for the standard of review of trial judges’ exceptional case 
determinations); Medtronic, Inc. v. Mirowski Family Ventures, 134 S. Ct. 843, 849-51 
(2014) (similar for allocation of burdens of proof in declaratory judgment actions); 
MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 129-30 (2007) (similar for 
declaratory judgment standing); eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 
392-94 (2006) (similar for injunctions and equity practice). For a recent analysis of 
this dynamic, see Peter Lee, The Supreme Assimilation of Patent Law, 114 MICH. L. REV. 
1413, 1425-31 (2016). See also Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Supreme Court and the 
Federal Circuit: Visitation and Custody of Patent Law, 106 MICH. L. REV. FIRST 
IMPRESSIONS 28, 31-32 (2007).  
 17 See supra note 15; see also Recovery in Patent Infringement Suits: Hearing on H.R. 
5231 Before the H. Comm. on Patents, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1946) (statement of Mr. 
Conder C. Henry, Assistant Commissioner of Patents) (likening enhanced patent 
damages to what “[s]ometimes in actions of tort . . . is called exemplary damages”).  
 18 See, e.g., Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1920, 1930 (2015). 
 19 See, e.g., Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1546 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en 
banc).  
 20 See, e.g., Mentor Graphics Corp. v. EVE-USA, Inc., 851 F.3d 1275, 1284-85 
(Fed. Cir.), reh’g en banc denied, 870 F.3d 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (mem.). 
 21 See, e.g., Commil, 135 S. Ct. at 1931-32 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Rite-Hite, 56 F.3d 
at 1558-60, 1569-70 (Nies, J., dissenting); Mentor Graphics, 870 F.3d at 1300-01 (Fed. 
Cir. 2017) (Dyk, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (denying the very 
relevance of tort principles to an aspect of patent damages). But see id. at 1299 & n.1 
(Stoll, J., concurring in denial of rehearing en banc) (“I . . . believe the panel decision 
to be consistent with long-standing damages principles in property, tort and contract. 
I do not agree with the dissent that there should be a special rule for damages in 
patent cases which is at odds with mainstream damages principles.”). See generally 
Karshtedt, Damages for Indirect Patent Infringement, supra note 5 (criticizing courts’ 
misapplication of tort principles in patent cases in the context of measuring damages 
for indirect patent infringement).  
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basic purpose of this remedy. In recent times, consensus has 
developed that such damages should be reserved for “willful” patent 
infringement,22 however defined. But over the long history of treble 
damages in patent law, courts have variously mentioned 
punishment,23 deterrence,24 and even adequate compensation25 as 
potential justifications for these awards, and legal scholarship has sent 
similarly conflicting messages over the years.26 Although it is certainly 
possible for a remedy to have multiple purposes,27 at least some of the 
pairings — like punishment and compensation — might be at odds.28 
Moreover, deciding which of these multiple possible purposes of treble 
 
 22 See Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1934 (2016) (stating 
that enhanced damages in patent law “should generally be reserved for egregious cases 
typified by willful misconduct”). 
 23 Id. at 1928-29 (quoting Seymour v. McCormick, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 480, 488-89 
(1854)).  
 24 Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 819 F.2d 1120, 1126 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (“The role 
of a finding of ‘willfulness’ in the law of infringement is partly as a deterrent — an 
economic deterrent to the tort of infringement — and partly as a basis for making 
economically whole one who has been wronged . . . .”). 
 25 Id.; see also In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1382-84 (Fed. Cir. 2007) 
(en banc) (Gajarsa, J., concurring); Trio Process Corp. v. L. Goldstein’s Sons, Inc., 638 
F.2d 661, 662-63 (3d Cir. 1981).  
 26 See Keith N. Hylton, Enhanced Damages for Patent Infringement: A Normative 
Approach, 36 REV. LITIG. 417, 435, 439-41 (2017) [hereinafter Hylton, Enhanced 
Damages for Patent Infringement] (focusing on deterrence); Mark A. Lemley & Ragesh 
K. Tangri, Ending Patent Law’s Willfulness Game, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1085, 1089 
(2003) (focusing on punishment); Note, The Enforcement of Rights Against Patent 
Infringers, 72 HARV. L. REV. 328, 350-51 (1958) (focusing on compensation). 
 27 Indeed, the purposes of punishment and deterrence are often interrelated. See 
generally Gary T. Schwartz, Deterrence and Punishment in the Common Law of Punitive 
Damages: A Comment, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 133 (1982). In addition, compensatory rather 
than punitive damages can also further the goals of deterrence. See generally Russell 
M. Gold, Compensation’s Role in Deterrence, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1997 (2016); Love, 
supra note 5.  
 28 See Harvey McGregor, Compensation Versus Punishment in Damages Awards, 28 
MOD. L. REV. 629, 629 (1965) (“That the object of an award of damages is to 
compensate the plaintiff for his loss and not to punish the defendant for his 
wrongdoing is a modern notion. In an earlier age the separation of compensation and 
punishment was not so clear-cut, but as tort gradually became weaned away from 
crime and as, much later, the idea of no liability without fault became undermined by 
principles of strict liability, so the idea that damages might be based on punishment as 
well as compensation waned.”); cf. Peter Lee, Distinguishing Damages Paid from 
Compensation Received: A Thought Experiment, 26 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. (forthcoming 
2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3013793 (arguing that the amount the infringer pays 
could be different from the amount the patentee receives in order to calibrate the 
deterrence and innovation inducement functions of compensatory damages).  
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damages is dominant would be helpful because that framing could 
shape the standards for awarding them.29 
But the fact that the common law has not supplied ready answers for 
enhanced damages in patent law is, unfortunately, not a surprise. The 
very idea of awarding more than make-whole damages in civil cases 
has been controversial, and the theory of punitive damages — a 
potential tort-law analog of patent treble damages that courts and 
scholars have often looked to for content when dealing with this issue 
in patent law30 — is widely debated and appears rather unsettled, as 
evidenced by the prodigious amount of scholarship devoted to this 
field.31 Nonetheless, as I argue in this Article, there is much useful 
 
 29 For example, compensatory damages can be readily awarded without proof of 
fault on the part of the losing defendant, while punitive damages generally require 
some form of fault. See, e.g., Thiry v. Armstrong World Indus., 661 P.2d 515, 516-17 
(Okla. 1983); David G. Owen, Punitive Damages in Products Liability Litigation, 74 
MICH. L. REV. 1257, 1268-71 (1976) [hereinafter Owen, Punitive Damages in Products 
Liability Litigation]. 
 30 See supra notes 22–26 and accompanying text.  
 31 See, e.g., Bruce Chapman & Michael Trebilcock, Punitive Damages: Divergence in 
Search of a Rationale, 40 ALA. L. REV. 741 (1989); Thomas B. Colby, Clearing the Smoke 
from Philip Morris v. Williams: The Past, Present, and Future of Punitive Damages, 118 
YALE L.J. 392, 395 (2008) [hereinafter Colby, Clearing the Smoke]; Thomas B. Colby, 
Beyond the Multiple Punishment Problem: Punitive Damages as Punishment for Individual, 
Private Wrongs, 87 MINN. L. REV. 583 (2003); Robert D. Cooter, Economic Analysis of 
Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 79 (1982); Dan B. Dobbs, Ending Punishment in 
“Punitive” Damages: Deterrence-Measured Remedies, 40 ALA. L. REV. 831 (1989); Dorsey 
D. Ellis, Jr., Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 
(1982); Marc Galanter & David Luban, Poetic Justice: Punitive Damages and Legal 
Pluralism, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1393 (1993); Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., Augmented Awards: 
The Efficient Evolution of Punitive Damages, 51 LA. L. REV. 3 (1990); Mark F. Grady, 
Punitive Damages and Subjective States of Mind: A Positive Economic Theory, 40 ALA. L. 
REV. 1197 (1989); David D. Haddock et al., An Ordinary Economic Rationale for 
Extraordinary Legal Sanctions, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (1990); Angela P. Harris, Rereading 
Punitive Damages: Beyond the Public/Private Distinction, 40 ALA. L. REV. 1079 (1989); 
Keith N. Hylton, Punitive Damages and the Economic Theory of Penalties, 87 GEO. L.J. 
421 (1998) [hereinafter Hylton, Economic Theory of Penalties]; Alexandra B. Klass, 
Punitive Damages and Valuing Harm, 92 MINN. L. REV. 83 (2007); Jill Wieber Lens, 
Justice Holmes’s Bad Man and the Depleted Purposes of Punitive Damages, 101 KY. L.J. 
789 (2013) [hereinafter Lens, Bad Man]; Jill Wieber Lens, Punishing for the Injury: Tort 
Law’s Influence in Defining the Constitutional Limitations on Punitive Damage Awards, 39 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 595 (2011); Dan Markel, Retributive Damages: A Theory of Punitive 
Damages as Intermediate Sanction, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 239 (2009); David G. Owen, 
Civil Punishment and the Public Good, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 103 (1982) [hereinafter Owen, 
Civil Punishment and the Public Good]; Owen, Punitive Damages in Products Liability 
Litigation, supra note 29; A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An 
Economic Analysis, 111 HARV. L. REV. 869 (1988); Martin H. Redish & Andrew L. 
Mathews, Why Punitive Damages Are Unconstitutional, 53 EMORY L.J. 1 (2004); Michael 
Rustad, In Defense of Punitive Damages in Products Liability: Testing Tort Anecdotes with 
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guidance that courts deciding patent cases can still glean from a close 
examination of the historical developments that brought forth the 
modern law of punitive damages in tort.32 Indeed, tort law can help 
courts develop a standard for awarding treble damages for patent 
infringement that is more rational than the one currently in place.33 
The need for clarity in this area has not diminished after the 
Supreme Court handed down Halo Electronics, Inc. v. Pulse Electronics, 
Inc., a recent decision addressing treble damages in patent cases.34 
Although it roundly rejected a rigid, multi-part test that the Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit imposed on plaintiffs wishing to obtain 
enhanced damages,35 the Supreme Court seemingly equivocated with 
respect to the approach that is to take the place of the discarded rule. 
The Court did offer some guidance: after looking to several old 
precedents, it focused on the punishment rationale of enhanced patent 
damages. The Court explained that such awards are reserved for 
“egregious cases typified by willful misconduct”36 and for infringer 
conduct that is “willful, wanton, malicious, bad-faith, deliberate, 
consciously wrongful, flagrant, or — indeed — characteristic of a 
pirate.”37 Nonetheless, the Court also held that such damages are 
available for a “full range of culpable behavior”38 that, in addition to 
the epithets quoted in the previous sentence, also encompasses the 
elusive mental state called “recklessness.”39 What are we to make of 
 
Empirical Data, 78 IOWA L. REV. 1 (1992); Schwartz, supra note 27; Anthony J. Sebok, 
Punitive Damages: From Myth to Theory, 92 IOWA L. REV. 957 (2007); Anthony J. 
Sebok, What Did Punitive Damages Do? Why Misunderstanding the History of Punitive 
Damages Matters Today, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 163 (2003) [hereinafter Sebok, What 
Did Punitive Damages Do?]; Sharkey, Economic Analysis of Punitive Damages, supra 
note 3; Catherine M. Sharkey, Punitive Damages as Societal Damages, 113 YALE L.J. 
347, 357 (2003) [hereinafter Sharkey, Punitive Damages as Societal Damages]; 
Benjamin C. Zipursky, A Theory of Punitive Damages, 84 TEX. L. REV. 105 (2005). 
 32 See infra Part II. 
 33 See infra Part III. 
 34 136 S. Ct. 1923 (2016). 
 35 Id. at 1934. The Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction over cases that arise 
under the Patent Act. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (2018).  
 36 Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1933-34. 
 37 Id. at 1932. 
 38 Id. at 1933. 
 39 Id. at 1933. For representative work on recklessness in the law, see generally 
FINDLAY STARK, CULPABLE CARELESSNESS: RECKLESSNESS AND NEGLIGENCE IN THE CRIMINAL 
LAW (2016); Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Opaque Recklessness, 91 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 597 (2001) (analyzing culpability in cases when the defendant was 
unaware of reasons why the conduct at issue was dangerous); Geoffrey Christopher 
Rapp, The Wreckage of Recklessness, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 111 (2008) (discussing 
modern courts’ continued struggles with recklessness); Kenneth W. Simons, 
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this apparent divergence, and what does it mean for enhanced 
damages in patent law going forward? In this Article, I draw on tort 
underpinnings of the Halo opinion in search for an answer. 
The answer that tort law points to, and which I will explore in this 
Article, differs in significant respects from that given by the Federal 
Circuit in the months following Halo. Specifically, the Federal Circuit 
has adhered to its pre-Halo rule that a victorious patent plaintiff 
cannot receive damages beyond the compensatory baseline unless it 
can prove, at a minimum, that the defendant had actual knowledge of 
the patent-in-suit.40 Apparently, nothing less will suffice — not even 
so-called “willful blindness”41 or constructive knowledge42 that might 
be imputed based on,43 for example, the fact that the infringer copied a 
product marked with a notation that a patent application with claims 
covering the product is on file,44 or even with an actual patent 
number.45 The lower courts, to be sure, have followed Halo’s teachings 
to the extent of allowing plaintiffs to prove up willful infringement by 
showing that the defendant behaved recklessly or in bad faith based, 
for example, on a failure to develop a theory of noninfringement or 
 
Rethinking Mental States, 72 B.U. L. REV. 463 (1992) [hereinafter Simons, Rethinking 
Mental States] (providing a taxonomy of different kinds of recklessness). 
 40 See WBIP, LLC v. Kohler Co., 829 F.3d 1317, 1341-42 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
 41 Glob.-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 563 U.S. 754, 766 (2011). 
 42 See 58 AM. JUR. 2D NOTICE § 4 (2015) (explaining that “[a]ctual notice rests 
upon personal information or knowledge while constructive notice is notice that the 
law imputes to a person not having personal information or knowledge”). 
 43 A different issue implicating imputation arises when plaintiffs claim willful 
infringement and courts must determine whether actual knowledge of a patent by a 
low-level employee could be attributed to the corporate defendant. See generally 
Robert O. Bolan & William C. Rooklidge, Imputing Knowledge to Determine Willful 
Infringement, 24 AIPLA Q.J. 157 (1996). In this Article, though, I focus on whether 
(and when) the corporate defendant can be charged with willful infringement when 
the patent-in-suit was not actually known to any corporate employees (e.g., under 
willful blindness or recklessness principles).  
 44 State Indus., Inc. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 751 F.2d 1226, 1236 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
 45 Imonex Servs., Inc. v. W.H. Munzprufer Dietmar Trenner GmbH, 408 F.3d 
1374, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2005); see Christopher A. Harkins, A Budding Theory of Willful 
Patent Infringement: Orange Books, Colored Pills, and Greener Verdicts, 6 DUKE L. & 
TECH. REV. 1, 25 (2007) (challenging the Federal Circuit’s actual knowledge rule in a 
specific regulatory context and maintaining that “[i]f precautions by a defendant are 
intentionally deficient, then courts ought to adjust accountability, not to deny the 
opportunity to prove willfulness altogether”); see also Michael J. McKeon, The Patent 
Marking and Notice Statute: A Question of “Fact” or “Act”?, 9 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 429, 
436 (1996) (contrasting notice requirements for obtaining compensatory damages 
under 35 U.S.C. § 287(a), which requires a plaintiff to mark a product with a patent 
number, with those for obtaining enhanced damages under 35 U.S.C. § 284). 
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invalidity after learning of the patent.46 But that analysis is done with 
respect to specific patents whose existence the infringer actually knew 
about — and the possibility of treble damages arises only for the time 
period that the infringer possessed that knowledge. 
Intuitively, this rule seems questionable. After all, just as one can be 
reckless with respect to patents of which one is aware, one can also be 
reckless in failing to learn about the existence of a particular patent in 
the first place.47 More generally, the very idea of drawing a line at 
actual knowledge is strange. As courts have recognized even in patent 
cases dealing with the related issue of mental states for indirect 
infringement, willful blindness is legally equivalent to actual 
knowledge, and the basic concept of imputed or constructive 
knowledge appears throughout the law.48 Based on general legal 
principles, then, some forms of “ignorance”49 could be sufficiently 
“egregious” within the meaning of Halo as to exhibit “willful 
misconduct.”50 
In this Article, I examine where actual knowledge of the patent as a 
trigger for treble damages comes from, and probe whether it is 
consistent with the goals of the patent system. I conclude that the 
elevated status of this subjective mental state can be traced to the tort 
law standard for punitive damages prevalent in the nineteenth century 
and demonstrate that today, it is anachronistic.51 A study of the early 
history of punitive damages in tort reveals a key goal of sanctioning, 
and perhaps ensuring full compensation for unquantifiable (e.g., 
dignitary) injuries caused by,52 reprehensible interpersonal behaviors 
 
 46 See WesternGeco L.L.C. v. ION Geophysical Corp., 837 F.3d 1358, 1362-63 
(Fed. Cir. 2016) (discussing “subjective willfulness” and “objective reasonableness” as 
possible routes to proving up the level of scienter needed to recover enhanced 
damages for infringement of a known patent), cert. granted on other grounds, 138 S. Ct. 
734 (2018). 
 47 See Alexander F. Sarch, Beyond Willful Ignorance, 88 U. COLO. L. REV. 97, 138-52 
(2017) (discussing the concept of reckless ignorance).  
 48 See supra notes 41–43 and accompanying text.  
 49 Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1928 (2016) (citation 
omitted). 
 50 Id. at 1934. 
 51 See infra Part II; cf. Seymour v. McCormick, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 480, 488 (1854) 
(applying contemporary tort law principles to enhanced damages under the patent 
damages section then in force). 
 52 See Sebok, What Did Punitive Damages Do?, supra note 31, at 200. Professor Sebok 
explained, though, that the harms that punitive damages could “compensate” for in the 
nineteenth century are different from compensable emotional distress as it is conceived 
of today. Id. at 204-05; cf. Molzof v. United States, 502 U.S. 301, 306-07, 309-10 (1992) 
(tracing the goals of punitive damages throughout the history of tort law). 
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revealing the defendant’s extreme disregard for the rights of a specific 
victim. Examples include actions for assault, defamation, seduction, 
and other “insults,” with early tort law playing the criminal-law-like 
functions of providing an avenue for retribution of the wronged victim 
and preserving the public order.53 Given these goals, an enhanced 
damages standard concentrated on the defendant’s subjective 
culpability makes sense.54 
While tort cases today still allow for punitive damages for 
intentional or knowing misconduct directed toward individual 
targets,55 they also — in line with the admittedly limited guidance in 
Halo — award such damages for reckless indifference toward the 
rights of others generally. A more objective “reason to know”-type 
standard and its cognates have been added to the list of mental states 
that can make a defendant eligible for punitive damages.56 Awareness 
of a specific victim, or actual knowledge that harm will eventuate to 
someone in particular, is no longer absolutely required to increase 
damages from the compensatory baseline.57 Particularly in tort cases 
with corporate defendants, such as those involving products liability, 
punitive damages have been assessed for failures to discover hidden 
effects and for other reckless omissions that expose people in the 
world at large to probable injuries.58 In some cases, this calculus has 
justified enhanced damages awards when the defendant did not 
adequately test a product before putting it out on the market.59 In all, 
the scope of punitive damages in tort has expanded from actual 
knowledge and intent to imputed knowledge and recklessness, and 
from victim specificity to non-specificity.60 
These shifts can be difficult to explain and theorize in a definitive 
manner, and extensive literature on punitive damages reflects great 
 
 53 See infra Section II.B.1. 
 54 See generally David G. Owen, The Moral Foundations of Punitive Damages, 40 
ALA. L. REV. 705 (1989).  
 55 See, e.g., Bailey v. Graves, 309 N.W.2d 166, 169 (Mich. 1981) (allowing 
punitive damages in an intentional tort case upon proof of some aggravation beyond 
the elements of the tort itself); Burnett v. Griffith, 769 S.W.2d 780, 787-90 (Mo. 1989) 
(similar). 
 56 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500 (AM. LAW INST. 1965).  
 57 See infra Section II.B.2. 
 58 Victor E. Schwartz et al., Reining in Punitive Damages “Run Wild”: Proposals for 
Reform by Courts and Legislatures, 65 BROOK. L. REV. 1003, 1008 (1999) (“Beginning in 
the late 1960s, American courts began to depart radically from the historical 
‘intentional tort’ moorings of punitive damages.”). 
 59 See infra notes 405–06 and accompanying text. 
 60 See generally infra Part II.  
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complexity of this area of law.61 But to some degree, the greater role of 
somewhat more objective inquiries in punitive damages 
determinations today, as opposed to the nineteenth century, must 
reflect tort law’s increasing preoccupation with economic analysis over 
time.62 Indeed, while the modern law of punitive damages is not in 
line with economic models by a long shot,63 some scholars have 
argued that the evolving standards for punitive damages have, in 
recent times, at least shifted somewhat toward serving “the efficiency-
based goal of economic deterrence.”64 In some products liability cases 
in particular, courts have framed punitive damages inquiries in 
explicitly economic terms, addressing cost-optimization and balancing 
precautions against the risks and gravity of harm, and giving only 
limited weight to the defendant’s subjective mental state.65 Courts’ 
changing treatment of punitive damages is in line with the observation 
that “objective standards are endemic in tort law, and the cases 
generally insist on their superiority to subjective standards.”66 
In contrast, the older, narrower conception of punitive damages 
focused mainly on intent and other subjective factors and reflected 
primarily moral, rather than economic, considerations. Although 
modern commentators have developed post-hoc economic 
justifications for awarding punitive damages for intentional torts,67 it 
remains difficult to resist the conclusion that liability based on 
subjective culpability fits uneasily into economic models of law.68 
 
 61 See supra note 31. 
 62 See infra Section II.C.  
 63 See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 31, at 873; see also Sergey Budylin, Punitive 
Damages as a Social Harm Measure: Economic Analysis Continues, 31 OKLA. CITY U. L. 
REV. 457, 458 (2006) (“[T]here seems to be no clear-cut economic way to either 
define the notion of reprehensibility, or, most importantly, to calculate the optimal 
amount of punitive damages.”).  
 64 Sharkey, Punitive Damages as Societal Damages, supra note 31, at 450; see also 
Ariel Porat, Misalignments in Tort Law, 121 YALE L.J. 82, 95-96 (2011) (explaining 
how the “reprehensibility” criterion for constitutional limits on punitive damages 
could serve an economic function); Jill Wieber Lens, An Undetectable Constitutional 
Violation, 106 KY. L.J. (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 14-15), https://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=3006036 (similar). 
 65 See, e.g., Thiry v. Armstrong World Indus., 661 P.2d 515, 518-20 (Okla. 1983). 
 66 Gregory C. Keating, Reasonableness and Rationality in Negligence Theory, 48 
STAN. L. REV. 311, 339 (1996). 
 67 See Hylton, Economic Theory of Penalties, supra note 31, at 456-58; William M. 
Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of Intentional Torts, 1 INT’L REV. L. & 
ECON. 127, 127 (1981); see also Grady, supra note 31, at 1200; Richard A. Posner, An 
Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1193, 1199 (1985).  
 68 See Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr., An Economic Theory of Intentional Torts: A Comment, 3 
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Consistent with this intuition, statements from nineteenth-century 
decisions allowing enhanced damages brimmed with moral 
opprobrium for subjectively bad behaviors, and said nothing about 
economic considerations.69 
In view of this brief tort background, the weight given to the 
subjective mental state of actual knowledge for enhanced damages in 
patent infringement cases is difficult to countenance. Although there 
are prominent dissenting voices,70 “[t]here is widespread agreement 
that the reason we have a patent system is utilitarian,”71 and, 
particularly, economic-utilitarian. This orientation of patent law 
suggests that, in addition to sanctioning subjectively culpable 
behaviors, courts in patent cases should — as in tort cases — 
sometimes award enhanced damages for failings that reflect more 
objective forms of blameworthiness, such as reckless failures to search 
for relevant patents. But this intuition is not reflected in the Federal 
Circuit’s standard for enhanced damages post-Halo. Patent law today 
deviates from modern tort law by requiring actual, subjective 
knowledge of the plaintiff’s patent72 and, in so doing, it in effect clings 
 
INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 45, 49-53 (1983) (exposing flaws in the Landes-Posner theory 
and criticizing their 1981 article for insufficiently accounting for modern 
developments in the law of punitive damages). Of course, sanctions targeting conduct 
accompanied by subjectively culpable mental states can play an economic role of 
deterrence. But, as even Professor Landes and Judge Posner conceded, “‘Intent’ is not a 
normal part of the economist’s vocabulary and does not appear to correspond to any 
concept in economics.” Landes & Posner, supra note 67, at 127. In addition, what 
such sanctions would deter is conduct accompanied by culpable mental states. See also 
Simons, Rethinking Mental States, supra note 39, at 510-11 (“Shavell is more willing 
than Posner to accept that ‘intent to do harm may be associated with the absence of 
social benefits, for . . . society often appears reluctant to value private benefits that are 
based on the enjoyment of harm.’ But this concession only underscores a principal 
problem with his economic approach: can we really define a ‘social harm,’ or specify 
its magnitude, independently of the mental state associated with the harm? A murder 
is a more blameworthy crime than a negligent homicide; it is not simply a killing that 
is more difficult to deter, therefore requiring a higher sanction.” (quoting Steven 
Shavell, Criminal Law and the Optimal Use of Nonmonetary Sanctions as a Deterrent, 85 
COLUM. L. REV. 1232, 1248 (1985))). 
 69 See, e.g., Hawk v. Ridgway, 33 Ill. 473, 475 (1864) (citing Foot v. Nichols, 28 
Ill. 486, 488 (1862)); McWilliams v. Bragg, 3 Wis. 424, 430-31 (1854). 
 70 See, e.g., ROBERT P. MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 41 (2011) 
(advocating an approach to intellectual property rooted in moral, labor-theory 
foundations). 
 71 David S. Olson, Taking the Utilitarian Basis for Patent Law Seriously: The Case 
for Restricting Patentable Subject Material, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 181, 182 (2009). See 
generally Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. 
REV. 1031 (2005).  
 72 See supra notes 40–45 and accompanying text.  
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to the old interpersonal-animus and moral-opprobrium models of 
punitive damages. If anything, eligibility for treble damages in patent 
law is determined based on the standard resembling one that courts 
have today adopted for criminal, as opposed to civil, recklessness.73 
In this Article, I argue that this is a problem for several reasons. 
First, the actual-knowledge limit seems to be a failure of statutory 
interpretation. Relying on Supreme Court cases that dealt with the 
question of the proper mental state for punitive damages in other 
contexts, I argue that it is unlikely that Congress intended for courts 
today to look to the nineteenth-century standard for tort punitive 
damages when figuring eligibility for treble damages in patent cases.74 
It is significantly more probable that Congress would have expected 
for courts to modify mental-state standards for treble damages along 
with evolving tort standards, rather than keep them frozen in time. In 
addition, the fact that total damages in patent cases are capped at a 
maximum of treble the compensatory damages, rather than uncapped, 
further points to the fact that civil recklessness, as opposed to more 
culpable mental states like criminal recklessness and beyond, should 
be the threshold of eligibility for such damages.75 Accordingly, I 
maintain that the “generalized recklessness toward the rights of 
others” standard for enhanced damages in patent cases reflects a better 
interpretation of the Patent Act than the current one, which can be 
characterized as “recklessness or intent with respect to infringement of 
specific known patents.” The former is the standard that I propose and 
develop in this Article.76 As I will show, this standard would result in a 
recalibration of enhanced damages, allowing for such awards in some 
cases in which they are not possible under the present approach, but 
also rendering defendants ineligible for them under some 
circumstances in which enhanced liability is allowed today.77 
A second, closely related point is that acceptance of the modern tort 
standard in patent law would heed the Supreme Court’s general 
guidance that patent law is not to be an outlier that adopts rules that 
 
 73 See infra Section II.B.2. Other commentators have, likewise, criticized the 
incoherency of focusing on morally-grounded criminal-style standards for corporate 
acts constituting patent infringement, and questioned the very idea of subjective 
culpability in this setting. See generally Rantanen, An Objective View, supra note 15; 
Jacob S. Sherkow, Patent Infringement as Criminal Conduct, 19 MICH. TELECOMM. & 
TECH. L. REV. 1 (2012). 
 74 See infra Section II.A. 
 75 See infra Section I.B.2. 
 76 See infra Part III.  
 77 See infra Section III.C. 
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are exceptional or disconnected from the larger legal system,78 and the 
specific guidance that trial courts must be allowed to exercise 
discretion in awarding enhanced damages.79 As to the former, 
although at times the Federal Circuit appeared to look to non-patent 
sources when it adopted a standard for treble damages that it called 
“objective recklessness,”80 the Federal Circuit’s version did not 
actually resemble what objective recklessness looks like in other areas 
of law.81 As to the latter, the actual knowledge threshold looks like a 
rigid rule of the sort that, as the Supreme Court told us in Halo, the 
Federal Circuit should generally avoid.82 Under a more flexible 
approach, courts can, for example, allow juries to base their willful 
infringement decisions on the characteristics of the industry in which 
the parties operate, whether the infringement is concealed or open, 
and other factors that allow for awards of enhanced damages in 
economically justifiable scenarios.83 This result would follow the 
guidance Halo, which sought — consistent with other areas of law84 — 
to increase the range of the trial courts’ discretion in awarding treble 
damages. 
Third, if one accepts the proposition — not uncontroversial, to be 
sure — that punitive damages in tort today reflect economic analysis 
to a greater extent than they did in the nineteenth century,85 then 
perhaps policy reasons also support the conclusion that patent law 
should give up exclusive reliance on the old tort standard and 
incorporate the modern approach into doctrine. As noted above, the 
moral opprobrium model of punitive damages is an uneasy fit for 
patent law, so it is no surprise that reliance on that model has led to 
results that are inconsistent with the utilitarian goals of the patent 
system. For example, because it sometimes discourages firms from 
searching for and reading relevant patents, the Federal Circuit’s actual-
knowledge framework is opposed to the patent law’s fundamental 
 
 78 See supra note 16. 
 79 Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1931-34 (2016). 
 80 In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc), 
abrogated by Halo, 136 S. Ct. 1923. 
 81 See infra Section II.B. 
 82 Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1934-35. 
 83 See infra Part III.  
 84 In particular, the Court made clear that the Seagate standard was an outlier in 
allowing litigation-created defenses as an escape hatch from liability for enhanced 
damages. Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1933. 
 85 See infra Section II.C.  
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purpose of encouragement of dissemination and disclosure of 
information.86 
Worse yet, and in tension with notions of fundamental fairness, the 
current rule can treat potential infringers who make good-faith 
attempts to ascertain the nature of the patent landscape in the fields 
where they operate — by, for example, looking for patents that they 
may be infringing in the United States Patent and Trademark Office 
(“PTO”) database — less favorably than those that decide to bury their 
heads in the sand and do no patent searching whatsoever.87 Because 
the current rule effectively rewards firms for refusing to search for 
patents, it can promote socially wasteful behaviors of holdout and 
“contractual bypass,”88 which entail infringers’ avoidance of 
negotiation with patentees, and in turn leads to undesirable reliance 
on litigation. Of course, extensive patent searching would not be 
socially efficient for all industries and in all contexts, which is yet 
another reason for courts to take industry characteristics (and other 
relevant factors) into account when deciding whether the infringer’s 
non-search was reckless enough to justify eligibility for an award of 
treble damages. Under my proposed standard, courts can do so. 
The remainder of the Article proceeds in five parts. Part I traces the 
development of enhanced damages standards in patent law and 
pinpoints how the misguided actual knowledge rule was adopted. It 
catalogues the problems with this rule and notes that, although Halo 
carried the potential of resetting the jurisprudence of enhanced 
damages, lower courts continue to adhere to the old approach. Part II 
begins by situating the role of common-law principles in matters of 
interpretation of federal statutes, and then discusses how tort law and 
other areas of civil litigation deal with supra-compensatory damages 
with an eye to what patent law can (and should) learn from them. In 
particular, this Part describes the move toward objective standards of 
culpability for enhanced damages throughout the law. Part III returns 
to patent law, applying this learning and providing an approach for 
implementing the recklessness standard for treble damages in patent 
infringement cases. This Part shows that, if courts take industry 
 
 86 See infra Section I.E.1. But see Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Who Reads Patents?, 35 
NATURE BIOTECH. 421, 421 (2017) [hereinafter Ouellette, Who Reads Patents?] 
(providing empirical evidence that few researchers in biotechnology and chemistry 
fields are deterred from reading patents by the threat of legal liability).  
 87 See infra Section I.E.2. 
 88 Haddock et al., supra note 31, at 17-18, 27; see also Michael Abramowicz, A 
Unified Economic Theory of Noninfringement Opinions, 14 FED. CIR. B.J. 241, 281-84 
(2004).  
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characteristics and other economic factors into account in setting the 
standard for enhanced damages, willful infringement doctrine will 
more effectively serve the patent law’s goal of promoting innovation 
than under the current rule. Further, this Part supplies the procedural 
mechanics of this Article’s proposal, clarifying the allocation of power 
between judges and juries in the enhanced damages determination. 
Part IV addresses several objections, including administrative costs of 
the proposal, concerns about overdeterrence, and skepticism about 
whether the harms of patent infringement justify enhanced damages 
awards. The Article then concludes. 
I. ENHANCED DAMAGES IN PATENT LAW: HISTORY, DOCTRINAL 
DEVELOPMENT, AND PROBLEMS 
Section 284, the damages section of the Patent Act, is exceedingly 
simple. Among other things, it says that “upon finding for the 
claimant the court shall award the claimant damages adequate to 
compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than a 
reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention by the infringer,” 
and that “[i]n either event the court may increase the damages up to 
three times the amount found or assessed.”89 The former provision 
authorizes awards of compensatory damages and the latter, supra-
compensatory damages up to an amount equal to three times the 
compensatory baseline. The statute is silent with respect to the 
purpose of supra-compensatory damages — are they punitive, or do 
they have another role? — and it does not say what showings, in 
addition to those needed to recover compensatory damages, are 
required.90 Therefore, the answers to these questions had to be worked 
out by courts.91 
 
 89 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2018). 
 90 Note that liability for direct patent infringement is a form of strict liability, 
which means that the plaintiff is not required to provide any proof of the defendant’s 
culpable mental state to recover compensatory damages. See Hilton Davis Chem. Co. 
v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1523 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), rev’d on 
other grounds, 520 U.S. 17 (1997); cf. Oswald, supra note 15, at 1013-14 (criticizing 
this nomenclature). 
 91 Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 780 F.3d 1357, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2015) 
(Taranto, J., concurring in denial of rehearing en banc) (“Section 284 is close to 
content free in what it expressly says about enhanced damages . . . .”). 
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A. Halo’s Tort Underpinnings: Treble Damages as Punitive Damages 
In some early iterations of the Patent Act, treble damages were 
mandatory.92 The Patent Act of 1836 changed this rule, declaring that 
“it shall be in the power of the court to render judgment for any sum 
above the amount found by such verdict as the actual damages 
sustained by the plaintiff, not exceeding three times the amount 
thereof, according to the circumstances of the case.”93 Whatever the 
purpose of the enhanced damages provision of the Patent Act, its 
language has not changed much since 1836. As explained by Matthew 
Powers and Steven Carlson, “[s]ubsequent amendments to the patent 
laws maintained the provision of the Patent Act of 1836 that trial 
judges should have the discretion to increase a damages award by up 
to three times the jury verdict.”94 There were other important changes 
to the damages section of the Patent Act — for example, Congress in 
1946 eliminated accounting as a potential measure of damages — but 
the permissive language with respect to monetary enhancements 
beyond compensatory damages remained throughout.95 Importantly, 
one early version of the patent damages section stated that “the court 
shall have the same power to increase such damages, in its discretion, 
as is given to increase the damages found by verdicts in actions in the 
nature of actions of trespass upon the case,”96 thus explicitly tying 
patent suits to tort-type actions claiming money damages.97 Although 
this specific language was removed in 1946, there is no evidence that 
 
 92 Patent Act of Feb. 21, 1793, ch. 11, § 5, 1 Stat. 318, 322 (stating that the 
infringer “shall forfeit and pay to the patentee, a sum, that shall be at least equal to 
three times the price, for which the patentee has usually sold or licensed to other 
persons, the use of the said invention”); see also Act of Apr. 17, 1800, ch. 25, § 3, 2 
Stat. 37, 38; Matthew D. Powers & Steven C. Carlson, The Evolution and Impact of the 
Doctrine of Willful Patent Infringement, 51 SYRACUSE L. REV. 53, 66-68 (2001); Jon E. 
Wright, Comment, Willful Patent Infringement and Enhanced Damages — Evolution and 
Analysis, 10 GEO. MASON L. REV. 97, 99-100 (2001). But see Patent Act of Apr. 10, 
1790, ch. 7, § 4, 1 Stat. 109 (repealed 1793) (referring only to “such damages as shall 
be assessed by a jury” without any mention of trebling). 
 93 Patent Act of July 4, 1836, ch. 357, § 14, 5 Stat. 117, 123.  
 94 Powers & Carlson, supra note 92, at 66. 
 95 See Act of Aug. 1, 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-587, 60 Stat. 778. 
 96 Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 55, 16 Stat. 198, 206 (codified at REV. STAT. 
§ 4921, U.S. COMP. STAT. 1901, p. 3395); see also Birdsall v. Coolidge, 93 U.S. 64, 69 
(1876). 
 97 See Oswald, supra note 15, at 1000-01 (describing the role of the writs of 
trespass and trespass on the case in the development of modern tort law and noting 
the connection between the trespass writs and patent infringement). Trespass on the 
case is considered to be the precursor to the modern tort of negligence. See also Brown 
v. Kendall, 60 Mass. 292, 295 (1850). 
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Congress sought to sever the connection between patent infringement 
remedies and remedies for trespass.98 
The very first Supreme Court case to interpret the permissive-
enhancement amendment to the formerly mandatory treble damages 
provision, Hogg v. Emerson, assumed that treble damages still 
represented the baseline award, but noted that “a fair ground existed 
for a mitigation below that amount, if the maker of the [infringing] 
machine appeared in truth to be ignorant of the existence of the patent 
right, and did not intend any infringement.”99 This language strongly 
implies that the responsibility of showing that no enhanced damages 
are due rests with the defendant, who could avoid treble damages by 
demonstrating that the infringement was innocent or at least 
unintentional. Although Hogg has never been explicitly overruled, the 
judicial attitude has changed, and the burden is now on the patentee 
to show entitlement to enhanced damages.100 
Another key early case to address treble damages for patent 
infringement, and one on which Halo relied to a significant degree, 
was Seymour v. McCormick.101 The Court in Seymour opined that the 
pre-1836 rule mandating the trebling of damages no matter what the 
circumstances was “manifestly unjust,” for it subjected to the “same 
penalty” both “the defendant who acted in ignorance or good faith” 
and “the wanton and malicious pirate.”102 The Court then held that 
“where the injury is wanton or malicious, a jury may inflict vindictive 
or exemplary damages, not to recompense the plaintiff, but to punish 
the defendant.”103 Seymour cited no authority for this conclusion, but 
the phrases the Court used are telling. The rhetoric reveals an 
 
 98 See Recovery in Patent Infringement Suits: Hearing on H.R. 5231, supra note 17, at 
9 (statement of Mr. Conder C. Henry, Assistant Commissioner of Patents) (“[The bill] 
provides that the court can increase the damages in its discretion in the same manner 
as it is given to increase the damages found by verdicts in actions in the nature of 
actions of trespass upon the case. This, though, is not a new provision since it is in the 
present law.”). 
 99 52 U.S. 587, 607 (1850) (emphasis added). 
 100 See Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1934 (2016); cf. 
Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337, 
1349-50 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en banc) (Dyk, J., concurring-in-part and dissenting-in-
part) (contending, but without citing Hogg, that the pre-Seagate approach to 
willfulness at the Federal Circuit contravened Supreme Court precedent by essentially 
shifting the burden to defendants who have learned of a patent to avoid liability for 
treble damages).  
 101 57 U.S. (16 How.) 480 (1854). 
 102 Id. at 488. 
 103 Id. at 489. 
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unmistakable connection between treble damages in patent law and 
punitive damages in tort. 
The Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors, for example, used similar 
linguistic formulations in Linsley v. Bushnell,104 an action involving 
trespass on the case. The court noted “that vindictive damages, or 
smart money, may be, and is, awarded, by the verdicts of juries, in 
cases of wanton or malicious injuries.”105 Such rhetoric, including a 
reference to “smart money” and an explicit nod to the common law, 
was also used by the United States Supreme Court itself just three 
years before Seymour in Day v. Woodworth.106 In addition, describing 
the principles the courts relied on in Day, Seymour, and Linsley in 
somewhat more contemporary-sounding language, Theodore 
Sedgwick situated enhanced damages in civil litigation in his leading 
contemporary treatise on damages as follows: 
[I]n all cases of civil injury, or breach of contract, with the 
exception of those cases of trespasses or torts, accompanied by 
oppression, fraud, malice, or negligence so gross as to raise the 
presumption of malice, where the jury have a discretion to 
award exemplary or vindictive damages; in all other cases the 
declared object is to give compensation to the party injured, 
for the actual loss sustained.107 
Fast forward to 2016. As in the early cases, the Supreme Court in 
Halo v. Pulse was faced with the question of standards for the exercise 
of trial court discretion to enhance damages in patent cases, aiming to 
set limits on that decision because, as the Court succinctly explained, 
“discretion is not whim.”108 The Court in Halo trained its focus on the 
nineteenth-century framework, relying heavily on Seymour and 
adopting a decidedly tort-style punitive damages conception of 
enhanced damages in patent law. Indeed, some of the language that 
the Court chose to describe behaviors that qualify for treble damages 
is not very different from that found in the sources from the 1840s and 
1850s quoted earlier: 
 
 104 15 Conn. 225 (1842). 
 105 Id. at 236. 
 106 54 U.S. (13 How.) 363, 371 (1851). 
 107 THEODORE SEDGWICK, A TREATISE ON THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES, OR AN INQUIRY 
INTO THE PRINCIPLES WHICH GOVERN THE AMOUNT OF COMPENSATION RECOVERED IN SUITS 
AT LAW 27-28 (1847) (emphasis added).  
 108 Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1931 (2016) (citations 
and alterations omitted). 
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Awards of enhanced damages . . . are . . . designed as a 
“punitive” or “vindictive” sanction for egregious infringement 
behavior. The sort of conduct warranting enhanced damages 
has been variously described in our cases as willful, wanton, 
malicious, bad-faith, deliberate, consciously wrongful, 
flagrant, or — indeed — characteristic of a pirate.109 
This string of epithets links treble damages in patent cases to 
punitive damages in tort, and seems to reflect nineteenth-century 
emphasis on awarding such damages for conduct accompanied by 
subjectively bad mental states.110 But there is more to the Halo 
opinion. For example, the Court stated that “Section 284 allows 
district courts to punish the full range of culpable behavior” and 
“eschew[ed] any rigid formula for awarding enhanced damages under 
§ 284.”111 Moreover, the Court noted that “‘willfully’ is a word of 
many meanings whose construction is often dependent on the context 
in which it appears.”112 Elaborating on the meaning of willfulness, the 
Court mentioned the recklessness standard for awarding punitive 
damages, quoting the Restatement of Torts formulation stating that “a 
person is reckless if he acts ‘knowing or having reason to know of facts 
which would lead a reasonable man to realize’ his actions are 
unreasonably risky.”113 The Court, unfortunately, did not say much 
more about recklessness. 
Given the Court’s limited discussion of what it means to be reckless, 
a detailed analysis of tort law sources and other non-patent precedents 
is necessary to flesh out how the standard works. In spite of Halo’s 
extensive reliance on Seymour, that early case alone cannot give us a 
full understanding of Halo because “[r]ecklessness was not a word in 
the common law’s standard lexicon, nor an idea in its conceptual 
framework; only in the mid- to late-1800’s did courts begin to address 
reckless behavior in those terms.”114 To build up a conception of 
 
 109 Id. at 1932. 
 110 See Michael Feldman & Mark A. Lemley, “Characteristic of a Pirate”: Willfulness and 
Treble Damages (Stanford Pub. Law, Working Paper No. 2811773, 2016), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2811773; see also Karen Sandrik, Punishing the Malicious Pirate in 
Patent Law, 36 REV. LITIG. (forthcoming 2018), https://static1.squarespace.com/static/ 
54c31bf9e4b02f4c0b4203e6/t/5a45b7cc0852292beed21203/1514518488638/Sandrik_draft
.pdf (analyzing Halo’s focus on deliberate wrongdoing). 
 111 Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1933-34 (emphasis added). 
 112 Id. at 1933 n.* (quoting Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 57 (2007)). 
 113 Id. at 1933 (quoting Safeco, 551 U.S. at 69 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 500 (AM. LAW INST. 1965))). 
 114 Voisine v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2272, 2281 (2016). 
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recklessness relevant for interpreting Halo, I examine modern 
developments in the law of enhanced damages in Part II, but the 
remainder of Part I continues focusing on patent law so as to provide 
additional context for that more general discussion of mental state 
standards for awarding supra-compensatory damages in civil litigation. 
In particular, sections I.C through I.E are intended to reveal the full 
complexity of patent law’s treatment of treble damages over the years, 
to explain the framework that the Supreme Court in Halo rejected and 
the rule that the Court put in its place, and to sketch out and critique 
the Federal Circuit’s approach to treble damages in Halo’s wake. In the 
section that immediately follows, though, I examine some rationales 
for treble damages that Halo apparently discarded, and take a short 
detour into other areas of law to address the significance of the cap on 
supra-compensatory damages in patent law. 
B. Can Multiple Damages Have a Role Other than Punishment for 
Egregious Infringement? A Look at Alternative Approaches and the Role of 
the Cap 
1. Litigation-sanction and Quasi-remedial Roles of Multiple 
Damages 
Halo’s tenor is to treat treble damages in patent law as punishment 
for the infringement. But history reveals some alternative conceptions. 
For example, a significant line of precedent leading up to Halo 
suggested that enhanced damages in patent cases can play the role of 
sanctioning vexatious litigation conduct. In Day v. Woodworth, for 
example, the Supreme Court noted that damages might be increased in 
a patent case when the defendant “has been stubbornly litigious, or 
has caused unnecessary expense and trouble to the plaintiff.”115 To a 
similar effect was Clark v. Wooster, in which the Court opined that 
“the expense and trouble the plaintiff has been put to by the 
defendant, and any special inconvenience he has suffered from the 
wrongful acts of the defendant” could be remedied “by the court 
under the authority given to it to increase the damages.”116 The Halo 
Court, however, rejected such conceptions of enhanced damages in 
patent law. Specifically, it explained that monetary awards in 
connection with the infringer’s bad-faith litigation conduct are now 
 
 115 54 U.S. (13 How.) 363, 372 (1851).  
 116 119 U.S. 322, 326 (1886). 
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primarily the province of 35 U.S.C. § 285, the attorney’s fees section of 
the Patent Act.117 
The references to the plaintiff’s “expense and trouble” in Day and 
Clark — and particularly in Clark, which actually does not mention 
any sanctionable litigation behavior, but implies that “wrongful acts of 
the defendant” are simply acts of infringement forcing the patentee to 
litigate the case — also point to quasi-remedial functions of treble 
damages. In other words, treble damages under this view could make 
up for the patentee’s losses associated with having to pursue the case, 
and perhaps to provide for additional consequential damages beyond 
the amount of compensatory damages found by the jury.118 There is 
plenty of precedent for such schemes in civil litigation. For example, 
the Lanham Act provides for permissive treble damages for trademark 
infringement that are explicitly non-punitive.119 But there is no need 
to leave patent law, because courts have characterized patent treble 
damages this way as well. In Stockwell v. United States, a customs case 
decided in 1871, the Supreme Court used patent law as an example of 
a regime in which “a party injured is allowed to recover in a civil 
action double or treble damages” and noted that “[i]t will hardly be 
claimed that these are penal actions requiring the application of 
different rules of evidence from those that prevail in other actions for 
indemnity.”120 This case, not cited in Halo, appeared to take it for 
granted that enhanced damages in patent law are not “penal,” or 
punitive. 
Stockwell is not an outlier. In the middle of the twentieth century, a 
district court in Activated Sludge v. Sanitary District of Chicago, relying 
in part on a nineteenth-century Supreme Court copyright case, 
likewise concluded that the enhanced damages provision of the Patent 
Act is “remedial and not penal.”121 This interpretation was cited with 
 
 117 See Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1929. 
 118 Cf. Judith A. Morse, Treble Damages Under RICO: Characterization and 
Computation, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 526, 528, 528 n.13 (1986) (describing multiple 
damages as compensating for “accumulative harm,” noting that “[w]hile courts refer 
to the award of single damages as actual damages, they are more accurately labeled 
‘legal’ damages” because “[a] plaintiff may suffer actual harm for which the law will 
not provide damages,” and concluding that “accumulative damages compensate 
plaintiffs for actual harm not otherwise recoverable as legal damages”). 
 119 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (2018) (stating that permissive treble damages “shall 
constitute compensation and not a penalty”). 
 120 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 531, 547 (1871). 
 121 64 F. Supp. 25, 35 (N.D. Ill.) (citing Brady v. Daly, 175 U.S. 148 (1899)), aff’d, 
157 F.2d 517 (7th Cir. 1946) (mem.). But see Union Carbide Corp. v. Graver Tank & 
Mfg. Co., 282 F.2d 653, 673-75 (7th Cir. 1960) (making the case that the court in 
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approval in contemporary court decisions and law review articles.122 
For example, a note titled Exemplary Damages in the Law of Torts 
distinguished enhanced damages in patent law from punitive damages 
in tort, noting that “in patent infringement and antitrust cases, in 
which the actual injury to the plaintiff may be significantly more than 
he can establish, double- or treble-damage awards provide the plaintiff 
with a rough measure of compensation for these additional 
injuries.”123 The general idea behind these authorities is that damages 
capped at a small multiple of compensatory damages are still basically 
compensatory, granting some additional damages beyond quantifiable 
compensation for the violation of the right at issue. The mandatory 
treble damages provision of the early Patent Act124 likely reflected this 
attitude.125 
The view that treble damages in patent law can have a compensatory 
function appeared as late as 1981: In Trio Process Corp. v. L. Goldstein’s 
Sons, Inc.,126 the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit explained that 
enhanced damages are not limited to “willfulness,” however defined, 
thereby suggesting an additional, non-punitive function of such 
damages.127 On the facts before it, the court concluded that the 
enhancement was punitive “because of defendant’s bad faith,” but 
made it clear that “the enhancement provision of the statute is 
designed to permit, inter alia, adequate compensation for an 
infringement where strict legal rules would not afford it.”128 In his 
leading treatise on patent law, Professor Donald Chisum addressed 
cases like Activated Sludge and Trio Process, noting that “[w]hether the 
purpose of an increased damage award should be exemplary (i.e., to 
 
Activated Sludge did not actually award enhanced damages). 
 122 See, e.g., Armstrong v. Allen B. Du Mont Labs., Inc., 137 F. Supp. 659, 665 (D. 
Del. 1955) (“The mere fact that Congress has allowed the Court to assess additional 
damages, does not make the cause of action as for a penalty and this is rather clearly 
shown by the statute itself and by a number of adjudicated cases.” (citations 
omitted)); Armstrong v. Emerson Radio & Phonograph Corp., 132 F. Supp. 176, 179 
(S.D.N.Y. 1955) (“Public policy dictates that where the injury is to property, 
intangible aspects of the damage claim which relate to the complexities of our 
industrial society be satisfied by the imposition of additional damages, which though 
in some aspects punitive, are inherently remedial.”). 
 123 Note, Exemplary Damages in the Law of Torts, 70 HARV. L. REV. 517, 521 (1957). 
 124 See supra note 92 and accompanying text. 
 125 See Morse, supra note 118, at 528, 528 n.13; see also Blakey, supra note 3, at 
106-11 & nn.47–51; Hylton, Enhanced Damages for Patent Infringement, supra note 26, 
at 439. 
 126 638 F.2d 661 (3d Cir. 1981). 
 127 See id. at 662-63. 
 128 Id. at 663-64.  
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punish and deter flagrant acts of patent infringement) or 
compensatory (i.e., to compensate the patent owner for immeasurable 
expenses and losses) is a longstanding controversy in the law.”129 
Nonetheless, Halo said little about this line of authority, or the 
controversy described by Professor Chisum.130 
2. Possible Significance of the Cap for Culpability Levels 
Is this history now completely irrelevant in view of Halo’s punitive-
damages orientation? Likely so, but I wish to sound a cautionary note. 
Significant authority suggests that we should still be careful to 
distinguish schemes involving uncapped punitive damages, limited 
only by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,131 
from those that provide for supra-compensatory damages capped at a 
fixed amount or a small multiple of compensatory damages. The idea 
is that damages with an upper limit — and particularly, “multiplier” 
enhanced damages dictated by statute — ensure for at least numerical 
proportionality between compensatory and enhanced damages.132 As a 
result, even if treble damages are not exactly quasi-compensatory, they 
are at least closely tied to compensatory damages and are thus reserved 
for behaviors that are less culpable than those sanctioned by uncapped 
damages.133 
Professor Kenneth Mann captured these intuitions in a well-known 
article. He contended that because supra-compensatory civil sanctions 
constitute the remedial “middle ground” between criminal and civil 
cases, the level of substantive and procedural protections (e.g., 
elevated burdens of proof) for those defending against such sanctions 
should fall somewhere between what is accorded to criminal 
defendants as opposed to defendants in civil cases with only 
compensatory damages at stake.134 Moreover, Professor Mann argued 
 
 129 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 20.03[4][b][iii], at 20-344 (2017).  
 130 But see In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1382-84 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en 
banc) (Gajarsa, J., concurring). 
 131 For the leading case on constitutional limits on uncapped punitive damages, see 
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003). See also BMW of N. 
Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996).  
 132 See supra notes 121–25 and accompanying text; cf. Capitol Records, Inc. v. 
Thomas-Rasset, 692 F.3d 899, 907-09 (8th Cir. 2012) (discussing the proportionality 
concept in the context of statutory damages for copyright infringement).  
 133 For example, Oklahoma imposes caps on punitive damages for reckless 
conduct, but not for intentional conduct. See OKLA. STAT. ANN., tit. 23, § 9.1 (2018); 
see also Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 509 (2008).  
 134 See Kenneth Mann, Punitive Civil Sanctions: The Middleground Between Criminal 
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that the protections should fall on a continuum — the closer to a 
criminal sanction, the greater the protections.135 Because of potential 
exposure to virtually unlimited monetary liability, uncapped punitive 
damages in tort are much closer to criminal sanctions than capped 
damages, such as treble damages.136 Therefore, it stands to reason to 
reserve the highest levels of culpability for defendant’s eligibility for 
damages that are uncapped and subject only to constitutional 
proportionality review.137 
The continuum approach is reflected in states in which the extent of 
exposure to punitive tort damages corresponds to the level of a 
defendant’s culpability. In Arkansas, for example, punitive damages 
for reckless misconduct are capped, but punitive damages for 
intentional tortious acts are not.138 The Supreme Court in Exxon 
Shipping Co. v. Baker,139 a federal admiralty case, endorsed the 
continuum approach as well. The Court concluded that, because the 
behavior at issue was reckless rather than purposeful, the punitive 
damages award had to be capped at the “reasonable limit” of the 1:1 
ratio of compensatory to enhanced damages, but implied that higher 
ratios would be available upon proof of greater culpability.140 Because 
tort cases under the federal admiralty jurisdiction are a matter of 
federal common law, the Court reached this conclusion with no 
statutory guidance as to the maximum permissible magnitude of 
enhanced damages or the standard for awarding them. Following the 
pattern that we will see again,141 the Court relied heavily on state 
common law of punitive damages, and even on state statutes capping 
punitive damages, to fill the gap.142 
It is worth noting in this vein that, under settled interpretations of 
§ 284, a trial judge in a patent case does not have to award full treble 
 
and Civil Law, 101 YALE L.J. 1795, 1799 (1992).  
 135 See id. at 1837-38. 
 136 Although courts had not yet set Due Process limits on the amount of punitive 
damages at the time Professor Mann published his article, see infra notes 476–80 and 
accompanying text, he did explore potential constitutional limitations on civil 
punishment based on the degree of punitiveness, see Mann, supra note 134, at 1842-43.  
 137 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416-18 (2003). 
 138 ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-55-208 (2018). 
 139 Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471 (2008). 
 140 Id. at 510-11. The reckless behavior resulting in the award of punitive damages 
in Exxon involved a tanker captain’s decision to operate the tanker while drunk, 
ultimately causing a collision with a reef off the Alaskan coast and spillage of “millions 
of gallons of crude oil into Prince William Sound.” Id. at 475-79. 
 141 See infra Section II.A. 
 142 Exxon, 554 U.S. at 509-14; see also Baude & Sachs, supra note 15, at 1133-34. 
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damages even if the jury finds that the defendant possessed the 
necessary mental state to make the defendant eligible for them.143 
Treble damages are a ceiling, not a floor, and trial judges can and have 
awarded no enhanced damages, as well as double damages and other, 
fractional multiples after a jury willfulness finding opened the door for 
enhanced damages.144 As I explain in Part III,145 in which I work out 
the details of my proposal, trial courts could adopt the continuum 
model by modulating enhanced-damages sanctions for a “full range of 
culpable behavior”146 depending on, for example, whether the 
infringement was bad-faith or malicious as opposed to merely reckless. 
Under the continuum model, the presence of the multiplier cap, and 
the possibility of modulation of supra-compensatory damages within 
it, reinforces the point that a requirement of proving an elevated level 
of culpability to make a defendant eligible for any enhanced damages 
may not be appropriate.147 In Part II, I provide further support for my 
contention that this is how Halo’s “full range of culpable behavior” 
reference should be understood, but for now I return to patent law to 
sketch out the Federal Circuit’s pre-Halo approach to treble damages. 
C. Treble Damages at the Federal Circuit Before Halo 
1. The Birth of the Actual Knowledge Rule and the “Duty of Care” 
As noted in the previous section, there was a diversity of views with 
respect to whether enhanced damages in patent law were punitive or 
quasi-compensatory, or could possibly play both roles, prior to the 
creation of the Federal Circuit. Given the availability of these potential 
alternatives, the approach in Underwater Devices, Inc. v. Morrison-
Knudsen Co., the Federal Circuit’s first enhanced damages case, leaves 
 
 143 See Grp. One Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 407 F.3d 1297, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 
2005).  
 144 See, e.g., Sociedad Española de Electromedicina y Calidad, S.A. v. Blue Ridge X-
Ray Co., 226 F. Supp. 3d 520, 529-33 (W.D.N.C. 2016), appeal docketed, No. 17-1551 
(Fed. Cir. Jan. 31, 2017); Datascope Corp. v. SMEC, Inc., 14 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1071, 
1074 (D.N.J. 1990) (“A fifty-percent enhancement of damages is appropriate here. 
Although SMEC’s infringement was willful, it was not blatant.”). The Federal Circuit 
held, though, that a trial court should provide convincing reasons for no enhancement 
of damages after a jury finding of willful infringement. Jurgens v. CBK, Ltd., 80 F.3d 
1566, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1996); see also WCM Indus., Inc. v. IPS Corp., Nos. 2016-2211, 
2016-2268, 2018 WL 707803, at *10 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 5, 2018) (nonprecedential). 
 145 See infra Section III.D. 
 146 See Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1933 (2016). 
 147 See Mann, supra note 134, at 1837-38. 
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much to be desired. Without addressing the split of authority on the 
issue, the court simply picked a Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit 
case that assumed that enhanced damages could be awarded only for 
“willful infringement,”148 thus essentially deciding that such damages 
were punitive. The lack of analysis is surprising given that the Federal 
Circuit also relied on Trio Process, and even noted that the Third 
Circuit “concluded that the enhanced portion [of the damages that 
were allowed] was punitive in character”149 on the specific facts of that 
case. Underwater Devices, however, ignored the language from Trio 
Process suggesting that enhanced damages in patent law could serve a 
compensatory purpose.150 
More significant for the goals of this Article, Underwater Devices, 
again without analysis, assumed that “actual notice of another’s patent 
rights”151 was required for enhanced damages. A study of the citation 
chain from Underwater Devices dead-ends in a 1950s district court 
decision which, itself without citation, used the formulation 
“intentional, willful and deliberate.”152 In Part II, I endeavor to show 
that this phrasing, highlighting the significance of subjective mental 
states, is rooted in the nineteenth-century conception of punitive 
damages as sanctioning opprobrious interpersonal behavior, when tort 
law was still much closer to its criminal law roots than it is today.153 
But a tentative point can be made now that, based on the lineage of 
Underwater Devices, the actual knowledge rule as the sine qua non of 
enhanced damages appears to be drawn from that old tort law 
conception. 
Given that proof of subjective mental states is generally challenging, 
the Federal Circuit’s actual knowledge requirement might lead one to 
predict that Underwater Devices would have drawn the scorn of 
plaintiffs in patent cases. But in fact, it was patent defendants who had 
bigger problems with Underwater Devices. This is because this case 
also concluded that awareness of the patent would trigger an 
“affirmative duty . . . to seek and obtain competent legal advice from 
 
 148 Underwater Devices, Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1380, 1389-90 
(Fed. Cir. 1983). 
 149 Id. at 1389 (citing Trio Process Corp. v. L. Goldstein’s Sons, Inc., 638 F.2d 661, 
663 (3d Cir. 1981)). 
 150 See supra notes 126–28 and accompanying text. 
 151 Underwater Devices, 717 F.2d at 1389. 
 152 Bristol Labs., Inc. v. Schenley Labs., Inc., 117 F. Supp. 67, 80, 81 (S.D. Ind. 
1953) (cited in Coleman Co. v. Holly Mfg. Co., 269 F.2d 660, 666 (9th Cir. 1959) 
(cited in Milgo Elec. Corp. v. United Bus. Commc’ns, Inc., 623 F.2d 645, 666 (10th 
Cir. 1980) (cited in Underwater Devices, 717 F.2d at 1389-90))). 
 153 See infra Section II.B.  
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counsel before the initiation of any possible infringing activity.”154 
What is more, juries under this regime were instructed that they could 
draw an adverse inference of willfulness against the infringer if it did 
not produce such an opinion-of-counsel letter.155 
These features of the willfulness doctrine, therefore, forced patent 
defendants to generate significant expenses associated with opinion 
letters to counter claims for enhanced damages.156 Perhaps more 
perniciously, production of the letter would sometimes entail waiver 
of uncertain scope with respect to attorney-client communications 
related to the defendant’s legal positions, potentially even including 
communications with trial as opposed to merely opinion counsel.157 
To avoid waiver in any event, trial and opinion counsel had to be 
rigorously separated, multiplying expenses.158 Numerous 
commentators criticized the “unfair dilemma” of either giving up 
privilege or becoming a presumptive willful infringer, and called for 
the abandonment of the adverse inference rule.159 
Substantively, the Federal Circuit’s guidance with respect to what 
sorts of conduct would fail the “affirmative duty of care” was 
muddled. In one case, the court ruefully noted that “various criteria 
have been stated for determining ‘willful infringement,’”160 and an 
article co-authored by a well-known patent attorney, William Lee, 
referred to a “plethora of willfulness formulations.”161 Some cases 
came close to articulating a negligence-type standard of willful 
infringement (though, to be sure, negligence evaluated with respect to 
a patent whose existence was actually known to the defendant), while 
others appeared to require a higher level of culpability.162 This 
 
 154 Underwater Devices, 717 F.2d at 1390 (emphasis omitted).  
 155 See Kloster Speedsteel AB v. Crucible, Inc., 793 F.2d 1565, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 
1986). 
 156 See Lemley & Tangri, supra note 26, at 1092. 
 157 Cf. In re EchoStar Commc’ns Corp., 448 F.3d 1294, 1300 (Fed. Cir. 2006).  
 158 See generally Christopher A. Harkins, Choosing Between the Advice of Counsel 
Defense to Willful Patent Infringement or the Effective Assistance of Trial Counsel: A 
Bridge or the Troubled Waters?, 5 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 210, 238 (2007). 
 159 See William F. Lee & Lawrence P. Cogswell, III, Understanding and Addressing 
the Unfair Dilemma Created by the Doctrine of Willful Patent Infringement, 41 HOUS. L. 
REV. 393, 419-20 (2004); Lemley & Tangri, supra note 26, at 1115. 
 160 SRI Int’l, Inc. v. Adv. Tech. Labs., Inc., 127 F.3d 1462, 1464-65 (Fed. Cir. 
1997). 
 161 Lee & Cogswell, supra note 159, at 427. 
 162 Compare Graco, Inc. v. Binks Mfg. Co., 60 F.3d 785, 793-94 (Fed. Cir. 1995) 
(addressing reasonableness of the defendant’s reliance on an opinion letter), with 
Gustafson, Inc. v. Intersys. Indus. Prods., Inc., 897 F.2d 508, 510 (Fed. Cir. 1990) 
(“Whether an act is ‘willful’ is by definition a question of the actor’s intent . . . .” 
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uncertainty exacerbated the practical problems created by the adverse 
inference rule and the ill-defined scope of waiver, generating further 
dissatisfaction with the willfulness doctrine.163 The Federal Circuit 
eventually responded to some of these critiques, abrogating the 
adverse inference rule and limiting the scope of the attorney-client 
privilege waiver as well as of the waiver of work-product immunity.164 
2. In re Seagate 
But then, the Federal Circuit went much further, completely 
changing the substantive standard to establish entitlement to 
enhanced damages. In the en banc In re Seagate decision, the court 
adopted a multi-layer framework for proving willfulness.165 The court 
held that, as a threshold matter, the plaintiff would need to show that 
the infringer “acted despite an objectively high likelihood that its 
actions constituted infringement of a valid patent.”166 The court 
explained that “[t]he state of mind of the accused infringer is not 
relevant to this objective inquiry,” which was to be judged “by the 
record developed in the infringement proceeding.”167 In practice, this 
approach enabled defendants to avoid liability for enhanced damages 
as long as they could develop an objectively reasonable — essentially, 
non-frivolous — legal theory of patent noninfringement or invalidity 
in the course of litigation, often long after infringement began.168 
Moreover, this “objective recklessness” prong came to be treated as 
a pure question of law, making it amenable to summary judgment 
 
(alteration omitted)). 
 163 See supra notes 157–59 and accompanying text.  
 164 See Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 
1337, 1340-41 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en banc) (abrogating Kloster Speedsteel); see also In re 
EchoStar Commc’ns Corp., 448 F.3d 1294, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (defining the scope 
of privilege waiver of attorney-client communications and of waiver of work product 
immunity in cases in which advice of in-house counsel has been asserted as a defense 
against a claim of willful infringement). With respect to the adverse inference rule, 
Congress later went further and added a section to the Patent Act stating that “[t]he 
failure of an infringer to obtain the advice of counsel with respect to any allegedly 
infringed patent, or the failure of the infringer to present such advice to the court or 
jury, may not be used to prove that the accused infringer willfully infringed the 
patent . . . .” 35 U.S.C. § 298 (2018). 
 165 In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1370-72 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc). 
 166 Id. at 1371. 
 167 Id. 
 168 In Section II.B, I will show that this take on objective recklessness is at odds 
with the way this concept is defined in other areas of law. 
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grants169 and ready appellate reversals on de novo review.170 In one 
case, the Federal Circuit vacated an award of enhanced damages when 
an attorney for the plaintiff-appellee admitted in appellate oral 
argument that his opponent had a non-frivolous defense of 
nonobviousness of the asserted claims.171 Because patent cases in 
which the infringer lacks non-frivolous defenses are rare, this prong 
made enhanced damages more difficult for prevailing patentees to 
recover than it was prior to Seagate.172 
Objective recklessness was not the only requirement plaintiffs 
would have to meet to qualify for enhanced damages. Under the 
Seagate formulation, plaintiffs also had to show that the risk of 
infringement “was either known or so obvious that it should have 
been known to the accused infringer.”173 Subsequent cases held that 
proof of this second prong, which would normally be decided by a 
jury if the plaintiff overcame the “objective” threshold, typically 
turned on subjective factors.174 Like the first prong, subjective bad 
faith had to be proven by clear and convincing evidence.175 And, 
needless to say, actual knowledge of the relevant patent’s existence 
continued to be the sine qua non of treble damages. Once all of these 
elements were established, the court would enter judgment that the 
infringement was willful, making the defendant eligible for enhanced 
damages.176 As noted above, though, the trial judge still had the 
discretion, subject to deferential appellate review, not to award full 
treble damages, or even any enhanced damages at all.177 
 
 169 See Paul R. Gugliuzza, Quick Decisions in Patent Cases, 106 GEO. L.J. 619, 678 
(2018); Christopher B. Seaman, Willful Patent Infringement and Enhanced Damages 
After In re Seagate: An Empirical Study, 97 IOWA L. REV. 417, 439-41 (2012). 
 170 Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. v. W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc., 682 F.3d 1003, 
1005 (Fed. Cir. 2012).  
 171 Lee v. Mike’s Novelties, Inc., 543 F. App’x 1010, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2013) 
(nonprecedential). 
 172 But cf. Seaman, supra note 169, at 417 (showing a relatively small decrease in 
the number of cases in which willfulness was found after Seagate).  
 173 In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc). 
 174 See, e.g., SSL Servs., LLC v. Citrix Sys., Inc., 769 F.3d 1073, 1091-93 (Fed. Cir. 
2014). 
 175 See Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1371.  
 176 See id. at 1368. 
 177 See supra notes 143–44 and accompanying text; see also Read Corp. v. Portec, 
Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 828 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (stating that “a finding of willful 
infringement does not mandate enhancement of damages” and that a trial judge 
should take several factors into account “in determining whether to exercise its 
discretion to award enhanced damages and how much the damages should be 
increased”). 
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The Seagate framework did unburden patent defendants by making 
it possible to defeat allegations of willfulness without opinion letters 
— or, really, without any positions on invalidity or noninfringement 
prior to litigation. But it also became a target of numerous critiques. 
First, because Seagate made it quite difficult to obtain enhanced 
damages, some commentators contended that even blatant 
infringement was underdeterred as a result.178 Second, Seagate 
aberrantly turned quintessentially factual questions of culpability into 
questions of law, subjecting enhanced damages to tight appellate 
control and resulting in frequent reversals of willfulness decisions of 
trial judges who lived with the case and made fact findings with 
respect to the conduct and mental state of the defendant.179 Third, 
Seagate did not rest on stable doctrinal foundations. Other than some 
discrete provisions to deter sham litigation,180 there was little 
precedent for the Seagate framework anywhere in the law — in patent 
law prior to Seagate, in other areas of intellectual property, or in 
tort.181 The Seagate court did cite several copyright cases and even 
relied on a Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”) case, Safeco Insurance 
Co. of America v. Burr, in support of its approach to willfulness 
generally and objective recklessness specifically.182 But, as Halo 
concluded with respect to Safeco183 and I conclude with respect to the 
 
 178 See, e.g., Rachel L. Emsley, Copying Copyright’s Willful Infringement Standard: A 
Comparison of Enhanced Damages in Patent Law and Copyright Law, 42 SUFFOLK U. L. 
REV. 157, 178 (2008) (“A lower standard for enhancement of damages is appropriate 
in patent law where lost profits or a reasonable royalty can undercompensate and 
underdeter patent infringement.”); see also Sarah J. Garber, Copycats, Relax! The 
Federal Circuit Lightens Up on Willful Patent Infringement, 73 MO. L. REV. 817, 832 
(2008) (stating that Seagate was “squarely in favor of patent litigation defendants”). 
 179 Cf. Highmark, Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 701 F.3d 1351, 1356-59 
& n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (Moore, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). 
 180 See Prof’l Real Estate Inv’rs, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49, 
60-61 (1993); CRST Van Expedited, Inc. v. Werner Enters., Inc., 479 F.3d 1099, 
1111-12 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 181 See infra Section II.B; see also Brief of Amici Curiae Independent Inventor 
Groups in Support of Petitioners at 10, Stryker Corp. v. Zimmer, Inc., 136 S. Ct. 356 
(2015) (No. 14-1520), 2015 WL 4883187, at *10 (“The [Seagate] ‘willfulness’ test for 
patent infringement now looks nothing like the traditional tort doctrine in civil 
cases.”). 
 182 In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1370-71 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc) 
(citing Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 69-70 & n.20 (2007)). 
 183 Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1933 (2016) (quoting 
Safeco, 551 U.S. at 69). 
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copyright cases,184 these authorities did not support the Federal 
Circuit’s test. 
D. Halo and Its Aftermath 
1. Halo 
The Supreme Court eventually overturned the Seagate framework. 
The writing was on the wall when, in two unanimous companion 
opinions issued in 2014, the Court rejected an analogous approach the 
Federal Circuit adopted for awarding attorney’s fees in patent cases 
under 35 U.S.C. § 285.185 After the lower court refused to take an 
opportunity for course-correction of its willfulness doctrine,186 the 
Supreme Court granted certiorari in a pair of § 284 cases and, again, 
unanimously vacated the Federal Circuit’s judgments, putting an end 
to Seagate.187 
Halo, one of the § 284 cases that made it to the Supreme Court, 
turned on the “objective recklessness” prong of Seagate.188 In Halo, the 
patents-in-suit were directed to modular pieces for producing 
electronic circuits, and plaintiff and defendant were direct competitors 
in the field of surface-mounting technology for making the circuits.189 
The defendant, Pulse, was aware of the relevant patents as far back as 
1998 and received letters from Halo offering to license them in 
2002.190 According to Halo, at that point, “although a Pulse engineer 
conducted a ‘cursory’ invalidity analysis and determined the patents 
were invalid, there was no evidence that a decision maker at Pulse 
relied on that engineer’s analysis to make a decision to continue 
 
 184 See infra Section II.B.2.c. 
 185 Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749, 1752-53 
(2014); Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1744, 1746 
(2014). But cf. Tyler A. Hicks, Note, Breaking the “Link” Between Awards for Attorney’s 
Fees and Enhanced Damages in Patent Law, 52 CAL. W. L. REV. 191 (2016) (arguing that 
the Supreme Court’s decisions in the § 285 cases do not have to control the seemingly 
parallel issues in the § 284 cases). 
 186 Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 769 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2014), reh’g en 
banc denied, 780 F.3d 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (mem.). 
 187 Stryker Corp. v. Zimmer, Inc., 782 F.3d 649 (Fed. Cir. 2014), vacated sub. nom. 
Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923 (2016); Halo, 769 F.3d 1371, 
vacated, 136 S. Ct. 1923. 
 188 Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1931. Stryker, the other case on which certiorari was granted, 
likewise turned on this prong of Seagate.  
 189 Halo, 769 F.3d at 1374-75. 
 190 See Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., No. 2:07-cv-00331-PMP-PAL, 2013 
WL 2319145, at *16 (D. Nev. May 28, 2013). 
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selling the accused products.”191 Based in part on this evidence, a jury 
found Pulse’s infringement to be willful.192 
The trial court, however, granted judgment as a matter of law of no 
willfulness because Pulse had a non-frivolous litigation position that 
Halo’s asserted claims should have been found obvious and therefore 
invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 103.193 If Pulse had prevailed on this 
invalidity defense, it would of course have escaped all liability. But 
even though “Pulse did not prove obviousness by clear and convincing 
evidence, [it] presented enough evidence of obviousness such that this 
defense was not objectively baseless, or a ‘sham,’”194 thereby avoiding 
enhanced damages. The court held that, under Seagate, the fact that 
Pulse ignored Halo’s patent demand “does not undermine Pulse’s 
reasonable obviousness defense” because it was “relevant [only] to the 
subjective element of [willful] infringement,”195 as opposed to the 
other, “objective recklessness” element. The Federal Circuit agreed, 
concluding that although “[t]he record shows that . . . Pulse was 
ultimately unsuccessful in challenging the validity of the Halo patents, 
Pulse did raise a substantial question as to the obviousness of the Halo 
patents.”196 
In its opinion vacating the Federal Circuit’s judgment in Halo and 
the companion case of Stryker v. Zimmer, the Supreme Court 
abrogated the Seagate standard.197 First, the Court characterized the 
 
 191 Id.  
 192 Id. at *1. 
 193 Id. at *2. 
 194 Id. at *15 (citation omitted). 
 195 Id. at *16. 
 196 Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 769 F.3d 1371, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
 197 On remand in Halo, the district court ultimately concluded that, even though 
the jury verdict of willfulness was proper under the Supreme Court’s new standard, no 
enhancement of damages was warranted. Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 281 F. 
Supp. 3d 1087, 1093 (D. Nev. 2017) (“Considering all of the evidence submitted by 
the parties, I do not find that Pulse’s infringement was so egregious and unusual that 
enhanced damages are needed here.”). In contrast, the trial court in Stryker enhanced 
the damages to the maximum allowable treble damages limit. Stryker Corp. v. 
Zimmer, Inc., No. 1:10-cv-1223, 2017 WL 4286412, at *11 (W.D. Mich. July 12, 
2017) (“While perhaps more egregious cases exist, the test is not whether this case is 
the worst possible that can be imagined. Zimmer’s conduct was more egregious than 
most, and Zimmer is precisely the type of egregious infringer the Supreme Court had 
in mind when it relaxed the Seagate standard to provide district courts with the 
freedom to exercise their discretion to enhance damages in cases of willful 
infringement.”), appeal docketed, No. 17-2541 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 13, 2017). See infra 
Section III.D (discussing the respective roles of judge and jury in the damages 
enhancement).  
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Seagate approach as requiring three separate inquiries subject to 
“trifurcated appellate review”: “objective recklessness,” “subjective 
knowledge,” and “the ultimate decision — whether to award enhanced 
damages.”198 The Court then launched into a critique of Seagate by 
pointing to Octane Fitness, one of the § 285 cases it decided just two 
years before. The Court explained that in Octane, it rejected a test 
“requiring that the claim asserted be both objectively baseless and 
brought in subjective bad faith.”199 The Court noted that the issue of 
standards for awarding attorney’s fees “arose in a different context but 
points in the same direction” and, following Octane, it eliminated the 
Federal Circuit’s “rigid formula” for willfulness.200 
The Court held that “[t]he principal problem with Seagate’s two-
part test is that it requires a finding of objective recklessness in every 
case before district courts may award enhanced damages.”201 This 
approach, therefore, removed from the ambit of enhanced damages the 
core, subjectively bad behaviors that were subject to such damages 
dating back to the early tort cases.202 Emphasizing that the Federal 
Circuit’s treatment of willfulness impermissibly interfered with the 
trial courts’ discretion,203 the Court concluded that “[t]he subjective 
willfulness of a patent infringer, intentional or knowing, may warrant 
enhanced damages, without regard to whether his infringement was 
objectively reckless.”204 
As noted, the Court indicated that enhanced damages could also be 
collected based on recklessness, but said very little about this route to 
willfulness.205 At the very least, the Court rejected the Federal Circuit’s 
litigation-timed approach to recklessness when it observed that 
“[n]othing in Safeco,” the case from which Seagate principally drew its 
objective standard, “suggests that we should look to facts that the 
defendant neither knew nor had reason to know at the time he 
acted.”206 The Court thus held that litigation was not the correct time 
to evaluate the defendant’s mental state. In doing so, the Court 
 
 198 Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1930 (2016). 
 199 Id. at 1932. By “claim” here, the Court is referring to the accused infringer’s 
defenses and counterclaims. 
 200 Id. at 1932-34. 
 201 Id. at 1932. 
 202 See infra Section II.A. 
 203 Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1930.  
 203 Id. at 1931-32, 1934-35. 
 204 Id. at 1933. 
 205 See supra notes 111–14 and accompanying text.  
 206 Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1933.  
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approvingly cited Safeco’s formulation that a reckless person “acts 
‘knowing or having reason to know of facts which would lead a 
reasonable man to realize’ his actions are unreasonably risky,”207 which 
Safeco in turn quoted from the Restatement of Torts. The “having 
reason to know” language plainly suggests something less than actual 
knowledge, but it is not clear whether this phrase refers to reason to 
know of infringement or reason to know of the patent’s existence.208 
Furthermore, the reference to “a reasonable man” connotes an 
objective inquiry209 — but again, “the reasonable man’s” apprehension 
of risk may or may not refer to a known patent. 
Additional, though not decisive, hints of how Halo is best 
interpreted come from Farmer v. Brennan,210 the case that Safeco relied 
on in turn. Farmer distinguished civil recklessness from criminal 
recklessness,211 and Safeco held — sensibly enough for a case 
involving civil penalties for inaccurate credit reporting — that it is the 
civil version of recklessness that should be adopted as the standard for 
willfulness under the FCRA.212 What is the difference between the 
two? The basic idea is that while criminal recklessness entails 
indifference to a known risk, civil recklessness involves indifference to 
a risk that is “objectively high,” or one of which — as stated in the 
Restatement — the defendant had reason to know, but not necessarily 
one of which the defendant actually knew.213 As Professor Kenneth 
Simons explained, civil recklessness does not hinge on “advertence to 
risk,” but might instead “require both indifference to risk and a greater 
departure from the standard of care than negligence requires.”214 
 
 207 Id. (quoting Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 69 (2007) (quoting 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500 (AM. LAW INST. 1965))). 
 208 Cf. Glob.-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 563 U.S. 754, 760-61 (2011) 
(dealing with a similar problem in the setting of indirect infringement). 
 209 See generally Keating, supra note 66. 
 210 Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994). 
 211 Id. at 836-37. 
 212 Safeco, 551 U.S. at 57-58 & n.9, 68-69; see Tejas N. Narechania, Certiorari, 
Universality, and a Patent Puzzle, 116 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript 
at 28), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3044035. 
 213 See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 836-37. 
 214 Kenneth W. Simons, Dimensions of Negligence in Criminal and Tort Law, 3 
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 283, 293 & n.26 (2002); see also Simons, Rethinking Mental 
States, supra note 39, at 471-72 & nn.31–32 (“[T]he test of recklessness is more 
subjective than the test of negligence. Yet tort recklessness, unlike Model Penal Code 
criminal recklessness, does not specifically require awareness of a risk. ‘Reason to 
know’ suffices.” (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 12, 500 (AM. LAW INST. 
1965))); cf. Kenneth W. Simons, Statistical Knowledge Deconstructed, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1, 
15 (2012) [hereinafter Simons, Statistical Knowledge Deconstructed] (explaining that, 
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Although these definitions do not fully resolve the question of which 
form of recklessness should be adopted by patent law, the distinction 
at least supplies a starting point for further discussion. While Part II 
will explore the difference between the two forms of recklessness in 
more detail, the sections that follow focus on the lower courts’ actual 
interpretations of Halo. 
2. Post-Halo: Actual Knowledge or Bust 
In WBIP, LLC v. Kohler Co., the first case in which it had to apply 
Halo, the Federal Circuit concluded that “[k]nowledge of the patent 
alleged to be willfully infringed continues to be a prerequisite to 
enhanced damages.”215 Although the court did not qualify the noun 
“knowledge” with the adjective “actual,” district courts have so far 
generally held that Halo did not abrogate the actual knowledge 
threshold for willfulness. For example, the United States District 
Court for the Northern District of California concluded in Apple Inc. v. 
Samsung Electronics Co. that, even though Samsung copied Apple’s 
product, “because Samsung had no knowledge of the [asserted patent] 
before the instant suit was filed, Samsung’s conduct before the instant 
suit . . . does not constitute willful patent infringement.”216 The Apple 
court relied on a case from the same district explaining that “[a]t the 
time that the defendant allegedly analyzed the product embodying the 
patent to introduce a competing product around 2002, the plaintiff 
had not received any patents on infringed technology.”217 Although it 
cannot be a surprise to an infringer that a patent on a successful 
product that it copied may be forthcoming, Apple concluded that the 
actual knowledge requirement is unbending. It noted that “the 
defendant’s sales of the competing product for a decade without any 
notice that the competing product infringed any plaintiff [sic] patent 
cannot support a finding of willfulness,”218 even if that product was 
copied not long before the patent covering it issued. The approach in 
 
to be criminally reckless, an actor must “(a) believe that the risk of the relevant legal 
fact is substantial and (b) take a risk that society considers unjustifiable” (citing 
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(c) (AM. LAW INST. 1962))).  
 215 829 F.3d 1317, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., 
Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1932-33 (2016)). 
 216 258 F. Supp. 3d 1013, 1024 (N.D. Cal. 2017).  
 217 Id. at 1025 (quoting Radware, Ltd. v. F5 Networks, Inc., 5:13-cv-02024-RMW, 
2016 WL 4427490, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2016)) (some alterations omitted). 
 218 Id. (quoting Radware, 2016 WL 4427490, at *3).  
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Apple is typical,219 and courts have not yet attempted to parse the 
“reason to know” language from Halo.220 
Admittedly, Federal Circuit cases prior to Halo did converge on the 
actual knowledge rule.221 And although Halo overruled Seagate, it did 
not specifically speak to actual knowledge. There is other authority 
undermining that standard, to be sure. For example, it is difficult to 
reconcile actual-knowledge primacy with the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Global-Tech, in which — as noted in the Introduction222 — 
the Court concluded that willful blindness is legally equivalent to 
actual knowledge in the context of indirect infringement, over a 
dissent on that very point.223 In addition, in the nineteenth-century 
case of Topliff v. Topliff, the Supreme Court allowed an award of 
enhanced damages seemingly without any evidence that the defendant 
had actual knowledge of the patent-in-suit.224 But Halo did not 
 
 219 See, e.g., Adidas Am., Inc. v. Skechers USA, Inc., No. 3:16-cv-1400-SI, 2017 WL 
2543811, at *3 (D. Or. June 12, 2017) (“Knowledge of the patent by the alleged 
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cf. Intel Corp. v. Future Link Sys., LLC, 268 F. Supp. 3d 605, 623 (D. Del. 2017) 
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“Intel’s own engineers concede that they avoid reviewing other, non-Intel patents so 
as to avoid willfully infringing them” and allegations of “corporate atmosphere 
encouraging employees to ‘turn a blind eye’ to patents”); see also Adidas, 2017 WL 
2543811, at *5 (“It is unclear . . . that the doctrine of willful blindness as articulated 
in Global-Tech, an induced infringement case, applies in the direct infringement 
analysis context.”). Interestingly, Greatbatch and Intel were decided by the same 
district judge. 
 220 In a recently decided nonprecedential case, the Federal Circuit suggested that 
actual knowledge of the patent’s existence is not necessary for willfulness, while at the 
same time observing that the plaintiff provided evidence from which actual knowledge 
could be inferred. See WCM Indus., Inc. v. IPS Corp., Nos. 2016-2211, 2016-2268, 
2018 WL 707803, at *8-9 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 5, 2018) (nonprecedential). 
 221 See supra notes 44–45 and accompanying text. 
 222 See supra notes 48–50 and accompanying text.  
 223 See Glob.-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 563 U.S. 754, 769 (2011) (defining 
“willful blindness” as follows: “(1) the defendant must subjectively believe that there 
is a high probability that a fact exists and (2) the defendant must take deliberate 
actions to avoid learning of that fact”). 
 224 145 U.S. 156, 174 (1892) (cited in Brief of Amici Curiae Small Inventors in 
Support of Petitioners at 18, Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923 
(2016) (Nos. 14-1513, 14-1520), 2015 WL 9245248, at *18).  
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highlight that aspect of Topliff, nor attempted to square its rules for 
mental states for indirect infringement with those for willfulness.225 In 
fact, the Commil case, which clarified the relevance of the defendant’s 
knowledge and beliefs about asserted patents for indirect liability just 
a year before Halo issued, was not even cited in Halo.226 Thus, panels 
of the Federal Circuit are probably correct in maintaining the actual 
knowledge threshold which, given Halo’s lack of endorsement of it, 
the court could nonetheless modify if it decided to take up the issue 
en banc.227 
As I argue in this Article, tort law sources discussed principally in 
Part II can help in determining the right mental state for eligibility for 
treble damages in patent cases. But before delving deep into tort law, 
an argument can be advanced that even an internal analysis of the 
Patent Act casts doubt on the actual knowledge rule. Subsection 
154(d), which governs compensatory damages for so-called 
“provisional” patent rights (i.e., damages for infringement of patents 
that have not yet issued) and is cross-referenced in § 284, requires 
“actual notice of the published patent application.”228 The marking 
subsection, § 287(a), also addresses notice, mentioning the 
requirement of “proof that the infringer was notified of the 
infringement and continued to infringe thereafter”229 in order to 
 
 225 In a copyright case, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit recently held 
that, while willful blindness is the minimum mental state requirement for 
contributory copyright infringement, willful copyright infringement can be established 
upon proof of recklessness. BMG Rights Mgmt. (US) LLC v. Cox Commc’ns, Inc., 881 
F.3d 293, 312-13 (4th Cir. 2018). Given “the historic kinship between patent law and 
copyright law,” Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 439 
(1984), and the BMG court’s extensive reliance on the Supreme Court’s patent law 
precedents, 881 F.3d at 308-10, this result might have informative value for patent 
cases going forward. 
 226 Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1920, 1926-28 (2015). See 
generally Nate Ngerebara, Commil v. Cisco: Implications of the Intent Standard for 
Inducement Liability on Willfulness, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 535 (2016) (examining 
tensions between mental state standards for indirect infringement as opposed to 
willfulness). 
 227 See Troy v. Samson Mfg. Co., 758 F.3d 1322, 1325-27 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
 228 35 U.S.C. § 154(d) (2018); see Rosebud LMS Inc. v. Adobe Sys. Inc., 812 F.3d 
1070, 1073-74 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (interpreting the “actual notice” provision of § 154(d) 
and noting that “‘actual notice’ is synonymous with knowledge” (quoting 58 AM. JUR. 
2D NOTICE § 4 (2015)).  
 229 35 U.S.C. § 287(a) (2018). The marking subsection, to be sure, has been 
interpreted to require “an affirmative act by the patentee to notify infringers.” See 
McKeon, supra note 45, at 466. In addition, the marking subsection limits damages 
only when the infringer copies a commercially available product, and does not apply 
to method claims even when the patentee markets a product embodying such claims. 
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collect past damages where the product at issue was not marked with a 
patent number. Although § 154(d) came into existence in 1999,230 
§ 284 and § 287(a) both have a long history in the Patent Act.231 
Congress knew how to address notice explicitly, but chose not to add 
any such language to § 284. Nonetheless, the requirement persists. 
A fair question to ask at this point, however, is why should we care? 
Even if courts are getting the law wrong, perhaps some mistakes are 
not significant enough to fix. This response, however, is not a 
satisfying one when it comes to willfulness. As Professor Keith Hylton 
explained in a recent article, a miscalibrated enhanced damages 
doctrine can lead to diminished incentives to innovate,232 and getting 
damages right is a critically important challenge in patent law as a 
general matter.233 The specific problems with the actual knowledge 
rule, though, are worth addressing at some level of granularity. The 
next section sets forth policy rationales for relaxing this rule because it 
is, in fact, causing problems for patent law. 
E. Problems with the Actual Knowledge Rule 
1. It Discourages Reading of Patents 
The “knowledge of the patent” gloss on the enhanced patent 
damages provision is problematic for a variety of reasons. One, 
although there is some evidence that the threat of willful infringement 
does not deter researchers in at least some fields from looking at 
patents,234 actual knowledge as the trigger of enhanced liability can 
discourage patent search and analysis.235 Commentators have voiced 
 
See Crown Packaging Tech., Inc. v. Rexam Beverage Can Co., 559 F.3d 1308, 1316 
(Fed. Cir. 2009); see also Tun-Jen Chiang, The Reciprocity of Search, 66 VAND. L. REV. 
1, 55 (2013) (criticizing this rule).  
 230 Act of Nov. 29, 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113, § 4402, 113 Stat. 1501, 1536 
(amending § 154 to add § 154(d)). 
 231 See Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, §§ 38, 55, 16 Stat. 198, 203, 206. 
 232 Hylton, Enhanced Damages for Patent Infringement, supra note 26, at 425.  
 233 See supra notes 1–10 and accompanying text. 
 234 See Ouellette, Who Reads Patents?, supra note 86; see also Lisa Larrimore 
Ouellette, Do Patents Disclose Useful Information?, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 545, 546-47 
(2012) (concluding that researchers use patents as a source of technical information 
in certain fields). 
 235 Colleen V. Chien, Opening the Patent System: Diffusionary Levers in Patent Law, 
89 S. CAL. L. REV. 793, 833-34 (2016) [hereinafter Chien, Opening the Patent System]; 
Jeanne C. Fromer, Patent Disclosure, 94 IOWA L. REV. 539, 588 (2009) (“[T]o improve 
the incentive to read patent documents, which is a critical aspect of operational 
disclosure, it is vital to remove — if not reverse — the penalty of willful infringement 
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this concern with respect to Federal Circuit doctrine in this area over 
the course of the previous decade,236 and the concern persisted, if not 
increased, after the Supreme Court issued its decision in Halo. Thus, 
in the wake of Halo, Professor Lisa Ouellette suggested that “as lower 
courts flesh out the meaning of Halo, they recognize the potential 
harm from firms deciding that the risks of enhanced liability from 
reading patents outweigh the teaching benefit those patents could 
otherwise provide.”237 Professor Ouellette’s comments echo, for 
example, the Federal Trade Commission’s observation, particularly 
salient before Seagate,238 that exposure to treble damages triggered by 
reading patents interferes with the various benefits that flow from the 
disclosure function of patent law: 
Some Hearings participants explained that they do not read 
their competitors’ patents out of concern for such potential 
treble damage liability. Failure to read competitors’ patents can 
jeopardize plans for a noninfringing business or research 
strategy, encourage wasteful duplication of effort, delay 
follow-on innovation that could derive from patent 
disclosures, and discourage the development of competition. 
It is troubling that some businesses refrain from reading their 
competitors’ patents because they fear the imposition of treble 
damages for willful infringement.239 
 
as applied to reviewing patents to inform follow-up innovation.”); Timothy R. 
Holbrook, Possession in Patent Law, 59 SMU L. REV. 123, 142 (2006) (“The doctrine of 
willful infringement provides another structural infirmity to the ability of patents to 
perform a teaching function.”); Mark A. Lemley, Ignoring Patents, 2008 MICH. ST. L. 
REV. 19, 21-22; Michael Risch, The Failure of Public Notice in Patent Prosecution, 21 
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 179, 213 (2007) (“[K]nowledge of a patent can lead to a finding of 
willful infringement, so there is a disincentive for competitors to review others’ 
patents to learn of the latest technology.”); see also Ryan T. Holte, Patent Submission 
Policies, 50 AKRON L. REV. 637, 657-58, 687-88 (2016). 
 236 See supra note 235. 
 237 Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Halo v. Pulse and the Increased Risks of Reading 
Patents, STAN. L. SCH.: BLOGS (June 16, 2016), https://law.stanford.edu/2016/06/16/ 
halo-v-pulse-and-the-increased-risks-of-reading-patents.  
 238 Seagate, to be sure, reduced some of the disincentives for reading patents by 
allowing an escape from enhanced damages liability based on defenses developed in 
litigation. See Sean B. Seymore, The Teaching Function of Patents, 85 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 621, 625 (2010). Still, Seagate continued to treat actual knowledge as the sine qua 
non of enhanced damages, maintaining the incentive to avoid learning of patents.  
 239 FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF 
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY 16-17 (2003), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/ 
default/files/documents/reports/promote-innovation-proper-balance-competition-and-
  
2018] Enhancing Patent Damages 1471 
I share these critics’ views that enhanced damages doctrine 
structured so as to discourage rather than promote patent search and 
analysis disserves the purposes of patent law. While the disclosure 
function of patents is far from perfect,240 information-transfer benefits 
of the patent document can be substantial, and should not be 
undermined by patent law’s treble damages rules.241 Patents transfer 
technical information, inform inventors and firms about research that 
has already been done, and encourage inventive design-arounds.242 
With the caveat that the relevance of personal anecdotes to scholarly 
work may be limited, I note that during my time as a scientist working 
in Silicon Valley, a supervisor once criticized me for finding, through a 
Google search, a patent that was arguably relevant to my project. At 
the time, it seemed odd to me that intellectual curiosity would be 
suppressed rather than rewarded. Now that I know some patent law, I 
see that my supervisor was in the right, but the rule still seems 
strange. And other legal scholarship shows that my experience with 
patent searching was far from exceptional.243 
One could argue that, if patent disclosure were so valuable, firms 
would search for and read patents anyway, even if that meant having 
to deal with allegations of aggravated conduct sufficient for imposition 
of enhanced damages. Nonetheless, when actual knowledge is made to 
be the sine qua non of added liability, the decision to avoid searching is 
tempting to make — and, in turn, would become much less attractive 
when a standard that is not so strongly tied to actual knowledge is 
adopted.244 It therefore stands to reason to have a standard for 
 
patent-law-and-policy/innovationrpt.pdf. 
 240 See, e.g., Note, The Disclosure Function of the Patent System (or Lack Thereof), 
118 HARV. L. REV. 2007, 2017-23 (2005); see also Fromer, supra note 235, at 539; 
Seymore, supra note 238, at 628-41. 
 241 See Dmitry Karshtedt, Photocopies, Patents, and Knowledge Transfer: “The Uneasy 
Case” of Justice Breyer’s Patentable Subject Matter Jurisprudence, 69 VAND. L. REV. 1739, 
1743-44 (2016) [hereinafter Karshtedt, Photocopies, Patents, and Knowledge Transfer]; 
Jason Rantanen, Peripheral Disclosure, 74 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 14-15 (2012). 
 242 See Karshtedt, Photocopies, Patents, and Knowledge Transfer, supra note 241, at 
1745-46. 
 243 See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 235, at 19-20; Risch, supra note 235, at 213.  
 244 Cf. Chien, Opening the Patent System, supra note 235, at 849 (“The criterion of 
‘knowledge of the patent’ that the willfulness doctrine is connected to is arguably both 
overinclusive and underinclusive with respect to what the patent system is trying to 
deter. For example, an innovator who studies and reverse-engineers a patentee’s 
product or website should not be less subject to a finding of willfulness than one who 
happens to read a patentee’s patent among many others in the course of doing routine 
research. At the same time, innovators should not be punished for being 
comprehensive in checking different sources of technical knowledge by reading 
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enhanced damages that rewards, or at least does not punish, patent 
searching.245 This is so because search and analysis of patents might 
sometimes produce benefits to society that would outweigh the social 
costs and burdens of searching.246 Although it has been suggested that 
properly calibrated compensatory damages should generally be 
adequate to promote socially optimal behaviors,247 it is difficult to 
explain the practice of ignoring patents, described further in the next 
section, even in scenarios in which even a search could have been 
performed in a socially cost-effective manner. The problem could, 
therefore, be with the legal standards that discourage searches,248 not 
with the costs and benefits of search in the abstract. 
A common response to the argument that legal doctrine should not 
inhibit patent searching is that patents in certain industries provide 
little in the way of technically valuable information and serve 
primarily as a tax on innovation.249 According to this narrative, search 
and analysis of patents has little social value, and entails great costs.250 
Maybe so — and such considerations, if accurate, should be taken into 
account in the enhanced damages inquiry. As I argue in Part III, 
reasons like these further point to introducing a greater degree of 
industry-specificity in making the threshold determination as to 
whether enhanced damages should be available to the prevailing 
 
patents if there is no evidence that the patentee actually derived anything from the 
patent. But the current law leads to both outcomes.”); Lee & Melamed, supra note 5, 
at 460-61 (suggesting that “guilty infringement” is possible without actual knowledge 
of the patent); see also id. at 441-42. But see Randy R. Micheletti, Willful Patent 
Infringement after In re Seagate: Just What Is Objectively Reckless Infringement?, 84 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 975, 1008 (2010) (“Knowledge of the patent at issue should remain a 
critically important factor in the Seagate analysis, however, because such knowledge 
may create an inference that the defendant knew or should have known of the risk of 
infringement. Conversely, proving an infringer should have known of the risk that he 
would infringe the patent at issue becomes very difficult — if not impossible — if the 
defendant had no knowledge of the patent at all.”). 
 245 See infra notes 567–68 (exploring the notion of a safe harbor from willfulness 
for firms that perform adequate searches). Another way to formulate the problem is to 
say that the current approach, which is focused on actual knowledge, does not 
sufficiently induce firms to engage in patent searching. 
 246 See Johnathan M. Jackson, If It Ain’t Broke, Don’t Fix It: The Pitfalls of Major 
Reform of the Doctrine of Willful Patent Infringement in the Wake of Knorr-Bremse, 15 U. 
BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 37, 63-64 (2006).  
 247 See, e.g., Love, supra note 5, at 943-48. 
 248 See id. at 936-41. 
 249 See JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, 
BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 233-24 (2009). 
 250 Id. at 49-50. 
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plaintiff, and this goal can best be accomplished by discarding the 
inflexible actual knowledge rule. 
2. It Promotes Holdout 
Recent literature has noted a “hold-out” problem in the patent 
system. As Professor Colleen Chien contended, “[i]n many cases, 
manufacturers fail to take steps to clear products prior to their release 
even though they are arguably in the best position to determine 
whether any patents read on their plans.”251 As discussed above, this 
happens in part because “reading the patents of others results in a 
manufacturer knowing about a patent, and knowledge of a patent 
makes it easier for a court to enhance a damages award based on a 
defendant’s knowing infringement.”252 Eventually, though, a patentee 
might learn about a possible infringement, approach the defendant 
with a demand letter, but then end up getting the proverbial cold 
shoulder. Professor Chien explained that, “[f]rom the patentee’s 
perspective . . . when companies resist patent demands, they shirk 
their responsibilities as willing participants in the patent economy.”253 
But, as Professor Chien’s comments about patent clearance suggest, 
the shirking of responsibility can manifest itself not only through 
resistance of licensing demands, but possibly also through the failure 
to perform patent searches.254 In cases in which it would be relatively 
inexpensive for the potential infringer to find and analyze relevant 
patents, a non-search can become a form of “hold-out” that in 
substance is not very different from the refusal to negotiate a license 
over a known patent. If the infringer could have easily found the 
relevant patents and readily concluded that they cover its products, 
the salient difference from actual knowledge is difficult to pin down.255 
Conversely, “a manufacturer’s good faith clearance search should be 
 
 251 Colleen V. Chien, Holding Up and Holding Out, 21 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. 
REV. 1, 23 (2014) [hereinafter Chien, Holding Up and Holding Out]. 
 252 Id. at 24; cf. Colleen V. Chien, Contextualizing Patent Disclosure, 69 VAND. L. 
REV. 1849, 1887 (2016) (contending that if courts “clarify that mere knowledge of the 
patent, without indicia that the patentee took advantage of the knowledge within the 
patent, won’t trigger treble damages, this could further reduce the risks associated 
with reading patents”). 
 253 Chien, Holding Up and Holding Out, supra note 251, at 24.  
 254 See F. Scott Kieff & Anne Layne-Farrar, Incentive Effects from Different 
Approaches to Holdup Mitigation and Surrounding Patent Remedies and Standard-Setting 
Organizations, 9 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 1091, 1102 (2013) (discussing the 
“socially optimal level of due diligence searching”).  
 255 See supra note 244 and accompanying text.  
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respected, and indeed encouraged.”256 Patent searches can have a great 
deal of social value because they could, besides transferring technical 
information, help firms avoid duplicative research257 and promote the 
formation of a market for patent rights258 — and, with it, development 
and commercialization of patented inventions.259 And yet, we have a 
rule that encourages the opposite. 
The theory of punitive damages supports these intuitions. One set of 
circumstances in which courts have not hesitated to award punitive 
damages in other areas of law involves violations that could have been 
avoided via negotiation with the rights-holder.260 As Professors David 
Haddock, Fred McChesney, and Menachem Spiegel explained in a 
well-known article, An Ordinary Economic Rationale for Extraordinary 
Legal Sanctions, “a legal remedy must leave a defendant who takes 
 
 256 Kieff & Layne-Farrar, supra note 254, at 1122; see also Shubha Ghosh, Patents 
and the Regulatory State: Rethinking the Patent Bargain Metaphor After Eldred, 19 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1315, 1348 (2004) (noting that “patent law seeds a norm of 
innovation and aids in instituting such social practices as searching a field before 
beginning one’s research and development”).  
 257 Cf. Stephen Yelderman, The Value of Accuracy in the Patent System, 84 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1217, 1267 (2017) (“[I]n cases in which a reasonable amount of searching would 
have revealed a known solution, it is preferable for the prospective inventor to search 
and find that solution rather than waste time and money re-creating it.” (citing 
ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY: CASES 
AND MATERIALS 401-02 (6th ed. 2013))). Although Professor Yelderman discussed this 
dynamic in the context of novelty and patentability generally, concerns over 
duplication of work equally apply to infringers who do not patent. See supra note 239 
and accompanying text. Moreover, the world is not divided neatly into patentees and 
infringers, and those who search for patents in order to clear a product might obtain 
information relevant for their own patents. Unfortunately, leaving aside clearance 
issues, there is also no duty to search the prior art before filing a patent application. 
See generally Thomas Schneck, The Duty to Search, 87 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 
689 (2005). Arguments in this Article indirectly support the imposition of such a 
duty, which, besides encouraging information transfer, would also lead to stronger 
patents.  
 258 See Kieff & Layne-Farrar, supra note 254, at 1106; see also F. Scott Kieff, 
Coordination, Property and Intellectual Property: An Unconventional Approach to 
Anticompetitive Effects and Downstream Access, 56 EMORY L.J. 327, 349, 366-67 (2006); 
F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for Commercializing Inventions, 85 
MINN. L. REV. 697, 733 (2001). But see Robin Feldman & Mark A. Lemley, Do Patent 
Licensing Demands Mean Innovation?, 101 IOWA L. REV. 137, 137 (2015) (“We find that 
very few patent license demands actually lead to new innovation; most demands 
simply involve payment for the freedom to keep doing what the licensee was already 
doing.”). 
 259 Kieff & Layne-Farrar, supra note 254, at 1107; Ted Sichelman, Commercializing 
Patents, 62 STAN. L. REV. 341, 345 (2010); see also Holte, supra note 235, at 660. 
 260 See, e.g., Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., 563 N.W.2d 154 (Wis. 1997). 
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with no advantage vis-a-vis a defendant who bargains.”261 Accordingly, 
“punitive rather than merely compensatory damages is a desirable 
response to many property violations.”262 Patents may fit into this 
framework because they are considered to be property rights whose 
utilization can, at least in theory, be negotiated over provided that the 
search, information, and transaction costs are not prohibitive. These 
assumptions sometimes do not hold, but there are some circumstances 
— like proceeding with making an infringing product after failing to 
investigate the patents of close competitors, or even copying others’ 
products — when an infringement after non-search might also be a 
welfare-diminishing “contractual bypass” of the sort described in An 
Ordinary Economic Rationale.263 
 
 261 Haddock et al., supra note 31, at 18; Lee & Melamed, supra note 5, at 461 (“[A] 
guilty infringer should be required to pay more than an innocent infringer . . . .”); see also 
Henry E. Smith, Property and Property Rules, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1719, 1723 (2004). An 
argument has been made that an injunction against continued infringement could 
function as a punitive remedy, Paul J. Heald, Permanent Injunctions as Punitive Damages in 
Patent Infringement Cases, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE COMMON LAW 514-29 
(Shyamkrishna Balganesh ed., 2013); see also Dan L. Burk, Punitive Patent Liability: A 
Comparative Examination, 36 REV. LITIG. (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 1), 
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/54c31bf9e4b02f4c0b4203e6/t/5a46ddfb9140b7ea14
ca1868/1514593788683/Burk_draft.pdf, but the traditional view is that, while the 
issuance of an injunction might sometimes depend on fault as judges often take the 
tortfeasor’s state of mind into account in performing equitable balancing, see MacLeod, 
supra note 15 (manuscript at 67), generally speaking the injunction is not a punitive 
remedy, see Metzler v. IBP, Inc., 127 F.3d 959, 963 (10th Cir. 1997); Zygmunt J.B. Plater, 
Statutory Violations and Equitable Discretion, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 524, 540 (1982) 
(“Injunctions, in their multiple variety, are merely remedial directives designed to 
implement the court’s determinations on threshold questions, substantive liability, and 
future conduct . . . .”). A related question is whether, when an injunction is denied, 
ongoing royalties as an equitable remedy for future (i.e., post-judgment) infringement 
could take on punitive character. See Layne S. Keele, Enhanced Ongoing Royalties: The 
Inequitable Remedy, 119 W. VA. L. REV. 469, 517 (2016) (“In most cases, courts should 
award only compensatory ongoing royalties. Nevertheless, there may be times in which 
supracompensatory awards are appropriate. One such example would be cases in which 
the infringer engaged in intentional misconduct before incurring significant prospective 
switching costs. Another example may be a case in which the court believes that the 
infringer’s inadequate pre-infringement patent clearance activities prevented the parties 
from reaching a negotiated license.”). Although the availability of punitive damages for 
past harm presents questions that are conceptually separate from issues relating to 
prospective relief via an injunction or ongoing royalties, a combination of punitive 
damages and an injunction (or ongoing royalties) could overdeter. See Haddock et al., 
supra note 31, at 30-32. If a trial judge concludes that this may happen, he or she could 
decide not to enhance past damages. See infra Section III.D. 
 262 Haddock et al., supra note 31, at 41. 
 263 Id. at 18. 
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While re-imagining punitive damages as a new kind of remedy 
called “retributive damages,” Professor Dan Markel made a similar 
argument. Professor Markel contended that “the availability of 
retributive damages encourages parties to use market transactions 
instead of misconduct that violates property rules — that is, those 
rules that require parties to negotiate over the transfer of legal 
entitlements prior to their exchange.”264 This is particularly true when 
“detecting complex wrongdoing occurring in private is difficult and 
where people may not even know they have been victimized,” as is 
often true for patent infringements.265 Of course, in cases where the 
infringement is “open and notorious,”266 the burden of coming to the 
infringer should lie squarely on the patentee. But in a number of 
important fact situations, infringement can be extremely difficult to 
detect, resulting in the undercompensation of the patentee — as well 
as underdeterrence of the infringer relative to a purely compensatory 
regime.267 To deal with underdeterrence, patent law already recognizes 
the notion of a culpable infringer in cases in which the infringer was 
aware of the patent,268 but it is not clear why the infringer who opted 
not to do any searching at all should fare better when launching an 
infringing product under circumstances in which the relevant patents 
could have been readily found and analyzed.269 
To be sure, underenforcement of patents is not necessarily a bad 
thing, as large-scale assertion of patents in litigation would bring the 
economy to a halt.270 But searching need not equal mandatory contact 
with the patentee followed by a lawsuit. For example, a firm may 
reasonably ignore a discovered patent because it is probably not 
infringed or invalid, side-step enforcement by designing around the 
claims, or even acquire or license the patent at issue if the price is 
right. In addition, even diligent searches can sometimes miss a patent, 
perhaps resulting ultimately in no enforcement, and some patentees — 
for various reasons, including cost, desire to preserve commercial 
 
 264 Markel, supra note 31, at 320. 
 265 Id. at 285; see also Jonathan S. Masur, Patent Liability Rules as Search Rules, 78 
U. CHI. L. REV. 187, 194-95 (2011). 
 266 Wanlass v. Gen. Elec. Co., 148 F.3d 1334, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (discussing 
this issue in analyzing laches). 
 267 Cf. Masur, supra note 265, at 191-92. 
 268 Lee & Melamed, supra note 5, at 443, 461-65. 
 269 Cf. id. at 411-12 & n.112 (“Current law distinguishes between ordinary and 
willful infringement. We propose a different distinction, between ‘guilty’ and 
‘innocent’ infringement.”); see also supra note 244 and accompanying text.  
 270 Chien, Holding Up and Holding Out, supra note 251, at 14.  
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relationships, fear of invalidation, and so on — do not assert their 
patents even when they know that infringement is occurring.271 In 
some cases, relevant patents or applications might simply not exist at 
the time that a clearance search is made, and the (eventual) infringer 
would have no reason to believe that a relevant patent will appear.272 
More generally, in some industries, the underenforcement story could 
be a positive one as a general matter given the social costs and benefits 
involved. But, because there are also industries for which an approach 
that would diminish the number of uncompensated infringements can 
provide social benefits that justify the costs of patent search,273 this 
insight may again point toward introducing industry-specificity in the 
enhanced damages analysis and, thus, to rejecting the uniformly 
applicable actual knowledge rule.274 
In some cases, moreover, the possibility of increased patent 
enforcement could bring with it various positive spillover effects. 
Patent litigation can be socially beneficial in numerous ways even if 
the underlying patents are weak — for example, it can lead to 
invalidation of such patents.275 This result is more readily 
accomplished by manufacturers or suppliers, who have greater 
capacity than other potential defendants, such as end users who 
sometimes end up being targeted instead, to search for patents and 
develop successful defenses.276 Professor Chien explained that “[t]he 
manufacturer is more likely to be more ‘patent-sophisticated,’ have 
better access to potentially invalidating prior art, and be more invested 
in establishing a reputation for toughness lest they be targeted by 
other patent asserters.”277 But for these very reasons, infringers falling 
into this category “are often left off the case” in lawsuits brought by 
 
 271 See Clark D. Asay, Patent Pacifism, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 645, 711 (2017). 
 272 I explain that not searching under these circumstances should not be generally 
considered reckless. See infra notes 556–58 and accompanying text. 
 273 See infra notes 535–57 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 383–86 and 
accompanying text. 
 274 See infra Section III.C. 
 275 See Brian J. Love & James C. Yoon, Expanding Patent Law’s Customer Suit 
Exception, 93 B.U. L. REV. 1605, 1620-21 (2013); see also Timothy R. Holbrook, The 
Supreme Court’s Quiet Revolution in Induced Patent Infringement, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1007, 1010, 1034 (2016) (explaining how the rules governing mental states for 
indirect infringement could affect market entry and patent validity challenges). But see 
Stephen Yelderman, Do Patent Challenges Increase Competition?, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1943 (2016) (arguing that patent invalidation does not always result in pro-
competitive effects).  
 276 Love & Yoon, supra note 275, at 1618. 
 277 Chien, Holding Up and Holding Out, supra note 251, at 29. 
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“enterprising” plaintiffs.278 If, however, there were a greater “stick” in 
place to force manufacturers to search for patents, they would have a 
greater likelihood of approaching the patentee, often triggering 
litigation against firms actually in position to defend the case 
successfully and thus improving the chances of the patent’s 
invalidation as opposed to a nuisance settlement.279 
3. It Reinforces Excessive Focus on Individual Patents 
The actual knowledge approach excuses ignorance of the larger 
patent landscape, but makes up for that by creating the expectation 
that the patents of which the defendant becomes aware are analyzed in 
exhaustive detail. The now-discarded adverse inference rule embodied 
this attitude, practically forcing accused infringers to spend a great 
deal of resources on formal opinion of counsel letters to avoid or at 
least counter charges of willfulness.280 Although the rule has been 
eliminated, opinion letters continue to play an important role in 
dealing with willfulness accusations.281 Of course, formal opinions can 
always be helpful for accused infringers defending the charge of 
willfulness in front of a jury. But given the high cost and resulting 
social burdens associated with such opinions, a willfulness standard 
that makes them critical would be misguided. For example, in cases 
where the theory of infringement is unclear, where there is 
invalidating prior art that looks on-point to an engineer analyzing the 
patent,282 or perhaps where the potential defendant is too small to 
 
 278 Id. 
 279 Karshtedt, Causal Responsibility and Patent Infringement, supra note 15, at 627-
41 (discussing the relative responsibilities of end users and manufacturers for 
infringement); see also Masur, supra note 265, at 200 (criticizing a rule under which 
“search responsibilities will not necessarily wind up in the hands of the most efficient 
party”).  
 280 See supra notes 155–64 and accompanying text. 
 281 Lynda J. Oswald, The Evolving Role of Opinions of Counsel in Patent Infringement 
Cases, 52 IDEA: INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 13 (2012); Timothy M. O’Shea, New Rule for 
Proving Willful Infringement and Why Opinions from Patent Counsel Still Matter After 
Patent Reform, LEXOLOGY (Jan. 28, 2013), http://www.lexology.com/library/ 
detail.aspx?g=afac3f58-f817-4b00-a32e-04a93708bd33; Charles T. Steenburg, Do 
Opinions of Counsel Still Matter After Patent Reform? Absolutely!, WOLF GREENFIELD 
(Apr. 2, 2012), http://www.wolfgreenfield.com/publications/articles/2012/opinions-
after-patent-reform-steenburg. For an example of a post-Halo case discussing the value 
of invalidity opinions in countering allegations of bad-faith infringement, see 
Greatbatch Ltd. v. AVX Corp., 121 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1786, 2016 WL 7217625, at *4-
5 (D. Del. 2016). 
 282 See, e.g., Trs. of Bos. Univ. v. Everlight Elecs. Co., Ltd., 212 F. Supp. 3d 254, 
257-58 (D. Mass. 2016) (relying on the testimony of the defendant’s director of the 
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afford a formal letter and must rely on whatever resources it has, lack 
of willfulness may be readily established even without any formal 
invalidity or noninfringement opinions.283 Nonetheless, opinion letters 
remain important for countering willfulness and are thought to have 
become more so after Halo stripped infringers of “objective 
recklessness” defenses developed during litigation.284 The outsized 
role of opinions of counsel in the enhanced damages determination is 
a natural consequence of the actual knowledge rule, which limits the 
universe of patents that the accused infringer must deal with, but then 
holds them to a very high standard with respect to those patents. 
Justice Breyer’s concurrence in Halo, joined by two other Justices, 
addressed the issue of expensive opinions of counsel.285 Justice Breyer 
maintained that mere receipt of a “demand” letter from a patent owner 
indicating the serial numbers of possibly relevant patents may not be 
enough to justify an award of enhanced damages starting from the 
date of receipt, even in some cases in which the infringer has not 
acquired an opinion of counsel.286 He argued that companies cannot 
always be faulted “simply for failing to spend considerable time, effort, 
and money obtaining expert views about whether some or all of the 
patents described in the letter apply to its activities.”287 The 
concurrence further noted that “the risk of treble damages can 
encourage the company to settle, or even abandon any challenged 
activity,” leading to the possibility that “a patent will reach beyond its 
lawful scope to discourage lawful activity.”288 Accordingly, Justice 
 
intellectual property division, a person without a law degree, to conclude that a 
reasonable basis to believe that the defendant did not infringe existed), appeal 
docketed, No. 16-2576 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 29, 2016). But cf. SSL Servs., LLC v. Citrix Sys., 
Inc., 769 F.3d 1073, 1092 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (affirming, on abuse of discretion review, a 
district court’s decision to exclude an engineer’s “personal beliefs regarding non-
infringement” because “they were beliefs formed by a lay person without the benefit of 
the court’s claim construction,” and therefore were “of little probative value and 
potentially prejudicial”). It is worth noting that patent examiners, who decide whether 
claims in patent applications comply with requirements of patentability and should be 
allowed, have technical training, but typically no law degrees. 
 283 Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1936 (2016) (Breyer, J., 
concurring); see infra Sections III.B–C (arguing that courts should be lenient toward 
end users in the enhanced damages calculus). 
 284 See Erik R. Puknys & Yanbin Xu, Willful Infringement After Halo, FINNEGAN 
(Sept. 14, 2016), https://www.finnegan.com/en/insights/willful-infringement-after-
halo.html.  
 285 Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1937-38 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 286 Id. at 1937. 
 287 Id.  
 288 Id. 
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Breyer concluded that courts, in their exercise of discretion whether to 
award enhanced damages, must account for the specific circumstances 
of each case, which “make[ ] all the difference.”289 It would surely be 
undesirable from a social welfare perspective to require a company to 
deplete its legal budget, and maybe its whole operating budget, in 
order to examine thousands of patents and initiate licensing 
negotiations over many of them. In contrast, a more limited search 
and analysis may not be excessively burdensome, and would be 
consistent with what could be reasonably expected for certain types of 
defendants.290 
What is even less defensible, however, is a state of affairs in which a 
complete non-search often ends up being preferred to a search, even 
for well-resourced, sophisticated defendants practicing in the relevant, 
well-circumscribed technology space.291 Indeed, although Justice 
Breyer proceeded from the assumption “that the infringer knew of the 
patent”292 before it could be eligible for enhanced damages, his “all-
circumstances” insight actually points the other way. While it 
sometimes may be non-reckless to do very little about a patent one 
knows about, the converse could also be true — failing to discover 
and address a patent that one could have readily found and analyzed 
could be a hallmark of recklessness, making the infringer a “guilty” 
one.293 But under the Federal Circuit’s willfulness doctrine, if a 
company adopted a policy of never searching for patents, never 
opening a demand letter, and instructing outside counsel to never 
inform it of any relevant patents, it would still be “innocent.”294 As 
colorfully described by a patent lawyer I know, this “would be the 
patent equivalent of a driver putting on a blindfold and later claiming 
(truthfully) he had no actual knowledge of all the pedestrians he ran 
over.”295 An alternative rule that would induce companies to spend 
some of their legal budgets on learning the broader patent landscape, 
as opposed to analyzing a few patents they learned about from a 
demand letter, would in turn discourage head-in-the-sand behavior 
 
 289 Id. at 1936. 
 290 See infra Section III.B. 
 291 See supra notes 260–63 and accompanying text.  
 292 Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1936. 
 293 Lee & Melamed, supra note 5, at 461. 
 294 But see Glob.-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 563 U.S. 754, 766 (2011) 
(concluding that, in the context of mental states for indirect infringement, willful 
blindness equals actual knowledge). 
 295 Attributed with permission to Andrew Baluch.  
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and align with the disclosure and information-dissemination functions 
of the patent system. 
 
*** 
 
The foregoing considerations suggest that the actual knowledge rule 
is a poor fit as a threshold for enhanced damages in patent law, and is 
potentially wrong in view of Halo and other authority. In the next 
Part, I look to tort law and other areas of civil litigation to see how 
analogous issues are handled. The aim of this analysis is manifold. 
First, I maintain that, as a matter of statutory interpretation, evolving 
common-law standards for enhanced damages should inform 
analogous questions of patent law.296 I examine a Supreme Court case, 
Smith v. Wade, that endorsed this methodology in a context of a 
different federal statute.297 Second, adopting this interpretive 
approach, I look to changes in mental state standards for enhanced 
damages in other areas of law to supply content for awarding patent 
treble damages, and, more generally, to see what patent law can learn 
from the accumulated wisdom on enhanced damages in civil litigation. 
This discussion fills the gaps left open by Halo, which embraced the 
rationale that treble damages in patent law are like punitive damages, 
but did not fully hash out the issue of what mental states must be 
proven to obtain such damages. In particular, history provides a 
grounding for Halo’s seemingly ambivalent treatment of treble 
damages, which allows for sanctions against behaviors that are 
“consciously wrongful” and “characteristic of a pirate,” but also those 
that are reckless.298 Third, I focus on the claim, particularly 
controversial in the area of punitive damages, that tort law has moved 
toward the goal of economic efficiency over time and examine the 
 
 296 See Baude & Sachs, supra note 15, at 1083; see also Karshtedt, Causal 
Responsibility and Patent Infringement, supra note 15, at 586. Professor Ted Sichelman 
questioned the value of tort principles for patent damages, Sichelman, supra note 6, at 
554-60, but conceded that the Patent Act would need to be amended for his proposal 
to be adopted, id. at 567-68. But in this Article, I take § 284, and its interpretation in 
Halo, as givens and operate within these constraints. For an analysis of the tensions 
between the goals of tort law and those of copyright law, raising issues similar to those 
one encounters in developing the tort-patent connection, see generally Wendy J. 
Gordon, Of Harms and Benefits: Torts, Restitution, and Intellectual Property, 21 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 449 (1992). 
 297 461 U.S. 30, 46-50 (1983). Smith was cited, but not analyzed, in Seagate. See In 
re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc). 
 298 Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1932-33 (2016). 
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relevance of this argument for the correct standard for treble damages 
in patent cases. 
II. SUPRA-COMPENSATORY DAMAGES OUTSIDE PATENT LAW 
A. Methodological Considerations 
When Congress has been silent on the standards to apply for 
awarding supra-compensatory damages, how should courts go about 
filling in those standards? Fortunately for the purposes of this Article, 
the Patent Act is not unique among federal statutes in setting forth no 
standards for the recovery of supra-compensatory damages, so courts 
have faced this general problem in other contexts. A well-known 
example is 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a statute that creates a civil cause of 
action for those who have suffered “the deprivation of any rights, 
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws”299 at 
the hands of state officers. This section says little about remedies, 
stating only that the losing defendant “shall be liable to the party 
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding 
for redress.”300 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court readily concluded 
that, among other remedies, Congress implicitly provided for punitive 
damages against those found to have violated § 1983.301 
As to the mental state standard for awarding such damages, the 
Supreme Court explained that a two-stage analysis is in order.302 A 
court should first ascertain the requirements for this remedy in the 
developing tort law and, second, determine whether overriding policy 
considerations in the specific statutory context would support a 
departure from the dominant tort approach. While, in this section, I 
focus on the first step of the analysis as set forth by the Court in an 
important § 1983 case, I undertake a deeper exploration of the 
trajectory of the tort punitive damages standard in the section that 
follows, further hashing out the appropriate mental state that the 
Wade Court has gleaned from the case law. Finally, in section II.C, I 
examine whether policy considerations should override the tort 
approach to mental states for enhanced damages in the context of the 
Patent Act. 
 
 299 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2018). 
 300 Id.  
 301 See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 22 (1980). Because § 1983 does not speak to 
punitive damages, they are uncapped and limited only by the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.  
 302 See infra note 326 and accompanying text. 
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In Smith v. Wade,303 the Supreme Court faced the question of what a 
defendant’s minimal level of culpability should be for a plaintiff to 
collect punitive damages in a successful suit under § 1983. Daniel 
Wade, confined in a reformatory for youthful first offenders in 
Missouri, successfully sued William Smith, a guard who had placed 
Wade in a cell with other inmates who ended up assaulting Wade.304 
After the district court instructed the jury that it “may assess punitive 
or exemplary damages” upon showing that Smith exhibited “a reckless 
or callous disregard of, or indifference to, the rights or safety of 
others,” the jury “awarded [Wade] $25,000 in compensatory damages 
and $5,000 in punitive damages.”305 The Court of Appeals for the 
Eighth Circuit affirmed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari and 
affirmed the Eighth Circuit in turn.306 Although parallels between 
patent infringement and deprivations of civil rights are difficult to 
draw based on the differences in the interests at stake, the case is 
nonetheless useful and instructive for its statutory interpretation 
methodology. As in Halo, the Court dealt with a relatively old statute 
whose language did not say very much. Accordingly, the Court turned 
to tort law to deal with the problem before it, and made some 
significant jurisprudential points. 
In determining the appropriate mental state standard for § 1983 
punitive damages, the Court looked “to the common law of torts (both 
modern and as of 1871 [the year that § 1983 was signed into law]), 
with such modification or adaptation as might be necessary to carry 
out the purpose and policy of the statute.”307 Moreover, the Court 
explicitly defended its reliance on modern tort law. It explained that, 
while “we have found useful guidance in the law prevailing at the time 
when § 1983 was enacted[,] it does not follow that that law is 
absolutely controlling, or that current law is irrelevant.”308 The Court 
noted that “if the prevailing view on some point of general tort law 
had changed substantially in the intervening century . . . , we might be 
highly reluctant to assume that Congress intended to perpetuate a 
now-obsolete doctrine.”309 
 
 303 461 U.S. 30 (1983).  
 304 Id. at 32-33.  
 305 Id. at 33 (citation omitted).  
 306 Id. at 33, 56.  
 307 Id. at 34. 
 308 Id. at 34 n.2.  
 309 Id.; see Hillel Y. Levin & Michael L. Wells, Qualified Immunity and Statutory 
Interpretation: A Response to William Baude, CALIF. L. REV. ONLINE (forthcoming 2018) 
(manuscript at 8-9, 25), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3131242 (arguing that statutes such 
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Canvassing both modern and historical sources, the Supreme Court 
ultimately settled on the standard of recklessness as opposed to intent 
for punitive damages under § 1983. The Court initially determined 
that 
[m]ost cases under state common law, although varying in 
their precise terminology, have adopted more or less the same 
rule, recognizing that punitive damages in tort cases may be 
awarded not only for actual intent to injure or evil motive, but 
also for recklessness, serious indifference to or disregard for 
the rights of others, or even gross negligence.310 
Based on this interpretive approach, the Court’s distillation of state 
common-law developments led it to conclude tentatively that punitive 
damages in § 1983 actions could be awarded for behaviors beyond 
those that exhibited subjective intent to harm a particular victim. In 
other words, the Court adopted the recklessness mental state as a kind 
of a presumptive minimal standard for punitive damages based on the 
common law, and then noted that “the purpose and policy” of § 1983 
did not override this default.311 Specifically, the court determined that 
Smith “has not shown why § 1983 should give higher protection from 
punitive damages than ordinary tort law” by way of adopting the 
intent, as opposed to recklessness, standard to open the door for such 
damages.312 
Justice Rehnquist’s thoughtful dissent, joined by two other Justices, 
nicely captured the distinction between intent and recklessness. He 
explained that the “distinction between acts that are intentionally 
harmful and those that are very negligent, or unreasonable, involves a 
basic difference of kind, not just a variation of degree.”313 But what is 
the precise nature of that difference? “The former typically demands 
inquiry into the actor’s subjective motive and purpose, while the latter 
ordinarily requires only an objective determination of the relative risks 
 
as the Lanham Act and § 1983 should be interpreted under the “common law method” 
and enumerating factors pointing to the conclusion that the Patent Act likely does as 
well). 
 310 Smith, 461 U.S. at 47-48. 
 311 Id. at 34; see Edward F. Mahoney, Casenote, Punitive Damages and the Use of 
Modern Common Law in Construing Section 1983: Smith v. Wade, 25 B.C. L. REV. 1001, 
1004-10 (1984) (discussing the genesis of this analytical approach).  
 312 Smith, 461 U.S. at 50.  
 313 Id. at 64 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (first citing WILLIAM J. PROSSER, LAW OF 
TORTS § 34, at 185 (4th ed. 1971); then citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500, 
cmt. f (AM. LAW INST. 1965)). 
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and advantages accruing to society from particular behavior.”314 
Justice Rehnquist believed that the subjective standard was more 
historically defensible than recklessness for punitive damages under 
§ 1983, as well as more appropriate from a policy perspective.315 
Justice Rehnquist’s reasoning has merit.316 In suits against 
government officers engaged in abusive behaviors under color of law, 
the coherence of a primarily subjective standard can be reasonably 
defended. Here, it might make sense for juries to focus mainly on 
punishing wardens and guards for consciously neglecting (and 
perhaps showing disdain for) their duties toward prisoners in their 
charge.317 Indeed, because § 1983 actions might be viewed as quasi-
criminal,318 a mainly objective, cost-benefit evaluation of the 
defendant’s conduct leaves one uneasy in this context.319 In this vein, 
there was some ambiguity with respect to the precise basis on which 
punitive damages in Smith were imposed. While the case’s facts are 
consistent with the guard’s laziness or desire to save money and time, 
they also suggest that he subjectively held the lives of the prisoners in 
his custody in low regard,320 and punitive damages were properly 
awarded to sanction and deter such an immoral attitude and 
associated conduct.321 Perhaps it stands to reason, then, that courts 
applying Smith eventually settled on the criminal version of the 
recklessness standard for punitive damages under § 1983.322 Justice 
Rehnquist may have lost the battle in Smith, but he arguably won the 
 
 314 Id. at 64 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 282). 
 315 Id. 
 316 See Gary B. Brewer, A Recklessness Standard for Punitive Damages in Section 1983 
Actions, 49 MO. L. REV. 815, 816-20 (1984) (criticizing the Smith majority and 
defending Justice Rehnquist’s view).  
 317 See id. (providing various rationales for limiting the availability of punitive 
damages in § 1983 actions).  
 318 See Taylor Van Hove, Fraud, Mistake, and Section 1983 Prison Claims: Why the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Should Be Amended to Require Heightened Pleading for 
Section 1983 Inmate Litigation, 65 DEPAUL L. REV. 213 (2015); cf. Rachel A. Harmon, 
The Problem of Policing, 110 MICH. L. REV. 761, 765-77 (2012). To the extent that we 
wished to make it easier to punish these violations, though, a civil recklessness 
standard may be appropriate. See infra notes 371–74 and accompanying text 
(suggesting that this dynamic may be behind the development of the law of punitive 
damages for drunk driving). 
 319 See infra Section II.C. 
 320 Smith, 461 U.S. at 32-33.  
 321 Id. at 49-54.  
 322 See Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526, 535-36 (1999) (construing Smith 
to have held that subjective recklessness is the standard for punitive damages under 
§ 1983).  
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war in that future decisions adopted this more morally-grounded type 
of recklessness which, like intent, has strongly subjective features. 
The difference between the two forms of recklessness is worth 
exploring further. Echoing Justice Rehnquist’s dissent in Smith, the 
Supreme Court in Farmer v. Brennan distinguished them as follows: 
While “[t]he criminal law . . . generally permits a finding of 
recklessness only when a person disregards a risk of harm of which he 
is aware,” “[t]he civil law generally calls a person reckless who 
acts . . . in the face of an unjustifiably high risk of harm that is either 
known or so obvious that it should be known.”323 In Safeco v. Burr, the 
Court explained that in contrast to criminal recklessness, “[s]ubjective 
knowledge on the part of the offender”324 is not required for civil 
recklessness. While § 1983 actions today call for a criminal version of 
recklessness as a prerequisite for punitive damages awards, perhaps 
most other civil actions, like claims for compensation under the FCRA 
addressed in Safeco, sensibly demand proof of only civil recklessness 
before enhanced damages can be imposed.325 
Leaving aside the details of Smith, the case’s methodology for setting 
the standard for awarding punitive damages under a federal statute is 
worth recapping. The Court looked to developing tort law to fill the 
gaps in the statute, and only then, as a second line of analysis, 
considered whether the tort standard made sense for § 1983 actions as 
a policy matter.326 Smith is not unique in its focus on the common law. 
 
 323 511 U.S. 825, 836-37 (1994). It is notable that even cases like Farmer, which 
explicitly adopted the criminal version of recklessness as the standard for establishing 
Eighth Amendment violations in prisoner suits, have been interpreted by some courts 
to allow liability with proof of something less than actual knowledge. See, e.g., 
Makdessi v. Fields, 789 F.3d 126, 136 (4th Cir. 2015) (vacating the judgment of a 
district court against the plaintiff in an Eighth Amendment prisoner suit because the 
lower court “failed to appreciate that the subjective ‘actual knowledge’ standard 
required to find deliberate indifference may be proven by circumstantial evidence that 
a risk was so obvious that it had to have been known”); see also Brice v. Va. Beach 
Corr. Ctr., 58 F.3d 101, 105 (4th Cir. 1995) (“Nevertheless, even under this 
subjective standard, a prison official cannot hide behind an excuse that he was 
unaware of a risk, no matter how obvious.”).  
 324 Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 68 n.18 (2007).  
 325 Id. at 68; cf. supra note 73 and accompanying text (noting critiques of subjective 
standards in patent law by other commentators). Interestingly, Safeco also held that 
punitive damages under the FCRA are not available for bad-faith conduct in the 
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current thinking.” 551 U.S. at 70 n.20. But the Supreme Court distinguished this 
aspect of Safeco in view of patent-specific precedents allowing for enhanced damages 
for bad-faith infringement. Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1933 
n.* (2016); see Narechania, supra note 212 (manuscript at 48).  
 326 See Michael L. Wells, Punitive Damages for Constitutional Torts, 56 LA. L. REV. 
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To give another example, the Supreme Court in Exxon Shipping Co. v. 
Baker, a case involving punitive damages for torts under the admiralty 
jurisdiction of the federal courts,327 likewise drew upon state law 
sources. The Exxon Court emphasized the importance of 
“understanding of the place of punishment in modern civil law and 
reasonable standards of process in administering punitive law,” and 
accordingly provided “a brief account of the history behind today’s 
punitive damages” before settling on the proper standard.328 The 
Court’s characterization of the mental states relevant for punitive 
damages was not far off from that of Justice Rehnquist’s dissent in 
Smith: Exxon noted that “under the umbrellas of punishment and its 
aim of deterrence, degrees of relative blameworthiness are apparent,” 
and explained that “[r]eckless conduct is not intentional or malicious, 
nor is it necessarily callous toward the risk of harming others, as 
opposed to unheedful of it.”329 Notably, Exxon dealt only with the 
issue of the proper cap on punitive damages, and did not question the 
availability of this remedy in admiralty cases for behaviors falling 
under the rubric of civil recklessness.330 
Halo, like Smith and Exxon, looked to the common law of punitive 
damages when it interpreted § 284, and flagged intent and 
recklessness as the relevant culpability levels as well.331 The general 
approach is ubiquitous: as Professors William Baude and Stephen 
Sachs argued in a recent article, the common law routinely provides 
unwritten “substantive rules” for interpreting federal legislation.332 But 
to fully understand what Halo meant, an exploration of relevant tort 
precedents is in order. 
B. Punitive Damages in Tort 
1. Historical Developments 
For a significant period of time in Anglo-American legal history, 
torts and crimes were essentially undifferentiated.333 Both the state and 
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the Smoke, supra note 31, at 395. For an early case suggesting a distinction, see 
  
1488 University of California, Davis [Vol. 51:1427 
the injured party had a role to play in pursuing the offender in the 
same case, blurring the functions and procedural aspects of what we 
today recognize as criminal as opposed to civil actions. In some suits, 
the injured party had the option of obtaining a monetary judgment 
from the offender if it principally sought compensation, or of having 
the offender imprisoned if he or she cared more about revenge.334 
Although actions that we would characterize today as civil eventually 
became independent from their criminal counterparts, scholars of the 
common law have noted the historic links between them. For 
example, “[l]arceny has been regarded as the criminal kin to the civil 
action for trespass vi et armis, that is, by actual or implied violence,” 
and “[m]ost scholars of English law agree that the writ of trespass is 
derived from the appeal of felony for larceny.”335 Even so, the close 
link between criminal and civil actions remained. Thus, “[a] civil 
action of trespass as late as 1694 could result in criminal sanctions 
against the defendant.”336 The spirit of the historical tort-crime 
connection persists to this day, and some theorists continue to see 
some aspects of tort law as carrying out the function of private 
vengeance, or recourse.337 
 
Weaver v. Ward (1616) 80 Eng. Rep. 284, 284 (K.B.) (noting that “if a lunatick hurts 
a man, he shall be answerable in trespass,” but explaining that the killing “shall be no 
felony”); cf. WILLIAM B. HALE, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES 216 (1896). See 
generally David J. Seipp, The Distinction Between Crime and Tort in the Early Common 
Law, 76 B.U. L. REV. 59, 83-86 (1996). 
 334 Colby, Clearing the Smoke, supra note 31, at 432 (“Victims who preferred 
compensation could bring an action for a writ of trespass; victims who preferred 
vengeance could bring an appeal of felony. ‘They could either put their wrongdoers to 
death and collect nothing [through an appeal of felony], or collect money for 
themselves and leave their wrongdoers alive with the rest of their wealth intact 
[through a writ of trespass].’” (quoting Seipp, supra note 333, at 84) (alterations in 
original)). 
 335 Michael E. Tigar, The Right of Property and the Law of Theft, 62 TEX. L. REV. 
1443, 1446 (1984) (citation omitted). Professor Tigar noted that “[m]ost scholars of 
English law agree that the writ of trespass is derived from the appeal of felony for 
larceny.” Id. (citing THEODORE F.T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON 
LAW 369-70 (5th ed. 1956)).  
 336 Note, supra note 123, at 523.  
 337 See Keating, supra note 66, at 343-44 (setting forth the moral foundations of 
tort law’s reasonableness standard); see also John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. 
Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 917, 974 (2010) (“When the social-
contract metaphor is stripped away, the idea of civil recourse becomes clearer. It is a 
political commitment to the following effect: Individuals who are able to prove that 
someone has treated them in a manner that the legal system counts as a relational, 
injurious wrong shall have the authority to hold the wrongdoer accountable to him. 
This commitment is not founded, in the first instance, on instrumental concerns but 
on political and moral ones.”). See generally ERNEST WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 
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Even as tort law began to embrace the goal of compensation in the 
nineteenth century,338 courts’ description of punitive damages as a 
vehicle of vengeance and punishment continued to reflect the tort-
crime link. Thus, the Illinois Supreme Court held in 1864 that “where 
the wrong is wanton, or it is willful, the jury are authorized to give an 
amount of damages beyond the actual injury sustained, as a 
punishment, and to preserve the public tranquillity.”339 The reference 
to “public tranquillity” suggests that punitive damages could reduce 
the possibility of self-help by fulfilling tort victims’ desire for revenge. 
According to the court, this function was different from that of 
compensatory damages, which were meant to cover the victims’ 
monetary losses for “the actual injury sustained.”340 Some nineteenth-
century courts, however, took a different view, arguing that 
punishment is the exclusive province of criminal law and punitive 
damages do not belong in civil litigation at all.341 While punitive 
damages remain an integral part of tort law today, the fit continues to 
be an uneasy one and some commentators have argued that such 
damages are nothing but criminal-style punishment through the civil 
litigation backdoor.342 
Still, the Illinois court’s reference to “public tranquility” seems 
jarring to modern ears. Although public-order rationales for punitive 
damages in tort, and for tort law as a whole, continue to be invoked 
today, we now generally think of criminal law as playing the dominant 
role over tort in helping maintain the peace.343 The law in the 
 
(1995). Indeed, even a claim only for compensatory damages from a defendant, rather 
than for punitive damages or for the defendant’s imprisonment, can be characterized 
as seeking recourse. See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra, at 960-66. 
 338 See supra note 107 and accompanying text.  
 339 Hawk v. Ridgway, 33 Ill. 473, 475 (1864) (citing Foot v. Nichols, 28 Ill. 486, 
488 (1862)); see also Merest v. Harvey (1814) 128 Eng. Rep. 761, 761 (C.P.) (Heath J) 
(“It goes to prevent the practice of duelling, if juries are permitted to punish insult by 
exemplary damages.”); cf. McNamara v. King, 7 Ill. (2 Gilm.) 432, 437 (1845) (stating 
that the function of punitive damages is “not only to compensate the plaintiff, but to 
punish the defendant”); PUNITIVE DAMAGES AND BUSINESS TORTS: A PRACTITIONER’S 
HANDBOOK 6-12 (Thomas J. Collin ed., 1998) (summarizing the history of punitive 
damages). 
 340 Hawk, 33 Ill. at 475. 
 341 Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342, 382 (1872). 
 342 See, e.g., Redish & Mathews, supra note 31, at 13-16. 
 343 Ellis, supra note 31, at 29. To be clear, the functions of revenge and of deterrence 
of unlawful behavior are not mutually exclusive, and perhaps even complementary. 
And, particularly in actions for intentional trespass to land, the rationale of prevention 
of breaches of the peace, as through violent self-help, appears even today. See, e.g., 
Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., 563 N.W.2d 154, 209 (Wis. 1997). But the focus on 
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nineteenth century, however, presented a somewhat different picture. 
One commentator, Professor Michael Rustad, noted: 
The doctrine of exemplary damages was used in nineteenth-
century American cases to punish and deter defendants who 
committed a wide variety of intentional torts with a spirit of 
malice, fraud, oppression, or insult. The purpose of the 
remedy was to compensate the plaintiff for the mortification of 
the injury and deter the defendant from repeating actions 
which threatened the social order. The overriding function of 
the remedy was to preserve the social peace and avoid crude 
forms of self-help such as dueling and the type of destructive 
social conflict dubbed by historian William Holdsworth as 
“bastard feudalism.”344 
Consistent with these intuitions, enhanced damages functioned to 
provide redress for reprehensible interpersonal behaviors that 
embodied the defendant’s extreme disregard for the rights of a specific 
victim. Examples include cases of assault, seduction, breach of a 
promise to marry, libel, and other “insults.”345 There are complications 
in this picture: As Professor Rustad’s reference to “compensat[ing] the 
plaintiff for the mortification of the injury” suggests,346 “exemplary” or 
“vindictive” damages were not always completely divorced from the 
goal of compensation — at least when it came to “dignitary” injuries 
for which compensatory damages were difficult to quantify. Professor 
Anthony Sebok, likewise, explained that “compensation for emotional 
suffering” and “compensation for insult” were two make-whole 
functions of “exemplary” damages that can be gleaned from 
nineteenth-century opinions.347 
Nonetheless, early understandings of the kinds of torts for which 
punitive damages were available convey opprobrium of malevolent 
behavior toward fellow human beings that, according to Professor 
Sebok, gave this remedy a strong retributive flavor. In the context of a 
discussion of punitive damages for trespass to chattels and seduction, 
 
revenge as a key reason for awarding punitive damages appears more pronounced in 
nineteenth-century tort cases as opposed to modern ones.  
 344 Rustad, supra note 31, at 3 & n.7 (quoting 2 SIR WILLIAM S. HOLDSWORTH, 2 
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 416-18 (3d ed. 1923)). 
 345 See Sebok, What Did Punitive Damages Do?, supra note 31, at 200. 
 346 Rustad, supra note 31, at 3.  
 347 Sebok, What Did Punitive Damages Do?, supra note 31, at 197-201; cf. supra note 
52 and accompanying text (noting that such harms are not remedied by compensatory 
damages in modern tort law). 
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Sebok noted that “[o]ne might even describe the phenomenon of 
exemplary damages as a concrete example of the expressive use of 
punishment, where punishment is not inflicted to alter criminals’ cost-
benefit analysis but to alter criminals’ sense of what would be tolerated 
by the communities in which they live every day.”348 Thus, in line 
with early tort law’s close connection with criminal law, punitive 
damages began as a remedy against those who were acting upon evil 
motives and exhibited reprehensible interpersonal conduct that would 
be expected to prompt revenge. 
But things have changed, at least to some degree. Professor 
Catherine Sharkey contended that “[m]odern tort cases . . . have 
exerted increasing pressure upon this individual-specific harm 
model”349 that focuses on “retributive punishment.”350 As the advent 
of the industrial age led to a depersonalization of injury-causing 
behavior, the doctrine of punitive damages “expanded to punish and 
deter large corporations which recklessly endangered the public 
through their misconduct.”351 The law, however, was left with an old 
vocabulary for labeling enhancement-eligible offenses: Professor 
Rustad noted that “[t]he words most frequently used to describe 
conduct deserving of punitive damages such as ill-will, evil motive or 
wanton misconduct are fictitious when applied to organizational 
deviance.”352 
Indeed, it is difficult to imagine that a corporation, through its 
officers, would actually seek to harm consumers with its products.353 
More likely, this type of defendant would aim to cut costs and in so 
doing put out an unsafe product or service — with railroads 
distinguishing themselves as perhaps the most notable late nineteenth-
 
 348 Sebok, What Did Punitive Damages Do?, supra note 31, at 203. 
 349 Sharkey, Punitive Damages as Societal Damages, supra note 31, at 357. 
 350 Id. at 353. 
 351 Rustad, supra note 31, at 3 & n.7.  
 352 Id.; see also Owen, Civil Punishment and the Public Good, supra note 31, at 119 
(arguing that formulation of precise standards for punitive damages awards would 
help prevent unfair results against corporate defendants). 
 353 Cf. Rantanen, An Objective View, supra note 15 (discussing the incoherency of 
the notion of subjective mental states of corporations). Interestingly, punitive damages 
are awarded more frequently for business torts than for personal injuries. See MARK A. 
FRANKLIN ET AL., TORT LAW AND ALTERNATIVES: CASES AND MATERIALS 756 (10th ed. 
2016) (“Punitive damages are awarded more frequently and at higher rate in 
commercial litigation than in tort cases. The only category of personal injury torts in 
which punitive damages are awarded at a higher rate than the rate in commercial 
litigation is intentional torts.”). 
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century corporate miscreant of this sort.354 The law adjusted to these 
developments, and punitive damages moved beyond the realm of 
intentional torts against specific persons: “[B]eginning in the mid-
nineteenth century, punitive damages were awarded in negligence 
cases, where the defendant’s conduct was gross or reckless.”355 The 
“public tranquility” rationale is more difficult to invoke in tort claims 
alleging corporate misdeeds, as it would seem that one is more likely 
to duel with or otherwise personally take revenge on an individual 
who committed assault or libel, or corrupted one’s child, than with the 
CEO whose product caused an injury due to reckless corporate 
conduct.356 
The twentieth century saw a further shift toward a more objective 
conception of punitive damages. As Professor Sharkey concluded, “It 
is no longer the case that malice or wanton conduct is required; 
increasingly, state legislatures and courts acknowledge that reckless 
disregard can suffice”357 for the imposition of such damages. In some 
states, courts continued to use terms like “wanton,” but effectively 
redefined them to bring them into line with the recklessness 
framework.358 Professor Jody Kraus noted the linguistic side of this 
phenomenon in an insightful article, explaining that courts might 
resort to terms whose semantic purchase might have originally been 
deontic, but which modern developments have imbued with 
economic-efficiency connotations at least to some degree.359 The shift 
has been comprehensive and covers numerous areas of law — from 
individual negligence to corporate torts, including products liability, 
 
 354 See, e.g., Goddard v. Grand Trunk Ry., 57 Me. 202 (1869). 
 355 Rustad, supra note 31, at 3 & n.7. 
 356 But see Zipursky, supra note 31, at 107 (“The plaintiff’s right to be punitive 
constitutes the core of a civil aspect of punitive damages, while the state’s goal of 
inflicting punishment upon the defendant is the root of a criminal aspect.”); see also 
Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 337, at 974; cf. 2 MARSHALL S. SHAPO, SHAPO ON THE 
LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 29.04[I].1 (7th ed. 2017) (“Decisions favoring the award 
of punitive damages sometimes have an avowedly moral slant.”). 
 357 Sharkey, Punitive Damages as Societal Damages, supra note 31, at 358 & n.19.  
 358 For a leading example, see Taylor v. Superior Court, 598 P.2d 854, 863-65 (Cal. 
1979) (Clark, J., dissenting) (accusing the majority of twisting statutory language in 
concluding that reckless conduct was indicative of “malice”), discussed immediately 
infra.  
 359 Jody S. Kraus, Transparency and Determinacy in Common Law Adjudication: A 
Philosophical Defense of Explanatory Economic Analysis, 93 VA. L. REV. 287, 323-36 
(2007). But see Schwartz, supra note 27, at 141 (“The common law’s criteria governing 
eligibility for punitive damages — ‘malice,’ ‘recklessness,’ and ‘conscious disregard’ for 
victim’s rights — . . . seem out of line with the standards one would expect from a 
deterrence oriented system.”). 
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and to intellectual property cousins of patent law, copyright and 
trademark. I consider each in turn in the following sections, hashing 
out the prevailing modern approach to mental states for punitive 
damages as I go. 
2. Modern Developments 
a. Drunk Driving 
In a well-known case, Taylor v. Superior Court,360 the Supreme 
Court of California was faced with deciding whether a statute that, at 
the time, allowed recovery of punitive damages “where the defendant 
has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, express or implied”361 
applied against a drunk driver. The trial court sustained the 
defendant’s demurrer to the claim for punitive damages “based upon 
plaintiff’s failure to allege any actual intent of defendant to harm 
plaintiff or others.”362 The high court disagreed that this was the 
appropriate standard and allowed the punitive damages claim to 
proceed. 
Turning to the Prosser on Torts treatise, the court explained that one 
way a plaintiff can establish entitlement to punitive damages is to 
show that the defendant engaged in “such a conscious and deliberate 
disregard of the interests of others that his conduct may be called 
wilful [sic] or wanton.”363 Canvassing case law authority, it held that 
“courts have not limited the availability of punitive damages to cases 
in which . . . an intent [to harm the plaintiff or others] has been 
shown” and noted that the plaintiff can recover punitive damages if it 
demonstrates “that the defendant was aware of the probable dangerous 
consequences of his conduct, and that he wilfully [sic] and 
deliberately failed to avoid those consequences.”364 The court 
concluded that this standard was met in Taylor based on the fact that 
the defendant got behind the wheel while intoxicated.365 In doing so, it 
abrogated a lower-court decision holding that, while drunk driving “is 
a reckless and wrongful and illegal thing to do . . . , it is not a 
 
 360 598 P.2d 854. See generally Michael H. Whitehill, Taylor v. Superior Court: 
Punitive Damages for Nondeliberate Torts — The Drunk Driving Context, 68 CALIF. L. 
REV. 911 (1980).  
 361 CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294 (1976). 
 362 Taylor, 598 P.2d at 855 (majority opinion). 
 363 Id. at 856 (quoting PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS, supra note 313, § 2, at 9-10). 
 364 Id. 
 365 Id.  
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malicious act,”366 and thus redefined “malice” to include reckless 
conduct. 
Relying on an older conception of punitive damages, the lone 
dissenter in Taylor contended that “the evil motive requisite to 
punitive damage is simply not shown by driving while intoxicated.”367 
The dissent noted that “[r]arely will the defendant have been drinking 
for the purpose of injuring someone, with knowledge that his drinking 
will injure the plaintiff, or even with knowledge that his drinking will 
probably injure someone.”368 But the dissent’s attitude has not 
prevailed. Along with California, most states now allow punitive 
damages in negligence cases against drunk drivers,369 even though the 
“malice” in the old sense of the word — an act directed at hurting a 
specific victim — is not present in these circumstances. 
Although driving while intoxicated and similar “aggravated 
negligence” scenarios embody an expansion of punitive damages 
theories from sanctioning acts conducted with malicious intent to 
harm particular individuals into the realm of generalized recklessness, 
they do involve behavior that we might seek to eliminate completely, 
rather than optimize.370 To be sure, sober driving is a socially useful 
activity, but perhaps we should not be too concerned if drunk driving 
is overdeterred with the recklessness standard of culpability.371 In 
 
 366 Id. (quoting Gombos v. Ashe, 322 P.2d 933, 940 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1958)). 
 367 Id. at 864 (Clark, J., dissenting). 
 368 Id. 
 369 Johnson v. Rogers, 763 P.2d 771, 774 (Utah 1988) (“The overwhelming 
majority of jurisdictions which have considered the issue have ruled that punitive 
damages are available in drunk driving cases.”). But see Komornik v. Sparks, 629 A.2d 
721 (Md. 1993) (denying punitive damages for drunk driving). Moreover, some states 
require a previous history of intoxicated driving for the award of punitive damages. 
See Bolsta v. Johnson, 848 A.2d 306, 308-09 (Vt. 2004); see also Taylor, 598 P.2d at 
859-60 (Bird, C.J., concurring). California itself amended the punitive damages statute 
to include the word “despicable,” CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294 (2018), which makes 
punitive damages more difficult to obtain. See Lackner v. North, 37 Cal. Rptr. 3d 863, 
880-84 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006). 
 370 See Colby, Clearing the Smoke, supra note 31, at 470-76; Sharkey, Economic 
Analysis of Punitive Damages, supra note 3, at 489, 492; see also George G. Stigler, The 
Optimum Enforcement of Laws, 78 J. POL. ECON. 526, 527 (1970) (listing activities that 
have no social utility). In contrast, overdeterrence of prison guards (for example) 
might have social costs. Cf. supra notes 319–24 and accompanying text (discussing 
this scenario). 
 371 In other words, there is no need to worry about overdeterring conduct that has 
no or almost no social utility. Cf. Frank H. Easterbrook et al., Contribution Among 
Antitrust Defendants: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 23 J.L. & ECON. 331, 367 (1980) 
(noting that antitrust law sanctions against price fixing might reflect this attitude); 
Stigler, supra note 370.  
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addition, drunk driving might even fit into the old moral opprobrium 
model of punitive damages: While the behavior at issue does not 
involve intentional harm, it is nonetheless highly reprehensible, and 
might prompt self-help by way of retribution.372 The relaxation of 
punitive damages standards for injuries caused by intoxicated drivers, 
then, may just be a legal adaptation that makes it easier to sanction 
conduct that, although not fully in the mold of the nineteenth-century 
intentional tort model of punitive damages,373 seems bad enough to 
constitute malice in the classical sense.374 Still, the expansion of 
punitive damages to generalized reckless conduct has ensnared far 
more than just drunk driving cases.375 
b. Products Liability and Other Corporate Torts 
Imposition of punitive damages for corporate torts, and particularly 
against defendants liable for making or selling defective products, 
presents questions that are more challenging than those involving 
supra-compensatory awards in cases of assault or drunk driving.376 
Unlike excessive damages for behaviors that have no redeeming value, 
“expansive approaches to liability [for product defects] might damage 
the innovation infrastructure, and the economy in general might 
suffer.”377 Even when certain units of the product end up hurting 
people, product manufacturing activities are, on the whole, socially 
valuable. For these reasons, the balancing of risk and utility can be 
particularly important in products liability cases.378 Patent law can 
 
 372 Cf. Livingston Hall, Assault and Battery by the Reckless Motorist, 31 AM. INST. CRIM. 
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 133 (1940) (cataloguing the trend of increasing penalties for reckless 
driving crimes); Lydia Warren, Father Breaks Down in Tears as He’s Found NOT GUILTY 
of Shooting Dead Drunk Driver Who Killed His Two Young Sons in Car Wreck, 
DAILYMAIL.COM (Aug. 27, 2014), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2736066/Dad-
ACQUITTED-shooting-dead-drunk-driver-killed-two-sons.html. 
 373 See supra Section II.B.1. 
 374 Shooting into a crowd might be an early example of such behavior — although 
not directed at a specific person, this sort of conduct could still be eligible for punitive 
damages. See, e.g., Bannister v. Mitchell, 104 S.E. 800, 801 (Va. 1920).  
 375 Interestingly, the majority and dissent in Taylor also disagreed on whether 
punitive damages against intoxicated drivers made sense from a deterrence 
perspective. Compare Taylor v. Superior Court, 598 P.2d 854, 897, 899 (Cal. 1979) 
(arguing that punitive damages will deter drunk driving), with id. at 903-05, 909-10 
(Clark, J., dissenting) (countering that criminal penalties are sufficient to deter this 
behavior).  
 376 For a leading early article on punitive damages in products liability cases, see 
Owen, Punitive Damages in Products Liability Litigation, supra note 29. 
 377 Karshtedt, Causal Responsibility and Patent Infringement, supra note 15, at 620. 
 378 See Aaron D. Twerski & James A. Henderson, Jr., Manufacturers’ Liability for 
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present similar challenges, and “policy debates in the law of products 
liability have resembled in some ways the debates in patent law.”379 
Although, as Justice Breyer noted in his concurrence in Halo, patent 
infringement is an “unlawful activity,”380 the proposition that 
“expansive liability that would squash downstream inventive activity 
is not desirable”381 seems difficult to contest. 
As I suggested in a recent article, “compensatory aspects of the two 
areas of law are different — patent infringement actions are meant to 
make up for patentees’ forgone royalties (or lost sales, if provable) and 
encourage innovation by future inventors, while products liability 
actions typically provide monetary recourse for physical injuries.”382 
But although the latter function sounds far more important, it must be 
remembered that we live in a world of extensive first-party insurance, 
with tort suits sometimes characterized as an avenue of last resort.383 
In addition, dynamic effects of patent damages cannot be ignored. 
Thus, as Professor Keith Hylton observed, while actions of future tort 
victims are unlikely to be affected by damages awards in prior cases, 
the same assumption might not hold for patent infringement.384 Low 
awards, particularly those in cases in which the defendant made the 
decision to accept the possibility of litigation in the event of getting 
 
Defective Product Designs: The Triumph of Risk-Utility, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 1061, 1062-
63 (2009) (explaining that products liability for design defects now predominantly 
involves risk-utility balancing, while liability for manufacturing defects remains close 
to true strict liability). Regular (i.e., non-willful) patent infringement, to be sure, is a 
strict-liability offense and therefore does involve this kind of balancing, but there may 
be good utilitarian reasons for this rule. See Robert P. Merges, A Few Kind Words for 
Absolute Infringement Liability in Patent Law, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1, 9 (2016). But cf. 
Samson Vermont, Independent Invention as a Defense to Patent Infringement, 105 MICH. 
L. REV. 475 (2006) (questioning strict liability in patent law). See generally Oswald, 
supra note 15 (criticizing the strict liability nomenclature for patent infringement).  
 379 Karshtedt, Causal Responsibility and Patent Infringement, supra note 15, at 620. 
 380 Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1937 (2016) (Breyer, J., 
concurring). 
 381 Karshtedt, Causal Responsibility and Patent Infringement, supra note 15, at 620; 
see also Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1936-38.  
 382 Karshtedt, Causal Responsibility and Patent Infringement, supra note 15, at 620; 
cf. Sichelman, supra note 6 (contending that the tort-law remedial framework should 
be eliminated from patent law completely).  
 383 See John G. Fleming, The Collateral Source Rule and Loss Allocation in Tort Law, 
54 CALIF. L. REV. 1478, 1546-49 (1966). Conversely, it is notable that patent 
infringement liability insurance has not become prevalent to the degree that tort 
liability insurance is. I thank Professor Jacob Sherkow for suggesting that I make this 
point.  
 384 Hylton, Enhanced Damages for Patent Infringement, supra note 26, at 428-29; see 
also Gordon, supra note 296, at 454 (addressing this dynamic in copyright law). 
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“caught” as a “cost of doing business,”385 could hurt innovation down 
the line. At the same time, though, incentives for plaintiff 
opportunism provided by awards that are excessive could also have 
deleterious social effects.386 
The bottom line is that enhanced damages for corporate torts, as for 
patent infringement, require balance. Even though torts involving 
product defects cause physical harm, concerns about excessive 
damages in this area reveal that some amount of injury-causing 
behavior might well go unremedied, or at least not sanctioned with 
punitive damages, so as to avoid overdeterring socially productive 
activity. Moreover, and closer to patent law in this particular respect, 
punitive damages are frequently awarded in suits for tortious 
interference with contract and other business torts that result only in 
financial injuries.387 There is no physical injury requirement for 
enhanced damages. Thus, in addition to examining mental state 
standards for punitive damages awards in products liability and other 
corporate tort cases because they are reflective of the evolving 
common law and therefore relevant for interpreting the Patent Act,388 I 
look to these areas of tort law because they might provide particularly 
helpful substantive guidance due to some parallels in the tradeoffs 
involved. 
An examination of cases involving punitive damages in products 
liability cases yields interesting insights. In many states that award 
such damages, lack of awareness of a specific victim is a given, and 
lack of actual knowledge of the injury-causing product defect may not 
be a barrier either.389 Thiry v. Armstrong World Industries, an 
 
 385 Wildlife Express Corp. v. Carol Wright Sales, Inc., 18 F.3d 502, 514 (7th Cir. 
1994) (addressing this issue in a copyright case).  
 386 See, e.g., Samuel Chase Means, The Trouble with Treble Damages: Ditching Patent 
Law’s Willful Infringement Doctrine and Enhanced Damages, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1999, 
2034. 
 387 See, e.g., Premix, Inc. v. Zappitelli, 561 F. Supp. 269, 277-78 (N.D. Ohio 1983); 
Cherne Indus., Inc. v. Grounds & Assocs., 278 N.W.2d 81, 96 (Minn. 1979); Empire 
Trucking Co. v. Reading Anthracite Coal Co., 71 A.3d 923, 936-39 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
2013); see also Fred S. McChesney, Tortious Interference with Contract Versus 
“Efficient” Breach: Theory and Empirical Evidence, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 131, 133 (1999); 
supra note 353 and accompanying text; cf. Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Copyright as 
Market Prospect, 166 U. PENN. L. REV. 443 (2018) (likening copyright infringement to 
tortious interference). Even in products liability cases, the harm does not always come 
in the form of a physical injury. See, e.g., Hess v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 341 P.3d 
662, 671 (Okla. 2014) (Taylor, J., concurring). 
 388 See supra notes 15–21 and accompanying text. 
 389 See DAVID G. OWEN & MARY J. DAVIS, OWEN & DAVIS ON PRODUCTS LIABILITY 
§ 26.15 (4th ed. 2017) (“Punitive damages . . . may be appropriate when a 
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Oklahoma asbestos case, provides an informative example.390 In Thiry, 
a plaintiff who developed asbestosis sued an asbestos manufacturer on 
the theories that “defendants’ products were defective in that they 
failed to adequately warn of health hazards associated with the use of 
asbestos” and that “defendant had an obligation to test its products 
and remain abreast of the medical and scientific knowledge 
concerning hazards in the use of products.”391 In addition, the plaintiff 
argued that the “defendants knew that exposure to asbestos would 
cause asbestosis or if defendants did not know such fact it was due to 
its gross omission, conscious indifference and utter disregard for 
persons exposed to the product.”392 On these theories, the plaintiff 
sought “to recover exemplary and punitive damages in such an 
amount as would deter defendants and others from such conscious 
indifference and utter disregard for the welfare of users of their 
products.”393 
In prefatory comments, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma noted that 
“[b]y removing the negligence requirement for recovery, strict liability 
expands the legal consequences of fault to the ‘innocent’ manufacturer 
of defective products.”394 But it explained that “[s]o much attention 
was devoted to the questions of how innocent manufacturers should 
be liable for defects in their products that rules applying to the highly 
blameworthy manufacturer may have been forgotten.”395 Accordingly, 
the court saw the need to complement the ‘shield’ of compensation 
provided by strict liability doctrine with a ‘sword’ of punitive 
damages.”396 Importantly, the court observed that while its prior cases 
used “traditional phrases as ‘willful and wanton, malice, oppression, 
gross negligence, ill will, actual malice, or under circumstances 
 
manufacturer’s testing or quality control procedures are so grossly inadequate in view 
of the known risks as to constitute a reckless indifference to public safety.”); see also 
SHAPO, supra note 356, § 29.04[J] (“Good general advice to businesses seeking to 
avoid the risk of punitive damages is to be able to establish that they have taken 
seriously a potential risk associated with their product.”). But cf. Owens-Illinois, Inc. 
v. Zenobia, 601 A.2d 633, 652-53 (Md. 1992) (in a state where punitive damages are 
uncapped, adopting an actual knowledge approach in products liability cases).  
 390 661 P.2d 515, 516 (Okla. 1983). 
 391 Id. 
 392 Id. 
 393 Id.  
 394 Id.  
 395 Id.; cf. John M. Golden, Reasonable Certainty in Contract and Patent Damages, 30 
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 257 (2017) (explaining how the defendant’s blameworthiness 
could be taken into account in the burden of proof on the plaintiff to establish the 
amount of damages). 
 396 Thiry, 661 P.2d at 517. 
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amounting to fraud or oppression,’” it maintained that “[a] more 
clearly defined and articulated standard is needed in the products 
liability context.”397 
The court held that social functions of punitive damages for injuries 
from defective products would be vindicated when such damages were 
allowed “if the injury is attributable to conduct that reflects reckless 
disregard for the public safety.”398 The court explained that “[t]o meet 
this standard the manufacturer must either be aware of, or culpably 
indifferent to, an unnecessary risk of injury” so as to “fail to determine 
the gravity of the danger or fail to reduce the risk to an acceptable 
minimal level.”399 But what, in the court’s view, was the hallmark of 
“culpable indifference”? Was the court’s approach to culpability 
concentrated on the subjective mental states of the defendant, or did it 
include more objective considerations? 
In keeping with the somewhat ambivalent nature of punitive 
damages, the test fashioned by the court revealed that both kinds of 
considerations matter. The court listed several factors for the lower 
courts to consider in determining whether punitive damages for 
product defects should be imposed, including “the gravity of the 
resulting risk of harm to the public,” “the costs of correcting or 
reducing the danger,” the level of “awareness of the existence and 
gravity of the product defect,” and “the nature of steps actually taken 
to correct the defect.”400 Although some of these factors suggest 
economic cost-benefit analysis, the court also referred to displays of 
“basic disrespect for the interests of others” as important to the 
inquiry401 — implying moral opprobrium of a defendant who has no 
regard for public safety. In addition, while the court noted that the 
level of awareness can make a difference in the punitive damages 
inquiry, it did not explain whether that factor matters because it is 
cheaper to fix a defect of which one knows as opposed to one that 
might take some research to discover, or because a defendant who 
ignores a known defect is subjectively more culpable.402 In a similar 
vein, while no knowledge of specific victims need be proved, “the 
manufacturer must also fail to determine the gravity of the danger or 
fail to reduce the risk to an acceptable minimal level” while 
 
 397 Id. at 518. 
 398 Id. (emphasis removed). 
 399 Id. (emphasis added). 
 400 Id. at 519. 
 401 Id. 
 402 See id. at 518-20. 
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“[k]nowing of this risk.”403 In many states, this mélange of 
considerations is what “malice” looks like in the context of corporate 
liability for product defects.404 
Other states have more explicitly allowed punitive damages for 
culpable failures to discover defects,405 including for claims of 
inadequate product testing prior to marketing.406 Moreover, 
formulations of a punitive damages standard that sanctions “reckless 
indifference” or “reckless disregard” toward the rights of others 
appeared in cases awarding such damages for torts by corporations 
other than products liability, including trespass (e.g., by developers 
failing to ascertain the property rights of others)407 and false 
representations.408 A hybrid approach that sometimes takes into 
account objective considerations, and allows enhanced damages for 
 
 403 Id. at 519.  
 404 Oklahoma has since codified the principle that recklessness is enough for 
imposing punitive damages, but capped punitive damages available for reckless 
behavior. See OKLA. STAT. ANN., tit. 23, § 9.1 (2018). 
 405 See Owen, Punitive Damages in Products Liability Litigation, supra note 29, at 
1339-45. 
 406 See, e.g., Moore v. Jewel Tea Co., 253 N.E.2d 636, 648-53 (Ill. App. 1969), aff’d, 
263 N.E.2d 103 (Ill. 1970) (allowing punitive damages for failure to test bursting 
point of a drain cleaner bottle); Sufix, U.S.A., Inc. v. Cook, 128 S.W.3d 838, 841 (Ky. 
App. 2004) (“Cook offered testimony by several experts that Sufix could and should 
have discovered the defect in the course of testing prior to release of the product, but 
that its testing had been grossly inadequate.”); Leichtamer v. Am. Motors Corp., 424 
N.E.2d. 568, 578-80 (Ohio 1981) (allowing punitive damages for failure to test car for 
rollovers); Wussow v. Commercial Mechanisms, Inc., 293 N.W.2d 897, 906-07 (Wis. 
1980) (citing the defendant’s lack of a “formal safety review committee” as a piece of 
evidence in support of allowing punitive damages); cf. Hillrichs v. Avco Corp., 514 
N.W.2d 94, 100 (Iowa 1994) (declining to allow punitive damages for failure to test 
coupled with generalized knowledge of danger, but explaining that such a failure 
could lead to punitive damages when it constitutes “an act of an unreasonable 
character in disregard of a risk that was so great as to make it highly probable that 
harm would follow”). See generally PETER M. GERHART, TORT LAW AND SOCIAL 
MORALITY 210-13 (2010) (discussing duties to monitor in the manufacturing defect 
context).  
 407 See, e.g., JCB, Inc. v. Union Planters Bank, NA, 539 F.3d 862, 872-73 (8th Cir. 
2008) (applying Missouri law); Liberty Bell Gold Mining Co. v. Smuggler-Union 
Mining Co., 203 F. 795, 802 (8th Cir. 1913); Cumberland Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Poston, 
30 S.W. 1040, 1041 (Tenn. 1895) (“There was also evidence sufficient . . . to raise the 
question of gross negligence on the part of the company in not exercising more 
caution to find and obtain the consent of the true owner of the property that the trees 
might be cut, and also in the manner in which the cutting was done, and in cutting 
the trees at all.”); see also Meighan v. U.S. Sprint Commc’ns Co., 924 S.W.2d 632, 641 
(Tenn. 1996) (reaffirming earlier rule). It is notable that punitive damages for reckless 
trespass have been awarded even in old cases. 
 408 E.g., Schmidt v. Pine Tree Land Dev. Co., 631 P.2d 1373, 1374-75 (Or. 1981). 
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highly unreasonable failures to discover defects and other lapses in 
adverting to the rights of others, is sensible if the goal is to “punish 
impersonal wrongdoing committed by artificial persons”409 who 
typically do not intend to hurt anyone and may not even engage in 
actions which, in a reasonable person’s understanding, would be 
substantially certain to occasion harm.410 The Oregon Supreme Court 
explained this adaptation of nineteenth-century “malice”-type punitive 
damages standards to modern corporate torts in an illuminating way: 
In the wide range of situations said to justify punitive 
damages, the present case [in which plaintiffs alleged that 
defendants made reckless misrepresentations in the course of a 
real estate transaction] is not one of giving vent to personal 
and societal outrage at aggressive or malicious wrongdoing, 
[such as assault and battery or malicious prosecution]. The 
large scale of these corporate defendants’ land development 
and marketing project places the case rather with those in 
which punitive damages serve the function to deter enterprises 
from accepting the risks of harming other private or public 
interests by recklessly substandard methods of operation at the 
cost of paying economic compensation to those who come 
forward to claim it. Such operations may well be wholly 
impersonal with respect to any victim, indeed conducted with 
the hope that no harm will occur, and they may not involve a 
culpable attitude on the part of any one person responsible for 
the management of the enterprise; yet this court has held that 
such lack of managerial culpability alone does not foreclose 
punitive damages. Still, to justify punitive damages the 
conduct must go beyond mere carelessness to a willful or 
reckless disregard of risk of harm to others of a magnitude 
evincing a high degree of social irresponsibility.411 
The modern frameworks for punitive damages in tort laid out by the 
supreme courts of Oklahoma and Oregon indicate an expansion of the 
scope of such damages, which in turn reflects a shift from their 
function of sanctioning morally reprehensible interpersonal behaviors 
to a broader goal of fostering deterrence of choices, sometimes made 
 
 409 Michael L. Rustad, Happy No More: Federalism Derailed by the Court that Would 
Be King of Punitive Damages, 64 MD. L. REV. 461, 469 (2005); see also Rantanen, An 
Objective View, supra note 15, 1609-22. 
 410 See infra note 464 and accompanying text.  
 411 Schmidt, 631 P.2d at 1374-75 (citations omitted); see also supra notes 349–52 
and accompanying text.  
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by corporate defendants, that generate high social costs.412 While 
moral, deontological considerations remain, they are diminished in 
prominence relative to older cases, or at least weighed or considered 
alongside some form of economic cost-benefit analysis. In this frame, 
awarding punitive damages for behavior that is reckless with respect to 
the affected group generally, as opposed to intentional or knowing 
toward specific victims, strikes one as good policy.413 Certain conduct, 
even if not intentional, can still be worth sanctioning — if not on 
moral grounds, then at least due to high social costs that the conduct 
imposes relative to its benefits to society. Indeed, this is exactly what 
we see in copyright and trademark cases as well. 
c. Copyright and Trademark 
Unlike the Patent Act, the Copyright Act actually uses the word 
“willful,” and has a statutory damages provision that allows for 
differing amounts of compensation on a per-work-copied basis 
depending on whether the infringement was willful or not.414 
Although one commentator argued that the word “willful” in the 
Copyright Act’s civil remedies provision denotes “an intentional 
violation of a known legal duty,”415 apparently relying exclusively on 
criminal willfulness and recklessness cases,416 the majority view in 
copyright law is decidedly different. For example, the Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit in Yurman Design v. PAJ held that 
“[w]illfulness in [the copyright] context means that the defendant 
 
 412 See generally Mathias v. Accor Econ. Lodging, Inc., 347 F.3d 672, 676-77 (7th 
Cir. 2003) (Posner, J.) (applying this reasoning to repeated, but uncompensated, 
harms that are relatively minor). 
 413 As other commentators noted in the context of patent law, the proper target of 
punitive damages when economic considerations are paramount must focus not (or at 
least not only) on the subjective states of mind of the “wrongdoer,” but on behaviors 
that are, from an objective standpoint, so unreasonable that they impose significant 
externalities on society. See generally Rantanen, An Objective View, supra note 15, at 
1611-13; Sherkow, supra note 73, at 35-36.  
 414 See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2018). Notably, the Copyright Act also includes 
criminal penalties for “[a]ny person who willfully infringes a copyright” with 
additional aggravating factors, such as infringing “for purposes of commercial 
advantage or private financial gain.” Id. § 506(a)(1)(A). For an analysis of why there 
are criminal penalties for some forms of copyright and trademark infringement, but 
not for patent infringement, see generally Irina D. Manta, The Puzzle of Criminal 
Sanctions in Intellectual Property Law, 24 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 469 (2011). 
 415 Robert Aloysius Hyde, A Reckless Disregard of the Ordinary Infringer? Moving 
Toward a Balanced and Uniform Standard for Willful Copyright Infringement, 35 U. TOL. 
L. REV. 377, 377 (2003). 
 416 See id. at 377 & n.9; see also supra notes 210–14, 322–25 and accompanying text.  
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‘recklessly disregarded’ the possibility that ‘its conduct represented 
infringement.’ . . . A plaintiff is not required to show that the 
defendant ‘had knowledge that its actions constitute[d] an 
infringement.’”417 The court held that while “PAJ testified that it was 
unaware of Yurman’s copyrights,” the jury was nonetheless “free to 
discredit that testimony, or to find that PAJ’s ignorance was due to 
recklessness.”418 
Although the Federal Circuit cited Yurman in Seagate, the Second 
Circuit’s standard for willful copyright infringement is different from 
Seagate’s because, for one thing, it does not require actual knowledge 
of the right at issue.419 Indeed, in contrast to Yurman, Seagate 
conceived of objective recklessness as depending entirely on the 
merits on the infringer’s legal position, and did not consider whether 
the defendant’s lack of awareness of the plaintiff’s rights could itself be 
culpable.420 Thus, in contravention to the Seagate standard and to the 
current Federal Circuit approach requiring actual knowledge of the 
infringed patent’s existence, but consistent with prevailing tort law 
standards described earlier, the Second Circuit in Yurman upheld a 
judgment that an infringement was willful based on the defendant’s 
“‘reckless disregard’ for, or ‘willful blindness’ to, the copyright holder’s 
rights.”421 Of course, a higher level of culpability — that is, a showing 
that “the defendant was actually aware of the infringing activity”422 — 
would also be enough for willfulness. 
Another Second Circuit case, Island Software v. Microsoft, illustrates 
these standards in operation. In Island Software, “a private investigator 
employed by a company participating in Microsoft’s anti-piracy 
program” found that Island, “a small software retailer and computer 
 
 417 Yurman Design, Inc. v. PAJ, Inc., 262 F.3d 101, 112 (2d Cir. 2001) (citations 
omitted); see also In re Barboza, 545 F.3d 702, 707-08 (9th Cir. 2008) (relying on 
cases from the Second, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits to hold that “recklessness is 
sufficient for a finding of willful copyright infringement”); Wildlife Express Corp. v. 
Carol Wright Sales, Inc., 18 F.3d 502, 511-12 (7th Cir. 1994) (same standard); 
RCA/Ariola Int’l, Inc. v. Thomas & Grayston Co., 845 F.2d 773, 779 (8th Cir. 1988) 
(same standard). But cf. Dolman v. Agee, 157 F.3d 708, 715 (9th Cir. 1998) 
(suggesting that willfulness requires knowledge that actions constitute infringement). 
 418 Yurman Design, 262 F.3d at 113; see also Broad. Music, Inc. v. Star Amusements, 
Inc., 44 F.3d 485, 488 (7th Cir. 1995) (providing three times the unpaid licensing fees 
as a remedy for copyright infringement in a non-punitive context). 
 419 See In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc). 
 420 See id. 
 421 Island Software & Comput. Serv., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 413 F.3d 257, 263 
(2d Cir. 2005) (citations omitted). 
 422 Id.  
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repairer,” was selling “counterfeit” or unauthorized copies of certain 
Microsoft software acquired from a supplier.423 The district court 
granted Microsoft’s motion for summary judgment that Island willfully 
infringed Microsoft’s copyrights based in part on an affidavit in which 
an Island employee stated that he was “suspicious of the authenticity” 
of the supplier’s products, but “did not take extensive measures to 
prevent the receipt and sale of high-quality counterfeit 
merchandise.”424 Instead, “Island’s employees . . . would conduct a 
relatively quick visual inspection of goods,”425 if any at all. 
The Second Circuit vacated the summary judgment order and 
remanded the case for trial on willfulness in part because Island 
“dispute[d] the inferences to be drawn from that evidence.”426 The 
court held that, based on the affidavit proffered by Microsoft, “[a] jury 
could, without a doubt, conclude that [the Island employee’s] 
statements reveal willful blindness, or establish a pattern of conduct so 
unreasonable as to constitute reckless disregard.”427 But, crucially, the 
court also opined that “a jury could infer that additional inspections 
were, for any number of reasons, not mandated,”428 explaining that 
“only an individual with specialized training . . . could discern the 
difference between authentic products and high-quality counterfeits of 
the sort at issue in this case.”429 The court noted that “the hiring of 
such experts could be found by a jury to be beyond what could 
reasonably be expected of small companies.”430 
Notably, the Island Software opinion was authored by Judge Guido 
Calabresi, who was a leading torts scholar in the law-and-economics 
tradition before being confirmed as a circuit judge.431 The tenor of the 
opinion is, not surprisingly, economic. Island Software made clear that 
the question of whether the defendant’s investigation was so 
inadequate as to qualify the infringement as willful can only be 
established after balancing the costs and benefits of that investigation 
under the circumstances, an inquiry that requires taking into account 
 
 423 Id. at 259. 
 424 Id. at 263. 
 425 Id. 
 426 Id. at 264. 
 427 Id.  
 428 Id. 
 429 Id. 
 430 Id. 
 431 For one example of a foundational scholarly contribution by then-Professor 
Calabresi, see generally GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1970) (discussing the economic goals of tort law).  
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the size of the defendant company and the expertise it is expected to 
have with respect to the potentially infringing matter.432 Economic 
analysis of this sort is what truly objective recklessness is about.433 In 
the next Part, I will aim to apply this approach to patent law which, 
like copyright law,434 is thought to have strong utilitarian foundations 
that make economic analysis a proper tool in determining the scope of 
the defendant’s liability.435 
The remedial scheme for trademark infringement under the federal 
Lanham Act is even more complex than in copyright. The relevant 
subsection states that “[i]n assessing damages the court may enter 
judgment, according to the circumstances of the case, for any sum 
above the amount found as actual damages, not exceeding three times 
such amount.”436 These permissive treble damages are explicitly non-
punitive,437 and indeed courts have held that the Lanham Act does not 
provide for punitive damages at all.438 Nevertheless, the statute also 
allows juries to award profits and gives judges seemingly unlimited 
discretion to adjust them,439 and it mandates treble damages for 
 
 432 See Island Software, 413 F.3d at 263-64.  
 433 Again, however, subjective considerations can also matter. See Yellow Pages 
Photos, Inc. v. Ziplocal, LP, 795 F.3d 1255, 1273 (11th Cir. 2015) (holding copyright 
infringement willful where the defendant was “not at all concerned about the source 
of the photos it was receiving”).  
 434 See CRAIG ALLEN NARD, MICHAEL J. MADISON & MARK P. MCKENNA, THE LAW OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 12-14 (5th ed. 2017). 
 435 On the use of economic analysis of some common-law rules in determining 
whether the defendant should be liable for patent infringement in a particular set of 
circumstances, see generally Dmitry Karshtedt, Divided Infringement, Economics, and 
the Common Law, 67 FLA. L. REV. F. (forthcoming 2018), https://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=3111911. 
 436 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (2018).  
 437 See id. (stating that permissive treble damages, like other remedies under 
§ 1117(a), “shall constitute compensation and not a penalty”). 
 438 See Getty Petroleum Corp. v. Bartco Petroleum Corp., 858 F.2d 103, 108-13 (2d 
Cir. 1988). I thank Professor Robert Brauneis for discussing these aspects of the 
Lanham Act’s remedial scheme with me. 
 439 See id. at 109-11 (tracing the history of 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a)); see Hearings 
Before the Subcomm. on Trade-Marks, Comm. on Patents, H.R. 102, H.R. 5461, and S. 
895, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 203-06 (1941). Some circuits require willfulness for an 
award of profits. See, e.g., Romag Fasteners, Inc. v. Fossil, Inc., 817 F.3d 782, 789-91 
(Fed. Cir. 2016) (holding that the Second Circuit requires willfulness for accounting, 
even though § 1117(a) says that this remedy is “not a penalty” and, unlike 
§ 1117(c)(2), does not use the word “willful”), cert. granted and judgment vacated on 
other grounds, 137 S. Ct. 1373 (2017) (mem.), judgment reinstated in relevant part, 686 
F. App’x 889 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (mem.). But see Banjo Buddies, Inc. v. Renosky, 399 
F.3d 168, 173-75 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding that “willfulness is a factor, not a 
prerequisite” for an award of profits).  
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intentional trademark infringement “unless the court finds 
extenuating circumstances.”440 Finally, the Lanham Act provides for 
statutory damages “[i]n a case involving the use of a counterfeit 
mark . . . in connection with the sale, offering for sale, or distribution 
of goods or services,” including enhanced statutory damages for this 
sort of infringement “if the court finds that the use of the counterfeit 
mark was willful.”441 
As in copyright law, the majority view appears to be that knowledge 
of a specific trademark is not required for willfulness, and reckless 
disregard toward the intellectual property rights of others would 
suffice. In one case, International Star Yacht Racing Ass’n v. Tommy 
Hilfiger, the Second Circuit cited the defendant’s “failure to conduct a 
comprehensive trademark search” as one of the factors pointing 
toward willfulness,442 and explained that “willful ignorance should not 
provide a means by which [the defendant] can evade its obligations 
under trademark law.”443 After another appeal and remand, the parties 
continued to dispute whether the defendant had “an obligation to 
conduct a more extensive trademark search” than one it actually 
performed to avoid a finding of willfulness.444 Some other jurisdictions 
have adopted a rule to the same effect: In the First Circuit, the conduct 
sufficient for willful trademark infringement is “measured against 
standards of reasonable behavior,” which suggests that highly 
unreasonable non-searches might be willful.445 Again, patent law is 
 
 440 15 U.S.C. § 1117(b) (2018); cf. Hogg v. Emerson, 52 U.S. 587, 607 (1850) 
(appearing to adopt this approach in patent cases); see also supra notes 99–100 and 
accompanying text (discussing Hogg).  
 441 15 U.S.C. § 1117(c)(2). 
 442 Int’l Star Class Yacht Racing Ass’n v. Tommy Hilfiger, U.S.A., Inc., 80 F.3d 749, 
752-53 (2d Cir. 1996); cf. Polo Fashions, Inc. v. Dick Bruhn, Inc., 793 F.2d 1132, 
1135 (9th Cir. 1986) (noting that the purpose of trademark remedies is to “take all the 
economic incentive out of trademark infringement”) (citation omitted). 
 443 Tommy Hilfiger, 80 F.3d at 754. See generally David Welkowitz, WillfulnessTM, 
79 ALB. L. REV. 509 (2016). 
 444 Int’l Star Class Yacht Racing Ass’n v. Tommy Hilfiger, U.S.A., Inc., 205 F.3d 
1323, at *1 (2d Cir. 2000) (unpublished table decision). 
 445 Fishman Transducers, Inc. v. Paul, 684 F.3d 187, 191-92 (1st Cir. 2012) (“In 
federal civil litigation willfulness requires a conscious awareness of wrongdoing by the 
defendant or at least conduct deemed ‘objectively reckless’ measured against standards 
of reasonable behavior. The criminal standard is slightly more demanding because it 
requires a subjective indifference to risk for recklessness — sometimes called willful 
blindness — as the minimum condition for a willfulness finding.”). But cf. 
SecuraComm Consulting Inc. v. Securacom Inc., 166 F.3d 182, 188-89 (3d Cir. 1999) 
(differentiating “careless” and “willful” failures to ascertain the trademark rights of 
others and distinguishing Tommy Hilfiger based on the fact of copying and attorney 
advice to search for trademarks) (citations omitted), superseded by statute on other 
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decidedly different in requiring actual knowledge of the existence of 
the right being infringed for enhanced damages.446 
One immediate objection, at least to the relevance of the copyright 
portion of this discussion, might be that copyright infringement, 
unlike patent law, requires proof of copying.447 But there are other 
ways to infringe copyrights, including — as we saw in Island 
Software448 — by distributing copyrighted materials,449 and similar 
cases of willful infringement under this provision of the Copyright Act 
can be readily found.450 In these cases, the defendants did not copy the 
materials, but rather merely passed them along in the stream of 
commerce. Nonetheless, the courts still concluded that the failure to 
ascertain whether the rights of others are infringed in the process 
could be willful. In addition, it bears repeating that, today, willful 
patent infringement cannot lie even when a defendant copies an item 
marked with a patent number or copies a product of a close 
competitor without investigating the competitor’s patent portfolio. 
The actual knowledge rule for patent treble damages is so rigid that 
even copying combined with a lack of a patent search will not suffice 
for enhancement. A fortiori, ignorance of easily discoverable patents 
cannot currently lead to liability for enhanced damages either.451 
It is worth noting, finally, that in contrast to the Patent Act, both the 
Copyright Act and the Lanham Act include provisions for criminal 
infringement, which are oriented toward subjectively culpable mental 
states.452 Criminal penalties are possible, for example, against those 
who “intentionally . . . traffic[ ] in goods or services and knowingly 
use[ ] a counterfeit mark,”453 while enhanced civil penalties are 
available for less subjective forms of culpability. Patent law, however, 
 
grounds as stated in Banjo Buddies, Inc. v. Renosky, 399 F.3d 168, 171 (3d Cir. 2005).  
 446 Although one can argue that the difficulty of determining validity and 
infringement in patent cases might support a unique standard for willful patent 
infringement, validity and infringement of trademarks can also raise exceedingly 
difficult questions, as do defenses to copyright infringement liability based on fair use, 
whether the use of the copyrighted material is authorized, and so on. 
 447 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (2018). 
 448 Island Software & Comput. Serv., Inc., v. Microsoft Corp., 413 F.3d 257, 260-
61 (2d Cir. 2005). 
 449 17 U.S.C. § 106(3). 
 450 Yellow Pages Photos, Inc. v. Ziplocal, LP, 795 F.3d 1255, 1269 (11th Cir. 
2015). 
 451 See supra note 45 and accompanying text.  
 452 17 U.S.C. § 506(a) (2018); 18 U.S.C. § 2320 (2018). See generally Manta, supra 
note 414.  
 453 18 U.S.C. § 2320(a)(1).  
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is distinctly non-criminal, so that the very notion of a form of liability 
exclusively focused on subjective factors seems aberrant. Nonetheless, 
criminal law concepts have found their way into patent cases in the 
form of the actual knowledge prerequisite for treble damages. 
d. Summary 
When compared to the laws of negligence, products liability, 
copyright, trademark, and even the FCRA, patent law is a severe 
outlier. This is because, even granting that “willfulness” is a 
requirement for enhanced patent damages, patent law does not follow 
the “standard civil usage” of willfulness.454 In emphasizing the 
subjective mental state of actual knowledge, courts in patent cases pay 
heed only to the historic function of punitive damages as a sanction of 
behavior actuated by a desire to cause someone harm, as opposed to 
modern, more objective forms of culpability reflected in the civil 
recklessness standard.455 To be sure, the former route to obtaining 
punitive damages has not been discarded, as courts generally continue 
to award them for subjectively culpable behaviors that could be 
classified as “insults.”456 But, as numerous examples in this section 
indicate, courts in tort cases also allow punitive damages under the 
objective standard, which focuses on socially undesirable conduct 
endangering the world at large, including reckless failures to advert to 
the possibility of invading the rights of others.457 Professor Sharkey 
summed up these developments as follows: “[W]hereas punitive 
damages were once awarded predominantly for acts that satisfied 
malice aforethought or intentional wrongdoing, now many punitive 
damages awards arise from what was essentially accidental conduct, 
albeit committed recklessly.”458 The Federal Circuit has not fully 
accounted for this aspect of enhanced damages. 
Halo’s discussion of punitive damages for “conscious” and “flagrant” 
infringements, as well as for “reckless” conduct involving 
infringements of which the defendant had “reason to know,” perfectly 
tracks the subjective-objective dichotomy of possible approaches for 
proving up enhanced damages.459 Although the Supreme Court 
 
 454 Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 57-58 (2007). 
 455 See Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1932-34 (2016). 
 456 See supra Section II.B. But see Safeco, 551 U.S. at 70 n.20. 
 457 See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 34, at 213-14 (5th 
ed. 1984) (discussing the interplay of culpable mental states and objectively deviant 
conduct). 
 458 Sharkey, Economic Analysis of Punitive Damages, supra note 3, at 493. 
 459 Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1932-33; see also infra notes 499–505 and accompanying text. 
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emphasized subjective routes to willfulness,460 it did so in the context 
of criticizing a Federal Circuit test that, anomalously, made subjective 
factors basically irrelevant in the willfulness inquiry — and the Court’s 
controlling opinion explicitly referenced continued applicability of 
civil recklessness to enhanced patent damages by relying on the 
formulation of that standard from the Restatement of Torts. The Court, 
to be sure, characterized enhanced patent damages as punitive, but the 
bottom line is that there is ample precedent for civil punishment of 
reckless behavior. 
Because Halo did not appear to signal a significant departure from 
the modern tort standards discussed in this section, it is difficult to 
rationalize retaining actual knowledge of the infringed patents as the 
limit on treble damages in patent law. At the very least, a departure of 
this magnitude from the prevailing standard would require highly 
persuasive policy or economic justifications. Nonetheless, even if Halo 
left that question open, those justifications do not support retaining 
the actual knowledge rule. In the section that follows, I sketch out the 
already familiar example of the statute in which policy considerations 
overrode the prevailing common-law rule and contrast it with the 
Patent Act. I then apply the prevailing rule to patent law in Part III. 
C. Policy Considerations 
Smith v. Wade holds that adoption of the dominant common-law 
approach to fill a gap in a federal statute silent on the relevant point is 
a sound methodology of statutory interpretation.461 Nonetheless, 
departures from that standard are possible if strong policy 
considerations that justify them, and which are consistent with the 
statute at issue, are present. Thus, perhaps in part due to the quasi-
criminal nature of § 1983 actions,462 decisions after Smith v. Wade 
settled on a standard limiting punitive damages in these suits to 
behaviors exhibiting callousness or willful indifference to known risks, 
as opposed to merely conduct that is “unheedful” in the circumstances 
in which the defendant had reasons to know that harm would 
eventuate.463 Indeed, because its passage was motivated by 
Reconstruction-Era resistance to civil rights, § 1983 embodies a strong 
undertone of moral disapproval against the acts that those subject to 
 
 460 See supra note 110 and accompanying text. 
 461 See supra notes 307–12 and accompanying text; see also supra note 15 and 
accompanying text.  
 462 See supra notes 317–18 and accompanying text.  
 463 See supra notes 321–30 and accompanying text.  
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liability under this section have committed. The subjective focus of 
punitive damages standards in § 1983 actions may reflect this 
background.464 
Patent law, in contrast, is as far from criminal law as can be in terms 
of its social goals, and patent infringement does not typically engender 
moral disapproval.465 The goals of patent remedies should be, on the 
whole, to encourage efficient conduct, however defined, not to mete 
out punishment that would preclude retribution and self-help.466 The 
adoption of a subjective, criminal-style recklessness standard relying 
on actual knowledge as an absolute constraint on awards of treble 
damages is therefore puzzling. Moreover, because this standard 
discourages assimilation of information and can reward forms of 
holdout,467 it is difficult to square with the economic-utilitarian 
orientation of patent law. While treble damages for the infringer’s 
subjective bad faith remain available in patent cases,468 policy and 
economic considerations fail to justify going against the tide of tort 
law by limiting the availability of that remedy to acts accompanied by 
subjectively culpable mental states, and in fact support its expansion 
to sanction more objective forms of “egregious” conduct.469 
To be sure, modern punitive damages doctrine is at variance with 
outcomes that a purely economic analysis would support.470 Economic 
models reject the very idea of “punitive” liability for egregious or 
 
 464 In addition, there are specific rationales for basing liability on a subjective 
standard in constitutional tort suits against federal officers, see, e.g., Farmer v. 
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835-44 (1994), and for defamation claims against public 
officials, see, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-86 (1964); Keating, 
supra note 66, at 339 & n.96. Interestingly, as Professor Gregory Keating and others 
noted, proof of certain intentional torts could include an objective component for 
evaluating intent. See Keating, supra note 66, at 339 & n.96 (citing, among other 
cases, Garratt v. Dailey, 279 P.2d 1091 (Wash. 1955), for the proposition that one 
intends the natural consequences of one’s actions); see also Keith N. Hylton, Intent in 
Tort Law, 44 VAL. U. L. REV. 1217, 1230 (2010). See generally Nancy J. Moore, Intent 
and Consent in the Tort of Battery: Confusion and Controversy, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 1585 
(2012). 
 465 See generally Sherkow, supra note 73; see also Paul M. Janicke, Do We Really 
Need So Many Mental and Emotional States in Patent Law?, 8 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 279 
(2000). 
 466 See generally Sarah R. Wasserman Rajec, Tailoring Remedies to Spur Innovation, 
61 AM. U. L. REV. 733 (2012); Karen E. Sandrik, Reframing Patent Remedies, 67 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 95 (2012).  
 467 See supra Section I.E.  
 468 Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1932-33 (2016). 
 469 Id. 
 470 See supra note 63 and accompanying text.  
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reprehensible behaviors, however defined, and rationalize supra-
compensatory damages primarily in the circumstances in which 
rights-violations are difficult to detect or provide such small 
compensatory damages that lawsuits are not worthwhile.471 Because 
they are still based on mental states of individual defendants, even if 
objectively defined in part, today’s tort punitive damages standards are 
not consistent with models that would make fault completely 
irrelevant in the punitive damages inquiry.472 Additional lines of attack 
on modern punitive damages doctrine include the criticism that the 
required elevated level of culpability is extremely difficult to 
communicate with precision to juries,473 as well as concerns about the 
size and unpredictability of the punitive damages awards.474 All of 
these critiques cast economic rationality of punitive damages into 
doubt, though it must be remembered that at least the “unpredictable 
punitive damages” critique does not completely translate to patent 
law’s enhanced damages because of the treble limit in the latter.475 
Availability of punitive damages awards untethered to compensatory 
damages has, in a significant constitutional law development, triggered 
Due Process claims that have led to such awards getting struck down 
for lack of proportionality (to the awarded compensatory damages) in 
a series of Supreme Court decisions.476 More interestingly, the seminal 
case of Philip Morris v. Williams held that the Due Process clause 
prohibits taking harms to parties not before the court into account in 
determining the amount of punitive damages477 — though some, 
 
 471 See, e.g., Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 31; see also Darryl Biggar, A Model of 
Punitive Damages in Tort, 15 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 1, 2 (1995). 
 472 But see Sharkey, Economic Analysis of Punitive Damages, supra note 3, at 488; see 
also Porat, supra note 64, at 95-96. 
 473 See Owen, Civil Punishment and the Public Good, supra note 31, at 108-10; see 
also Ellis, supra note 31, at 33-43; Grady, supra note 31, at 1219-24 (discussing the 
staying power of subjective elements in the law of punitive damages).  
 474 See, e.g., John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., A Comment on the Constitutionality of Punitive 
Damages, 72 VA. L. REV. 139, 139 (1986). For a critique of punitive damages in 
products liability cases in particular, see PETER W. HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL 
REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 14-15, 155-56, 170-71, 224-25 (1988). See also 
Richard J. Mahoney & Stephen E. Littlejohn, Innovation on Trial: Punitive Damages 
Versus New Products, 246 SCIENCE 1395 (1989).  
 475 See supra Section I.B.2. 
 476 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003); see also BMW 
of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996). 
 477 See Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 353-57 (2007) (holding that 
harms to parties not before the court cannot be directly taken into account in the 
punitive damages calculus). 
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including the dissent in that case,478 pointed out that the Court still 
allowed juries to consider such harms under the “reprehensibility” 
factor for evaluating the award’s rationality.479 Although these 
decisions were meant to prevent “runaway” awards, they have also, 
somewhat ironically, resulted in a move away from a rigorous 
economic treatment of damages enhancements. Even though awards 
with very large punitive-to-compensatory ratios can sometimes be 
economically justified, the Supreme Court appeared to forestall this 
possibility by announcing that awards for which this ratio is greater 
than 10:1 might draw particularly searching constitutional scrutiny.480 
Still, economic considerations continue to find their way into 
punitive damages cases. As Professor Sharkey argued, “it would be 
wrong to conclude that the U.S. Supreme Court has closed the door 
entirely on economic rationales of punitive damages.”481 She explained 
that “the Court recognizes optimal deterrence as one, but not the sole, 
underlying justification for punitive damages.”482 More generally, and 
putting the magnitude of the awards to one side, the threshold level of 
culpability for punitive damages today is at least more consistent with 
economic reasoning than the subjective nineteenth-century standard 
motivated by retribution for “insults.”483 As Professor Sharkey argued 
in a different article, the expansion of the scope of punitive damages to 
reckless behaviors serves “the efficiency-based goal of economic 
deterrence.”484 Professor Peter Diamond’s work is to the same effect — 
he contended that awards of punitive damages for reckless disregard of 
the rights of others properly take into account “costs that are not 
adequately represented in the defendant’s decision process.”485 Given 
 
 478 Id. at 360 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
 479 Sharkey, Economic Analysis of Punitive Damages, supra note 3, at 496-97; see also 
Colby, Clearing the Smoke, supra note 31, at 457-64. 
 480 State Farm, 538 U.S. at 425 (“[F]ew awards exceeding a single-digit ratio 
between punitive and compensatory damages, to a significant degree, will satisfy due 
process.”); cf. id. (“[R]atios greater than those we have previously upheld may 
comport with due process where ‘a particularly egregious act has resulted in only a 
small amount of economic damages.’” (quoting Gore, 517 U.S. at 582)); see Sharkey, 
Economic Analysis of Punitive Damages, supra note 3, at 492. But see Mathias v. Accor 
Econ. Lodging, Inc., 347 F.3d 672, 674, 675-76 (7th Cir. 2003) (Posner, J.) (allowing 
a large punitive-to-compensatory ratio in spite of State Farm). 
 481 Sharkey, Economic Analysis of Punitive Damages, supra note 3, at 496. 
 482 Id.  
 483 See supra Section I.B.1.  
 484 Sharkey, Punitive Damages as Societal Damages, supra note 31, at 450.  
 485 Peter Diamond, Integrating Punishment and Efficiency Concerns in Punitive 
Damages for Reckless Disregard of Risks to Others, 18 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 117, 134 
(2002). 
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the importance of this internalization function, economically efficient 
results are more likely to be achieved when the law of punitive 
damages allows for objective evaluations of the defendant’s conduct 
and does not, as in the nineteenth century, merely aim to punish those 
who commit acts accompanied by subjectively culpable states of 
mind.486 The modern solution may not be “first-best” from an 
economic perspective, but it is probably better from that perspective 
than the nineteenth-century one.487 
Although the claim is highly contested, increased consideration of 
objective factors in the punitive damages calculus may be a part of a 
larger trend in tort law — the move toward economic efficiency. Thus, 
Professor George Priest identified “the tendency of the set of all legal 
rules to become dominated by rules achieving efficient . . . allocative 
effects,”488 and Professor Paul Rubin came to similar conclusions.489 
Others, including Professor Jody Kraus, likewise noted an “impressive 
level of fit” between results of economic analysis and case outcomes 
under common-law rules.490 Professors Priest and Rubin contended 
that such shifts are an inevitable consequence of the iterative nature of 
adversarial litigation,491 while others, including Professor Kraus, 
argued that courts have lately been following — at least to some extent 
and maybe somewhat unwittingly — the teachings of economically-
 
 486 Cf. Sheldon M. Novick, Introduction to OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON 
LAW iii, xiv-xv (Dover 1991) (1881) (“If law was simply an instrument to accomplish 
certain material ends, it followed that the law should concern itself solely with 
external behavior; the merely moral or subjective should be stripped away by the 
process of evolution. Holmes argued that he could discern in the developing common 
law a trend toward complete reliance on ‘external standards’ of behavior.”); see also 
supra notes 65–66 and accompanying text. Note, though, that Seagate’s supposedly 
“objective” standard was in fact aberrant in comparison with objective standards in 
modern tort law. See supra notes 180–81 and accompanying text.  
 487 In addition, a purely economic approach to punitive damages might encounter 
significant challenges in the way of information costs, justifying the use of the 
recklessness standard as rough, “modular” proxy for identifying economically 
inefficient behaviors. See generally Henry E. Smith, Modularity and Morality in the Law 
of Torts, 4. J. TORT L. 1 (2011) (explaining how modularity helps reduce information 
costs in tort law). 
 488 George L. Priest, The Common Law Process and the Selection of Efficient Rules, 6 
J. LEGAL STUD. 65, 65 (1977). 
 489 Paul H. Rubin, Why Is the Common Law Efficient?, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 51, 51-52 
(1977). See generally Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29 
(1972). 
 490 Kraus, supra note 359, at 357. But cf. Gillian K. Hadfield, Bias in the Evolution of 
Legal Rules, 80 GEO. L.J. 583 (1992) (disagreeing with the common law efficiency 
thesis). 
 491 See generally Priest, supra note 488; Rubin, supra note 489. 
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minded scholars of tort law, some of whom have become judges.492 
Some have maintained, though, that the extent of influence of 
economic thinking on tort law has been overstated or should be 
limited493 — and still others argued that the rules that purportedly 
serve the goal of “efficiency” instead do the bidding of powerful 
interests in society.494 
Be that as it may, the increasing influence of the law-and-economics 
movement on civil litigation over time is difficult to deny — and Judge 
Calabresi’s opinion in Island Software is a powerful example of that 
trend.495 Nor is the shift to objective evaluations of conduct reflective 
of economic thinking necessarily a hypermodern development. 
Though far ahead of his time, one scholar, and later judge, with a 
strong economic-utilitarian bent was Oliver Wendell Holmes.496 
Interestingly enough, one of the legacies of Holmes’ handiwork as a 
Justice on the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts was an 
objective recklessness standard for criminal violations, in addition to 
the more historically grounded subjective standard.497 Although the 
possibility of proof of recklessness using a (mostly) objective standard 
should probably be considered aberrant as far as criminal law goes,498 
the Massachusetts approach allowing for separate, disjunctive 
subjective and objective routes to demonstrating recklessness for those 
crimes for which this mental state is an element closely reminds one of 
Halo. A recent case explained: 
Wanton or reckless conduct is determined based either on the 
defendant’s specific knowledge or on what a reasonable person 
should have known in the circumstances. If based on the 
objective measure of recklessness, the defendant’s actions 
constitute “wanton or reckless conduct if an ordinary normal 
[person] under the same circumstances would have realized 
 
 492 Kraus, supra note 359, at 333-36. 
 493 See, e.g., Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 337; see also Keating, supra note 66. 
 494 See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Too Good to Be True: The Positive Economic Theory of 
Law, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1447 (1987) (reviewing WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. 
POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW (1987)).  
 495 See supra notes 423–33 and accompanying text. 
 496 See HOLMES, supra note 486, at 108-09 (offering a vigorous endorsement of 
objective standards in the law). 
 497 See Commonwealth v. Pierce, 138 Mass. 165, 174-78 (1884) (Holmes, J.) 
(adopting a largely objective or “external” standard in a criminal recklessness case); 
see also HOLMES, supra note 486, at 53-59.  
 498 See Note, Criminal Negligence, 12 HARV. L. REV. 428, 428-29 (1898); see also 
Samuel H. Pillsbury, Crimes of Indifference, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 105, 192-206 (1996). 
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the gravity of the danger.” If based on the subjective measure, 
i.e., the defendant’s own knowledge, “grave danger to others 
must have been apparent and the defendant must have chosen 
to run the risk rather than alter [his or her] conduct so as to 
avoid the act or omission which caused the harm.”499 
The influence of Holmes’s economic-utilitarian thinking on tort law 
was marked as well. Specifically, his legacy has had an effect on the 
modern law of punitive damages. In Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, its 
latest pronouncement on punitive damages besides Halo, the Supreme 
Court invoked Holmes’s “bad man,” a homo economicus who cares only 
about possible penalties for his actions and thus seeks “some ability to 
know what the stakes are in choosing one course of action or 
another.”500 Professor Jill Lens criticized Exxon’s reliance on the bad 
man construct and lamented that the Court’s “conception of 
punishment is detached from its traditional morality roots.”501 But 
Exxon was dealing with a miscreant who was reckless, not one who 
acted maliciously or with intent to harm anyone,502 so the Court’s 
diminished focus on moral considerations can be defended. 
Significantly, though, modern economic-utilitarian thinking 
exemplified by Holmes’s bad man does not fully control the law of 
punitive damages. As the Halo Court pointed out with its vituperative 
“pirate” language, moral considerations can still come into play when 
such damages are awarded for intentional rights-violations.503 But 
Halo, like Exxon, also made clear that one can be liable for enhanced 
damages due to recklessness,504 a level of culpability whose 
“connection to morality”505 is more attenuated. As in most of the rest 
of tort law, recklessness based on a “reason to know” of unreasonable 
risk of infringement can, and should be, a route to establishing 
eligibility for enhanced damages that is separate from the route that 
contemplates punishment for “conscious” and “flagrant” 
 
 499 Commonwealth v. Pugh, 969 N.E.2d 672, 585 (Mass. 2012) (quoting 
Commonwealth v. Welansky, 55 N.E.2d 902, 909-10 (Mass. 1944)) (citations 
omitted). 
 500 554 U.S. 471, 502 (2008).  
 501 Lens, Bad Man, supra note 31, at 790.  
 502 Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 493-95, 512-13 (2008). To recall, 
the faulty conduct in Exxon was the captain’s operation of a tanker while intoxicated. 
See id. at 475-79; see also supra note 140 and accompanying text.  
 503 Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1932 (2016). 
 504 Id. at 1933. 
 505 See Lens, Bad Man, supra note 31, at 825. 
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infringements.506 Enhanced damages based on recklessness, I 
maintain, are particularly suitable for dealing with the homines 
economici engaged in patent infringement. I develop this standard in 
the Part that follows. 
III. BACK TO PATENT LAW: TOWARD A PROPER STANDARD FOR 
ENHANCED DAMAGES 
A. Civil Recklessness: A Recap and Some Potentially Easy Cases in 
Patent Law 
To orient the discussion of how civil recklessness can be 
implemented in patent law, its features are worth recapping and 
highlighting. To begin, the standard of having “reason to know” of 
facts that point to a risk of a rights-violation, adopted from the 
Restatement by Halo,507 is demanding. As explained by Professor 
Kenneth Simons, “The Restatement’s concept of ‘reason to know’ is 
narrower than ‘reasonably should know’ — it essentially requires that 
the facts be at your fingertips.”508 Echoing this characterization, 
Professor Stephanie Bornstein maintained that “[r]ecklessness in tort 
goes further than negligence to account for situations in which the 
actor takes risks that are unusually high and for which the costs of 
preventing the harms are low.”509 According to Professor Dan Dobbs’s 
treatise, “the risk-utility balance strongly disfavors the defendant’s 
conduct,”510 but — as noted throughout — civil recklessness can also 
include the somewhat subjective component of “conscious 
indifference,” which is “not necessarily required to establish gross 
negligence.”511 One way to further characterize the subjective 
component of the inquiry is that the defendant “intentionally or 
consciously runs a very serious risk with no good reason to do so.”512 
Another commentator, Professor Geoffrey Rapp, explained that some 
cases “find[ ] recklessness [in] the defendant’s ‘I don’t care 
 
 506 Cf. supra Section II.B.  
 507 Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1933 (quoting Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 69 
(2007) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500 (AM. LAW INST. 1965))). 
 508 See Simons, Rethinking Mental States, supra note 39, at 472 n.32 (quoting 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 12). 
 509 See Stephanie Bornstein, Reckless Discrimination, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 1055, 1086 
(2017) (citing DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 147 (West 2000)). 
 510 DOBBS, supra note 509, § 147, at 351. 
 511 Id.  
 512 Id. 
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attitude.’”513 Nonetheless, as Professor Dobbs observed, “[T]he 
defendant’s state of mind can ordinarily only be proved by proving the 
defendant’s conduct, so that extreme departure from ordinary care in 
many cases tends to prove not only gross negligence but a conscious 
indifference to the rights of others.”514 
Under this standard, a patent infringer’s conduct could be eligible 
for treble damages within the meaning of Halo in certain 
circumstances in which it lacked actual knowledge of the patent’s 
existence515 — a state of mind that, under the Federal Circuit’s current 
interpretation of Halo, now completely exonerates the infringer from 
liability for enhanced damages.516 For example, willful blindness to the 
existence of a patent, whereby “(1) the defendant must subjectively 
believe that there is a high probability that a fact exists and (2) the 
defendant must take deliberate actions to avoid learning of that 
fact,”517 would probably suffice under the proposed approach.518 So 
 
 513 Rapp, supra note 39, at 152 (quoting Williamson v. McKenna, 354 P.2d 56, 67 
(Or. 1960)).  
 514 DOBBS, supra note 509, § 147, at 351-52. The formulation in Georgia is 
illustrative. See GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1(b) (2018) (punitive damages possible 
where “the defendant’s actions showed willful misconduct, malice, fraud, wantonness, 
oppression, or that entire want of care which would raise the presumption of 
conscious indifference to consequences”). Interestingly, Theodore Sedgwick’s 1847 
treatise stated that punitive damages could be awarded for “negligence so gross as to 
raise a presumption of malice.” SEDGWICK, supra note 107, at 26; see also supra notes 
105–09 and accompanying text. In that, Sedgwick was probably ahead of his time, 
presaging the recklessness standard. Indeed, truly “objective” recklessness might be 
logically equivalent to gross negligence. See Simons, Rethinking Mental States, supra 
note 39, at 464-65, 478; see also George P. Fletcher, The Fault of Not Knowing, 3 
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 265, 278 (2002) (equating recklessness with gross 
negligence and discussing circumstances in which “the fault lies in [the defendant’s] 
having failed to investigate the risks attendant upon his affirmative conduct”). 
 515 Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1932 (2016). For an 
illuminating discussion of actual versus “statistical” knowledge, and associated 
concepts of particularized versus general risk, see generally Simons, Statistical 
Knowledge Deconstructed, supra note 214. 
 516 See supra notes 215–19 and accompanying text. 
 517 See Glob.-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 563 U.S. 754, 769 (2011). 
 518 For a recent example where a district court allowed a claim for enhanced 
damages to proceed in a willful blindness scenario, see Intel Corp. v. Future Link Sys., 
LLC, 268 F. Supp. 3d 605, 623 (D. Del. 2017) (refusing to grant summary judgment 
of no willfulness based in part on the evidence that “Intel’s own engineers concede 
that they avoid reviewing other, non-Intel patents so as to avoid willfully infringing 
them” and allegations of “corporate atmosphere encouraging employees to ‘turn a 
blind eye’ to patents”). This result seems in tension with prevailing precedent, see 
supra, Section I.D.2, though it is not clear if in the leading post-Halo Federal Circuit 
case on point, WBIP, LLC v. Kohler Co., 829 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2016), the plaintiff 
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would other behaviors involving inquiries into patent coverage that 
are so woefully inadequate as to demonstrate a gross enough departure 
from ordinary care and, in turn, indicate an infringer’s conscious 
indifference to the patent rights of others.519 Consistent with the 
demanding nature of the recklessness standard, as captured in the 
“reason to know” formulation, qualifying behaviors might include a 
failure to investigate whether a product that the defendant copied was 
covered by patents, or a decision not to monitor the patents of a close 
competitor.520 To go beyond these specific examples of non-searches 
that may be reckless, though, a comprehensive framework is needed. 
In the next section, I consider some factors that could be relevant to 
the recklessness inquiry. 
 
proved the defendant’s actual knowledge of the patent as a factual matter. In fact, it 
seems that the Federal Circuit held that actual knowledge could be inferred from 
patent marking on the products that the defendant copied. Id. at 1341-42; see supra 
notes 44–45 and accompanying text. 
 519 One may note that this standard is like the “deliberate indifference” mental state 
for indirect infringement that the Supreme Court rejected in Global-Tech in favor of 
the willful blindness standard. See Glob.-Tech, 563 U.S. at 766-70. Although, as 
observed above, see supra notes 224–26 and accompanying text, the Supreme Court’s 
willfulness and indirect infringement standards are difficult to reconcile, it is notable 
that Global-Tech explicitly rejected recklessness (the criminal version of it!) in the 
indirect infringement context, id. at 769-70, while Halo acknowledged recklessness as 
a possible standard, Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1932. But there is yet another wrinkle — the 
defendant’s beliefs with respect to the asserted patent’s validity cannot negate liability 
for indirect infringement, Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1920, 
1926-28 (2015), but can negate willfulness, Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1932. In this vein, I 
argued in a recent article that claims like those at issue in Commil might be 
recharacterized as claims of direct infringement, dispensing with the knowledge-of-
the-patent requirement. See Karshtedt, Causal Responsibility and Patent Infringement, 
supra note 15, at 586-92.  
 520 Cf. SEB S.A. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 594 F.3d 1360, 1375-78 (Fed. Cir. 
2010), aff’d on other grounds sub nom. Glob.-Tech, 563 U.S. 754; Intel, 268 F. Supp. at 
609, 623. For an example from Canada, see Bell Helicopter Textron Canada Ltée v. 
Eurocopter, [2013] F.C.A. 219, para. 190 (Can. C.A.), aff’g [2012] F.C. 113 (“[I]t 
simply defies belief that a large and sophisticated corporation such as Bell Helicopter 
would not verify intellectual property rights prior to embarking, as it did, on a research 
program directly involving the study of the landing gear of a leased EC120 helicopter. At 
the very least, this would be willful blindness.”). On remand, the court allowed treble 
damages, citing the fact that copying was involved. See Airbus Helicopters, S.A.S. v. Bell 
Helicopter Textron Canada Ltée, [2017] F.C. 170, para. 312, appeal docketed, A-94-17 
(F.C.A. Mar. 10, 2017). Notably, punitive damages in this case were awarded under 
the common law — there is no statutory authorization for them under Canadian 
patent law. I thank Professor Norman Siebrasse for bringing this case to my attention. 
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B. Reckless Failures to Learn of a Patent: Beyond the Easy Cases 
The exercise of setting a standard of care, and instructing juries on 
what might constitute an extreme deviation from it, creates — on the 
model of Judge Calabresi’s approach in Island Software — an 
opportunity for courts to bring economic reasoning to bear on the 
issue of enhanced damages within the strictures of modern common-
law punitive damages doctrine.521 Borrowing from tort law, the default 
standard one would set is, simply, what a reasonably prudent firm 
would do by way of investigating patent rights of others under all the 
circumstances.522 By itself, though, that standard does not tell us very 
much, and the real work lies in ascertaining the relevant 
circumstances, as well as their salience for the recklessness inquiry 
based on the defendant’s allegedly extreme deviation from the 
standard. A close examination of the specific setting of the 
infringement, then, should give us some sense of the efficient amount 
of patent search and analysis. The emphasis here, again, is on costs 
and benefits: as William Lee and Professor Douglas Melamed noted, 
“when a company can cost-effectively learn of relevant patents and 
avoid infringement ex ante, it should be deterred from proceeding to 
infringe the patents.”523 In other words, when potential defendants can 
readily take steps to avoid infringement but do not, deterrence 
through enhanced damages may be appropriate. 
Accordingly, one factor that the fact-finder could take into account 
in deciding if a non-search was reckless, suggested by Judge Calabresi 
in Island Software, is company size and sophistication in the relevant 
area of technology.524 Less is to be expected from a small company, for 
which an extensive investigation intended to forestall infringing 
activity may become cost-prohibitive, than of an established 
manufacturer operating in the field. Furthermore, the law should 
demand even less from an end user who lacks any technological 
expertise and just happens to have acquired the technology from 
another party because the necessary investments into search are, in 
these circumstances, likely to be highly socially costly relative to any 
social benefit of the avoided infringement.525 A related intuition is that 
 
 521 Island Software & Comput. Serv., Inc., v. Microsoft Corp., 413 F.3d 257, 264 
(2d Cir. 2005); see supra notes 426–30 and accompanying text. 
 522 See Brown v. Kendall, 60 Mass. 292, 296-97 (1850).  
 523 Lee & Melamed, supra note 5, at 299.  
 524 Island Software, 413 F.3d at 264. 
 525 See supra notes 282–84 and accompanying text; see also Mark D. Janis & 
Timothy R. Holbrook, Patent Law’s Audience, 97 MINN. L. REV. 72, 117 (2012); 
Karshtedt, Causal Responsibility and Patent Infringement, supra note 15, at 625 n.376.  
  
1520 University of California, Davis [Vol. 51:1427 
patent searching would be likely inefficient and socially wasteful if a 
firm had to develop expertise in an area of technology that is irrelevant 
to the firm’s operations just to avoid exposure to treble damages. 
Professor Paul Heald’s insightful model of optimal remedies for patent 
infringement is consistent with these insights: He is skeptical of 
enhancing damages in the circumstances in which “the inventive firm 
and a self-inventing infringer operate in different commercial 
fields.”526 Examining the characteristics of the infringing firm ensures 
that courts “do not automatically multiply a damage award simply for 
a failure to search,”527 but rather ascertain circumstances that make a 
search that would aid in avoiding infringement particularly 
appropriate and cost-effective. 
Another factor, alluded to earlier in the Article, centers on the 
patentee’s difficulties in detecting infringement,528 whether based on 
the defendant’s efforts to conceal the infringing acts or simply based 
on the nature of the invention. Reduced likelihood of detection leads 
to systematic undercompensation for infringement,529 making this 
factor particularly suitable for consideration under the economic 
models of enhanced damages.530 Indeed, this factor embodies one area 
in which modern approaches to mental states for punitive damages 
and law-and-economics thinking have reached some convergence: “As 
Judge Posner points out in Mathias v. Accor Economy Lodging, reckless 
and grossly negligent conduct may justify the application of a damage 
multiplier based on the chance that the wrong will go undetected or 
unchallenged.”531 Courts should therefore instruct juries to look with 
particular care at infringements of so-called method or process patents 
and other infringements unlikely to be discovered by the patentee.532 
Criticizing Seagate, Professor Heald questioned the fact that the 
 
 526 See Paul J. Heald, Optimal Remedies for Patent Infringement, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 
1165, 1191 (2008). 
 527 Id. at 1197. 
 528 See supra notes 265–67 and accompanying text; see also Chiang, supra note 229. 
 529 Thomas F. Cotter, An Economic Analysis of Enhanced Damages and Attorney’s 
Fees for Willful Patent Infringement, 14 FED. CIR. B.J. 291, 310 (2004).  
 530 Indeed, culpability aside, high punitive damages awards have been thought to 
be justifiable when the wrongdoing was difficult to detect, increasing the defendant’s 
chances of getting away with a violation. See, e.g., BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 
U.S. 559, 582 (1996).  
 531 Heald, supra note 526, at 1190 (citing Mathias v. Accor Econ. Lodging, Inc., 
347 F.3d 672, 675-76, 678 (7th Cir. 2003)).  
 532 See Jeffrey R.D. Lewis & Art C. Cody, Unscrambling the Egg: Pre-Suit 
Infringement Investigations of Process and Method Patents, 84 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. 
SOC’Y 5, 7 (2002). 
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“express focus in [its] willfulness inquiry is on the infringer’s intent, 
while ignoring the chance that the infringement will go 
undetected.”533 The criticism also applies to the Federal Circuit’s 
willfulness doctrine post-Halo, which focuses on the defendant’s 
subjective mental state by privileging actual knowledge, but ignores 
underdetection as an independent factor in determining whether 
threshold requirements for enhanced damages have been met.534 
Under the third factor, related to the other two, the fact-finder 
would address in a holistic manner the type of industry in which the 
infringer operates and the number and kind of patents potentially 
covering the infringing products. If the product could potentially 
infringe numerous patents, or if the area of technology is known for 
notice failures when it comes to patent claims,535 “self-inventing” 
could well be “the optimal behavior” given the expense of search.536 
Although these characterizations are subject to debate, broadly 
speaking the information technology industry is described by some as 
one in which a patent search could be prohibitively expensive based 
on notice difficulties and a sheer number of relevant patents, while the 
biomedical device industry could fall on the other end of the 
spectrum.537 
Decision-makers, to be sure, should consider the particular facts of 
each case, but the features of products and patents in the area of 
infringing technology could be highly informative with respect to 
whether a search would be efficient. The general idea of industry-
specific policy levers in patent law is not new — it was developed by 
Professors Dan Burk and Mark Lemley in a series of insightful articles 
 
 533 Heald, supra note 526, at 1197.  
 534 See Masur, supra note 265, at 195-96; see also Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. 
Cotter, An Economic Analysis of Damages Rules in Intellectual Property Law, 39 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1585, 1591 (1998). Concealment is, however, one of the “Read factors” 
guiding the trial judge’s discretion as to how much to increase the damages once the 
jury finds willfulness. See infra Section III.D. 
 535 See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 249, at 49-50, 233-34. See generally Peter S. 
Menell & Michael J. Meurer, Notice Failure and Notice Externalities, 5 J. LEGAL 
ANALYSIS 1 (2013). 
 536 See Heald, supra note 526, at 1189. 
 537 See WENDY H. SCHACHT, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, PATENT REFORM: ISSUES IN 
THE BIOMEDICAL AND SOFTWARE INDUSTRIES (2006), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/ 
RL33367.pdf; see also Christina Mulligan & Timothy B. Lee, Scaling the Patent System, 
68 NYU ANN. SURV. AM. L. 289, 289, 304 (2012) (estimating that “[i]n software, for 
example, patent clearance by all firms would require many times more hours of legal 
research than all patent lawyers in the United States can bill in a year” because “there 
are around twenty-four billion new [software] patent-firm pairs each year that could 
produce accidental infringement”). 
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and a book.538 But it has not yet been applied to the context of 
enhanced patent damages.539 Under the proposed framework, then, if 
industry characteristics suggest that uncompensated infringements 
would carry high social costs that could be readily avoided by patent 
searching, the fact-finder might readily find a non-search to be 
reckless. 
For this third factor, as for the first, an examination of industry 
customs with respect to patent searching might be relevant, though 
not conclusive.540 Although endogeneity is always a concern when 
courts rely upon the custom of a particular industry to determine 
whether a defendant grossly deviated from the standard of care,541 
accepted practices can often converge on socially efficient conduct.542 
In tort cases, courts have held that “extreme deviations” from industry 
customs or standards are indicative of recklessness,543 and some 
commentators have recognized that custom can be relevant to the 
enhanced damages inquiry in patent law in particular.544 Therefore, 
decision-makers could consider, in undertaking the recklessness 
inquiry, whether the defendant has acted like a severe industry outlier 
— but may, consistent with the treatment of custom in other areas of 
law, discount the custom if it appears eminently unreasonable, is a 
 
 538 DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS CAN 
SOLVE IT 95-170 (2009); Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Biotechnology’s Uncertainty 
Principle, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 691, 735 (2004); Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is 
Patent Law Technology-Specific?, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1155, 1155 (2002); Dan L. 
Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1576-77 
(2003).  
 539 Professor Jason Rantanen’s work comes close. See Rantanen, An Objective View, 
supra note 15, at 1623-24 (arguing that “it is the risk as perceived by a person in the 
actor’s place that is relevant, not some abstract notion of risk held by an omniscient 
being”). 
 540 Cf. Jennifer E. Rothman, The Questionable Use of Custom in Intellectual Property, 
93 VA. L. REV. 1899 (2007) (expressing skepticism with respect to the use of custom 
for determining fair use in copyright law).  
 541 For an insightful empirical study on endogeneity in two specific areas of law, 
see Daniel L. Chen & Susan Yeh, Distinguishing Between Custom and Law: Empirical 
Examples of Endogeneity in Property and First Amendment Precedents, 21 WM. & MARY 
BILL RTS. J. 1081, 1081 (2013). 
 542 For an early analysis of this thesis, see Clarence Morris, Custom and Negligence, 
42 COLUM. L. REV. 1147, 1148 (1942).  
 543 See Rhea v. Brown Mfg. Corp., No. 3:08-cv-35, 2010 WL 2572052, at *1-3 (E.D. 
Tenn. June 18, 2010) (safety standards); Walston v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 923 
P.2d 456, 459, 461 (Idaho 1996) (insurance industry standards). 
 544 See Heald, supra note 526, at 1191 & n.12 (citing Jay P. Kesan, Carrots and 
Sticks to Create a Better Patent System, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 763, 766 (2002)). 
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product of collusion between industry players, or is an inappropriate 
stand-in for the standard of care for some other reason.545 
Fortunately, some relevant data based on which we could make 
tentative generalizations on search practices by industry is available.546 
Addressing patent search behavior among startups, a study by 
Professors Graham, Merges, Samuelson, and Sichelman “inquired 
whether . . . respondents’ companies regularly check the patent 
literature to determine if someone else has a U.S. patent that covered 
what they were doing or were considering.”547 The authors found, for 
example, that “[a]mong [non-venture backed] respondents who 
answered, slightly more than one-third reported 
conducting . . . [patent] searches.”548 Notably, “[t]his likelihood was 
particularly high for biotechnology (nearly seven in ten) and medical 
device (over half) companies, while slightly less than one-quarter of 
software companies reported doing regular patent searches.”549 The 
overall search numbers were “substantially” greater among venture-
backed firms, and those firms exhibited a similar industry trend: 
“propensity [to search] was particularly high among biotechnology 
(nearly nine in ten) and medical device (over nine in ten) firms.”550 
These findings are consistent with the work on industry trends with 
respect to notice failure and patent numerosity discussed earlier.551 
Custom, indeed, has already been accepted in the willful 
infringement inquiry on some level. For example, relying on Federal 
Circuit precedent, the trial court looked to custom in Stryker v. 
Zimmer, the companion case to Halo. The court explained that 
“Zimmer offered no evidence that its behavior — copying a 
competitor’s product, without attempting to design around the 
competitor’s patents and without first seeking clearance from counsel 
 
 545 See, e.g., The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932) (Hand, J.). 
 546 I assume that the ten-year-old study discussed here is not outdated and remains 
relevant. If not, at least the study provides a model of the sort of data that could be 
collected and used in litigation in the future. 
 547 Stuart J.H. Graham et al., High Technology Entrepreneurs and the Patent System: 
Results of the 2008 Berkeley Patent Survey, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1255, 1321 (2009). 
 548 Id. 
 549 Id. 
 550 Id. 
 551 See supra notes 535–37 and accompanying text; see also Stewart E. Sterk, 
Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Uncertainty About Property Rights, 106 MICH. L. REV. 
1285, 1285 (2008) (“In some instances, the cost of acquiring information about the 
scope of property rights will exceed the social value of that information. In those 
circumstances, further search for information about the scope of rights is inefficient; 
the social harm avoided by further search does not justify the costs of the search.”). 
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on infringement concerns — was in keeping with standards of 
commerce in the medical device industry.”552 The court concluded 
that this evidence supported the jury’s finding of willfulness and, for 
this and other reasons, denied Zimmer’s motion for judgment as a 
matter of law of no willfulness.553 The Federal Circuit reversed the 
trial court in Stryker under the Seagate standard,554 but the Supreme 
Court in turn vacated the Federal Circuit’s judgment in that case and 
the district court ultimately reinstated the award of full treble 
damages.555 Although, under prevailing precedent, the Stryker court 
considered custom only with respect to conduct involving patents 
known to the defendant, there is nothing in Halo to foreclose the trial 
court’s consideration of search customs as well, and much to support 
it. Allowing the jury to hear this kind of evidence and assess its 
relevance should be a part of the trial court’s exercise of discretion that 
the Supreme Court emphasized in Halo.556 
Finally, the timing of search would be relevant for the recklessness 
inquiry. If a patent covering a product springs up unexpectedly years 
after the product has been launched, the failure to find that patent 
should be significantly less likely to be adjudged reckless than if the 
patent was in existence prior to product development. While the 
recklessness standard could readily demand a clearance search prior to 
potentially infringing activity based on the factors discussed above, the 
costs of continuous monitoring for new patents after product launches 
would probably be prohibitive in many circumstances. In addition, as 
Professor Mark Lemley and Ragesh Tangri explained, the number of 
options that an infringer has after investing into a particular product is 
more limited than prior to the time that the investments were made. 
They argued that “a company . . . can hardly be expected to 
throw . . . product-specific investments away every time the company 
is confronted with one of the more than two million patents currently 
in force in the United States” and concluded that a willfulness inquiry 
that “focuses only on the accused infringer’s state of mind at the time 
 
 552 Stryker Corp. v. Zimmer, Inc., No. 1:10-cv-1223, 2013 WL 6231533, at *14 
(W.D. Mich. Aug. 7, 2013), vacated, 837 F.3d 1268 (Fed. Cir. 2016).  
 553 To be sure, under the prevailing standard, the custom at issue was one relating 
to dealing with known patents. See id. at *12.  
 554 Stryker Corp. v. Zimmer, Inc., 782 F.3d 649 (Fed. Cir. 2014), vacated sub. nom. 
Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923 (2016).  
 555 Stryker Corp. v. Zimmer, Inc., No. 1:10-cv-1223, 2017 WL 4286412, at *1 
(W.D. Mich. July 12, 2017), on remand from 837 F.3d 1268 (Fed. Cir. 2016), appeal 
docketed, No. 17-2541 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 13, 2017). 
 556 Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1933-34.  
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it initially adopts the product” would help avoid overdeterrence.557 I 
largely agree: unless some special circumstances, such as a very low-
cost search followed by a cheap redesign, are present after the product 
launch, the failure to find “after-arising” patents should not count 
against the infringer in the recklessness inquiry.558 
To summarize, the ultimate purpose of the inquiry into the quality 
of a patent search is to enable the fact-finder to decide whether the 
defendant who lacked actual knowledge of the asserted patent should 
nonetheless be charged with it based on Halo’s “reason to know” 
standard.559 Importantly, the inquiry has both factual and evaluative 
components. On the factual side, the defendant who lacked actual 
knowledge could have either (1) done no searching at all; or (2) done 
some searching but missed the relevant patent. On the evaluative side, 
the fact-finder would conclude whether route (1) or (2) was reckless 
with the aid of the factors discussed above and thus decide if the 
infringement was willful. Of course, a defendant who lacked actual 
knowledge of the patent’s existence could not have formed a belief 
about legality of its activities as far as noninfringement or invalidity 
are concerned — the problem, if any, lies in the failure to find the 
patent. The nature of the inquiry, however, changes once the 
defendant learns of the patent.560 In the next section, I examine how 
willfulness should be analyzed under the proposed test for defendants 
who have acquired actual knowledge of the patent. 
C. Patent Search Versus Patent Analysis 
Assume an infringer who, at one point, lacked actual knowledge of 
the asserted patent and, based on the factors in the previous section, 
the court concludes that infringement during that period was not 
reckless and therefore not willful. But then the infringer learns of the 
patent, whether after a search, receipt of a demand letter, or perhaps 
even after being served with the plaintiff’s complaint. How should the 
conduct of this type of defendant be evaluated? Because, today, actual 
knowledge is the sine qua non of enhanced damages, we are seemingly 
 
 557 Lemley & Tangri, supra note 26, at 1117, 1119.  
 558 At the same time, infringers who do have patent monitoring programs for their 
existing products could use this fact in their favor in countering claims of willful 
infringement. I thank Professor Brian Love for suggesting that I make this point. 
 559 Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1933. 
 560 For example, if the defendant developed a reasonable noninfringement or 
invalidity position after acquiring actual knowledge of a patent, enhanced damages 
could not be collected from that point on. See Holbrook, supra note 275, at 1039, 
1044 (discussing similar timing issues in the context of indirect infringement).  
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in familiar territory. The question to ask is whether the conduct 
involved in infringing a known patent was reckless or intentional,561 
which could be answered by examining whether the defendant 
developed a noninfringement or invalidity position, attempted a 
redesign of its product, and so on. In the wake of Halo, courts have 
already been making such inquiries.562 
But under the approach set forth in this Article, something is now 
different than under the rule that renders actual knowledge dominant 
because the relevant timeframe has expanded to include search in 
addition to analysis. It should matter for the cost-benefit calculation, 
for example, whether a defendant acquired knowledge of the patent 
through its own search as opposed to a demand letter or another 
action by the patentee, such as a lawsuit.563 Particularly when the 
infringer already expended significant resources on search, it cannot 
be expected also to scrutinize every potentially relevant patent to the 
level of an opinion of counsel letter so as to avoid liability for 
enhanced damages. Under these circumstances, a relatively shallow 
analysis of each of the patents of possible interest by an engineer 
trained in the field may be sufficient to counter the willfulness 
charge.564 As an alternative, examinations of patent validity or 
noninfringement that do not involve the “deep dive” of an opinion 
letter are sometimes performed by law firms in the course of a so-
called “freedom to operate” study may be adequate to avoid willfulness 
in this context.565 Thus, a major benefit of the proposed inquiry is that 
 
 561 See Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1932-33. 
 562 See, e.g., WesternGeco L.L.C. v. ION Geophysical Corp., 837 F.3d 1358, 1362-
63 (Fed. Cir. 2016), cert. granted on other grounds, 138 S. Ct. 734 (2018). 
 563 Cf. Lemley & Tangri, supra note 26, at 1100-02 (noting that, under pre-Seagate 
doctrine, it did not seem to matter in the willfulness inquiry how the defendant’s 
knowledge of the patent was acquired).  
 564 Cf. supra notes 282–84 and accompanying text (explaining how something less 
than an opinion letter can be sufficient to avoid the conclusion of recklessness). 
 565 Although these terms are sometimes used interchangeably, “opinion of counsel” 
for the purposes of this Article refers to an in-depth development of invalidity or 
noninfringement positions with respect to one or a few patents, while “freedom to 
operate” denotes a broad patent search followed by a relatively cursory analysis of the 
patents that seem to be a threat. The latter is generally cheaper. See, e.g., A. James 
Isbester, 5 Top Takeaways: When Is an Opinion of Counsel Required in the New, Post-
Halo Environment?, LEXOLOGY (Apr. 17, 2017), https://www.lexology.com/library/ 
detail.aspx?g=235da072-c7c8-463e-99d1-222392a9c517 (distinguishing “clearance 
(freedom to operate) studies” from “opinions of counsel” and noting that there may be 
circumstances when “a summary memo regarding a specific patent or a freedom to 
operate memo covering all patents prior to product launch should be adequate,” while 
a “formal opinion” would not be needed to avoid willfulness). 
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it is at least structured in such a way so as not to discourage search, 
which the current approach does by giving potential infringers 
incentives to blind themselves to the patents of others.566 
Thus, inclusion of the quality of patent search, in addition to legal 
analysis, in the willfulness calculus could potentially further reduce 
reliance on opinion of counsel letters, and mitigate associated 
problems involving privilege waivers as the focus of the inquiry shifts 
from specific patents to clearance activities generally.567 As the case 
law develops, courts may even settle on some “industry standard” safe 
harbors, concluding that a certain amount of search and analysis is per 
se sufficient to avoid a finding of “egregious” infringement qualifying 
for enhanced damages.568 Ultimately, by rewarding search, this 
approach to willfulness could encourage investments into learning 
patent landscapes and concomitant acquisition of technical 
information, rather than consumption of resources on opinion letters 
designed solely to be shields from enhanced damages. This 
recalibration of the willfulness doctrine in line with modern tort 
standards could, therefore, make it consistent with the patent law’s 
disclosure function, rather than at odds with it.569 
In addition, the foregoing analysis is not meant to suggest that every 
time an infringer learned of a specific patent (or a set of patents) from 
the eventual plaintiff, as opposed to from its own search, a detailed 
analysis of the patents must be carried out to avoid the possibility of 
treble damages under the recklessness prong of Halo.570 When, on the 
one hand, the defendant is an end user lacking expertise in the 
relevant industry, requiring a formal opinion letter would be highly 
inefficient, for similar reasons that doing a patent search in the first 
 
 566 See generally supra Section I.E. 
 567 See supra notes 158–64 and accompanying text.  
 568 Professor Heald suggested that a diligent search could qualify the infringer for a 
safe harbor from willfulness, a proposal with which I agree to the extent it can be 
made consistent with Halo’s flexible inquiry. Heald, supra note 526, at 1191 (“[I]f the 
infringing firm conducted a reasonable search prior to self-inventing, and yet failed to 
find the invention, it seems clear that the damage award should not be augmented.” 
(footnote omitted)); cf. Lee Anne Fennell, Accidents and Aggregates, 59 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 14-20), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2960072 
(discussing the concept of safe harbors in negligence law). 
 569 Cf. supra Section I.E.2 (discussing the importance of patent disclosure). To be 
sure, if no reasonable invalidity or noninfringement positions could be cheaply 
developed, the searcher would need to engage in licensing (or designing around the 
patent) and, perhaps, litigation. I address this point immediately below and also infra 
in Section IV.B. 
 570 Or, under the intent prong. See Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 
1923, 1931-32 (2016). 
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place would also be inefficient for such an entity.571 On the other 
hand, though, when a company accused of infringement already 
employs technical experts who can meaningfully work with attorneys 
to evaluate the relevance of patents brought to the company’s 
attention, a relatively thorough analysis could be justified. In addition, 
company size and resources should matter here as well. As Justice 
Breyer suggested in his Halo concurrence, a small company might not 
have the financial wherewithal needed for extensive patent analysis, 
and could therefore be overdeterred by a rule allowing for ready 
imposition of enhanced damages based on mere knowledge of patents 
listed in a demand letter.572 
A question remains with respect to the proper course of action once 
it appears likely to the defendant that the patent at issue is valid and 
infringed. As an initial matter, proceeding with the development of the 
infringing product in these circumstances could potentially move the 
defendant from the zone of recklessness to that of intent and “piracy” 
under the subjective prong of Halo,573 though liability for patent 
infringement is always somewhat probabilistic given uncertainties in 
validity, claim construction, and so on.574 In any case, even when 
infringement approaches the intentional category, efficiency 
considerations are not completely irrelevant. In line with the 
framework adopted by Lee and Melamed, the fact-finder could ask if 
the intentionally-infringing defendant “could cost-effectively have 
avoided infringement by negotiating a license ex ante but chose 
instead to infringe.”575 Specifically, the fact-finder could evaluate 
whether the defendant was already “locked-in” to using the infringing 
product, or whether there was a reason that negotiating a license 
would generate high transaction costs.576 If the costs of avoiding 
infringement in these circumstances were high, a finding of willfulness 
may be unwarranted — though perhaps, as I argue in the section that 
follows, efficiency considerations in cases of intentional infringement 
may be better addressed by a judge as opposed to a jury. 
 
 571 See supra Section IV.B.  
 572 Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1936 (Breyer, J., concurring).  
 573 Id. at 1932 (majority opinion). 
 574 See generally Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Probabilistic Patents, 19 J. ECON. 
PERSP. 75 (2005). 
 575 Lee & Melamed, supra note 5, at 441.  
 576 But cf. Nat’l Presto Indus., Inc. v. W. Bend Co., 76 F.3d 1185, 1196 (Fed. Cir. 
1996) (holding that, even though activity before the issuance of the patent may have 
“locked” the infringer in, it could still be liable for enhanced damages based on post-
issuance infringement); see Lemley & Tangri, supra note 26, at 1100-02. 
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*** 
 
Combining the inquiries set forth in this section, the fact-finder 
could generally assess the “reasonableness of the infringer’s failure to 
negotiate a license ex ante in light of his or her assessment of the 
strength of the infringement claim, the number of patents and patent 
holders implicated by his or her product, and the cost of negotiating a 
license,”577 as well as, of course, the cost of search. The ultimate 
evaluative inquiry under the recklessness prong of Halo could be 
phrased to a jury as follows: “The defendant acted despite there being 
a substantial and unjustified risk of infringement that the defendant 
had reason to be aware of and should have avoided.”578 If the fact-
finder concludes that the defendant acted in this manner and thus 
determines that the infringer has deviated from reasonable behavior so 
greatly as to enter the land of reckless conduct,579 the infringement 
would be adjudged willful, and therefore eligible for enhanced 
damages. 
D. The Roles of Judge and Jury 
Under the current approach to treble damages, jury verdicts of 
willfulness have a quasi-advisory character.580 As with any jury 
 
 577 Lee & Melamed, supra note 5, at 462. 
 578 I thank Professor Alexander Sarch for suggesting this formulation. As noted 
throughout this Part, the “should have avoided” decision would be based on the 
likelihood of the detection of infringement, relative social costs and benefits of search, 
and so on. Although the recklessness standard implemented through this jury 
instruction is intended to follow tort law’s modular approach to economic efficiency, 
see Smith, supra note 487 (discussing modularity in tort law), a judge’s decision 
whether to enhance the damages at all, and by how much, might reflect more fine-
grained case-by-case determinations, see infra Section III.D.  
 579 See supra notes 507–14 and accompanying text.  
 580 I refer here to the judge’s ultimate decision to enhance damages, not to the 
initial willfulness determination. A recent district court decision called the jury’s 
willfulness conclusion itself advisory, which is a view that I do not believe to be 
consistent with Federal Circuit authority. Compare Enplas Display Device Corp. v. 
Seoul Semiconductor Co., No. 13-cv-05038 NC, 2016 WL 4208236, at *6 (N.D. Cal. 
Aug. 10, 2016) (“The Court approaches the jury finding as an advisory finding.”), 
appeal docketed, No. 16-2599 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 1, 2016), with WBIP, LLC v. Kohler Co., 
829 F.3d 1317, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“We do not interpret Halo as changing the 
established law that the factual components of the willfulness question should be 
resolved by the jury.”). But cf. Exergen Corp. v. Kaz USA, Inc., Nos. 2016-2315, 2016-
2341, 2018 WL 1193529, at *22 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 8, 2018) (nonprecedential) 
(suggesting that a judge can decide not to enhance damages without a jury 
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determination, an infringer can challenge a verdict that an 
infringement was willful via a motion for judgment as a matter of law 
of no willfulness,581 but that is not the only way that the infringer can 
avoid enhanced damages. The trial judge, in his or her discretion, has 
the ultimate authority to award any amount ranging from no enhanced 
damages to the full treble damages.582 Because the ultimate result of no 
enhancement is therefore possible in spite of a jury finding of 
willfulness, this division of authority renders the mechanics of treble 
damages fairly protective of defendants. Indeed, in numerous district 
court decisions since Halo, including Halo itself, trial judges declined 
to award any enhanced damages in spite of jury findings of 
willfulness.583 
Even more so than the standard for jury determinations of 
willfulness, the law governing the trial judge’s discretion with respect 
to whether and how much to enhance damages has been in flux post-
 
consideration of willfulness). 
 581 See FED. R. CIV. P. 50(a).  
 582 Grp. One Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 407 F.3d 1297, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2005).  
 583 See, e.g., Milwaukee Elec. Tool Corp. v. Snap-On Inc., Nos. 14-CV-1296-JPS, 
17-MC-49-JPS, 2017 WL 6759410, at *22 (E.D. Wis. Dec. 29, 2017) (noting that the 
infringer “should have taken a license like every other competitor,” but declining to 
enhance damages because “there is no reason to layer additional punishment atop this 
error”), appeal docketed, No. 18-1516 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 5, 2018); Saint Lawrence 
Commc’ns LLC v. Motorola Mobility LLC, 2:15-CV-351-JRG, 2017 WL 6268735, at 
*2 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 8, 2017); Idenix Pharm. LLC v. Gilead Scis., Inc., 271 F. Supp. 3d 
694, 698-99 (D. Del. 2017), further proceedings, 2018 WL 922125 (D. Del. Feb. 16, 
2018) (invalidating the patent at issue); Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 281 F. 
Supp. 3d 1087, 1092-95 (D. Nev. 2017); Convolve, Inc. v. Dell Inc., No. 2:08-CV-244-
RSP, 2017 WL 2463398, at *4-5 (D. Del. June 7, 2017), appeal docketed, 17-2335 
(Fed. Cir. July 24, 2017); Brigham & Women’s Hosp., Inc. v. Perrigo Co., 251 F. 
Supp. 3d 285, 293-94 (D. Mass. 2017), appeal docketed, No. 17-2021 (Fed. Cir. May 
12, 2017); Sprint Commc’ns Co. v. Time Warner Cable, Inc., No. 11-2686-JWL, 2017 
WL 978107, at *12 (D. Kan. Mar. 14, 2017); Power Integrations, Inc. v. Fairchild 
Semiconductor Int’l, Inc., No. 09-cv-05235-MMC, 2017 WL 130236, at *4-5 (N.D. 
Cal. Jan. 13, 2017); Sociedad Española de Electromedicina y Calidad, S.A. v. Blue 
Ridge X-Ray Co., 226 F. Supp. 3d 520, 529-33 (W.D.N.C. 2016), appeal docketed, No. 
17-1551 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 31, 2017); XY, LLC v. Trans Ova Genetics, LC, No. 13-cv-
0876-WJM-NYW, 2016 WL 6664619, at *3-4 (D. Colo. Nov. 10, 2016); Presidio 
Components, Inc. v. Am. Tech. Ceramics Corp., No. 14-cv-02061-H-BGS, 2016 WL 
4377096, at *20-21 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 17, 2016), aff’d in relevant part, 875 F.3d 1369 
(Fed. Cir. 2017); Enplas Display, 2016 WL 4208236, at *8; Trs. of Bos. Univ. v. 
Everlight Elecs. Co., Ltd., 212 F. Supp. 3d 254, 257-28 (D. Mass. 2016), appeal 
docketed, No. 16-2591 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 31, 2016); cf. Erfindergemeinschaft UroPep 
GbR v. Eli Lilly & Co., No. 2:15-CV-1202-WCB, 2017 WL 2190055, at *4 (E.D. Tex. 
May 18, 2017) (Bryson, J., sitting by designation) (granting judgment as a matter of 
law of no willfulness because the court “would not have enhanced damages even if the 
jury had found Lilly’s infringement to be willful”). 
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Halo. Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision, trial judges would 
typically look to the factors enumerated in the well-known Federal 
Circuit opinion in Read Corp v. Portec, Inc., including (1) “whether the 
infringer deliberately copied the [patentee’s] ideas or design,” 
including copying directly from the patent or from a patent’s 
“commercial embodiment,” (2) “whether the infringer . . . investigated 
the scope of the patent and formed a good-faith belief that it was 
invalid or that it was not infringed,” (3) “infringer’s behavior as a 
party to the litigation,” (4) infringer’s “size and financial condition,” 
(5) “closeness of the case,” (6) “duration of the defendant’s 
misconduct,” (7) “remedial action by the defendant,” (8) “defendant’s 
motivation for harm,” and (9) “whether defendant attempted to 
conceal its misconduct.”584 After Halo, though, some courts have 
begun to de-emphasize the Read factors, maintaining instead that 
“they are not dispositive of the issue at hand” because Halo held that 
that “there is no precise rule or formula for awarding damages under 
§ 284” and that “the touchstone for awarding enhanced damages after 
Halo is egregiousness.”585 Although it is difficult to draw 
generalizations less than two years after Halo was decided, trial judges 
appear to treat egregiousness as a kind of overarching requirement for 
awarding enhanced damages that they must enforce after the patentee 
proves to the jury that the infringer acted willfully.586 
Whatever the exact relationship between the jury willfulness 
standard and the trial judge enhancement standard,587 the inquiries 
overlap to some extent. For example, a good-faith belief of invalidity 
or noninfringement is likely relevant to the former as well as the latter, 
 
 584 970 F.2d 816, 827 & n.7 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
 585 See, e.g., Sociedad Española, 226 F. Supp. 3d at 532; see also Imperium IP 
Holdings (Cayman), Ltd. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 203 F. Supp. 3d 755, 763 (E.D. Tex. 
2016) (“While the Read factors remain helpful to the Court’s execution of its 
discretion, an analysis focused on ‘egregious infringement behavior’ is the touchstone 
for determining an award of enhanced damages rather than a more rigid, mechanical 
assessment.”), amended in part, 2017 WL 1716589 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 27, 2017), appeal 
docketed, No. 17-2133 (Fed. Cir. June 6, 2017).  
 586 Cf. Presidio Components, 875 F.3d at 1382-83 (affirming this approach); Alfred 
E. Mann Found. for Sci. Res. v. Cochlear Corp., 841 F.3d 1334, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2016) 
(remanding to the district court to “consider whether [the defendant’s] infringement 
‘constituted an “egregious case[ ] of misconduct beyond typical infringement” 
meriting enhanced damages under § 284 and, if so, the appropriate extent of the 
enhancement’” (quoting WesternGeco L.L.C. v. ION Geophysical Corp., 837 F.3d 
1358, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 
1923, 1934 (2016)) (alteration in original))).  
 587 See generally Mitchell G. Stockwell, Who Decides Enhanced Damages?, 45 AIPLA 
Q.J. 645 (2017).  
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even for courts that have replaced or supplemented the Read factors 
with the more amorphous “egregiousness” determination. Given the 
significance that Halo assigned to subjectively culpable behaviors and 
the Court’s mention of “motive or intent,” the “motivation for harm” 
factor likewise remains significant for both inquiries.588 Some of the 
other factors, such as the defendant’s size and financial condition, may 
not currently be relevant for the first, jury inquiry step. Under the 
framework I propose, though, this factor would be adapted to the 
recklessness inquiry by way of acknowledging the defendant’s specific 
circumstances and resource constraints, and queries captured in some 
of the remaining Read factors should also come into play at this, first 
stage of the willfulness inquiry. Thus, the fact that a product was 
copied would matter to the question whether the infringer was 
willfully blind, and concealment of misconduct would be probative of 
the difficulty of detection. 
Are such duplicative inquiries necessary? Perhaps not: for one thing, 
the litigation process would be more efficient if the trial judge 
performed the entirety of the treble damages analysis. In addition, the 
risk of prejudicing the defendant’s jury case for no infringement 
liability with matter related to willfulness, which may be 
inflammatory, would be reduced.589 Some textual support for the trial 
judge’s plenary role in the treble damages determination exists in the 
statute, which declares that “the court shall” assess compensatory 
damages if they are “not found by a jury,” but also states that “the 
court may increase the damages up to three times the amount found 
or assessed” without mentioning a possible role of the jury for that 
decision.590 Nonetheless, complete elimination of the jury’s role in 
awarding enhanced damages would be so at odds with common-law 
principles that, given the statute’s ambiguous language, an 
interpretation that puts enhancement under § 284 entirely in the 
hands of trial judges should be disfavored.591 And, in this Article, I 
 
 588 Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1933. 
 589 See Daniel Harris Brean & Bryan P. Clark, Casting Aspersions in Patent Trials, 79 
U. PITT. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2929055; see also 
Lemley & Tangri, supra note 26, at 1108-19 (considering but tentatively rejecting the 
possibility of bifurcation of patent trials into separate proceedings to determine 
liability and willfulness).  
 590 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2018); see Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 780 F.3d 
1357, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (O’Malley, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en 
banc).  
 591 See generally Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc., 532 U.S. 424 
(2001) (addressing the somewhat constrained but nonetheless pervasive role of juries 
in the determination of punitive damages in tort).  
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take § 284 as it exists today as a given and aim to develop an 
interpretation of this section that is as accurate as possible without 
also violating the limits set by Halo. 
Moreover, there is virtue in involving both jury and judge in the 
enhanced damages determination. For one thing, the presence of two 
separate decision-makers who are not required to defer to one another 
may help ensure that “enhanced damages are not . . . meted out in a 
typical infringement case.”592 For another, the current structure gives 
the judge the ability to modulate the amount of enhanced damages 
based on the severity of the infringer’s conduct, considerations of 
efficiency and deterrence specific to the circumstances of the case, 
and, perhaps, even based on the judge’s conclusion that the 
compensatory damages award is sufficiently severe that little or no 
enhancement is needed to ensure that the infringer is “punished.”593 
In addition, while the considerations taken into account by judge and 
jury might be similar, the dual decision-maker structure ensures that 
the relevant factors (for example, concealment and probability of 
detection) could be profitably used for both evaluating the infringing 
conduct generally and for fine-tuning the actual amount of 
enhancement. In all, the decision structure ensures that sanctions that 
are sometimes described as “extraordinary” are awarded with care as 
to both eligibility for the award and its actual amount.594 
One specific form of possible judicial modulation might involve 
differentiation in the amount of damages based on whether the 
conduct at issue is intentional or in “bad faith” as opposed to merely 
reckless. There is a great deal of precedent for awarding lower 
enhanced damages where the defendant acted in a way that is “worse 
than negligent but less than malicious,”595 in the old “intentional 
harm” sense of “malice.”596 Judges assessing enhanced damages may 
 
 592 Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1932. 
 593 See, e.g., Idenix Pharm. LLC v. Gilead Scis., Inc., 271 F. Supp. 3d 694, 703 (D. 
Del. 2017) (“[G]iven that the jury’s damages award is already the largest damages 
verdict ever returned in a patent trial (compensating Idenix for what it lost), 
additional sanction is just not warranted.” (emphasis removed)), further proceedings, 
2018 WL 922125 (D. Del. Feb. 16, 2018) (invalidating the patent at issue); Brigham & 
Women’s Hosp., Inc. v. Perrigo Co., 251 F. Supp. 3d 285, 293 (D. Mass. 2017), appeal 
docketed, No. 17-2021 (Fed. Cir. May 12, 2017) (declining to award any enhanced 
damages where compensatory damages were “at the high end of the damages 
sought”). 
 594 See, e.g., Novo Industri A/S v. Travenol Labs., Inc., 677 F.2d 1202, 1211 (7th 
Cir. 1982). 
 595 Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 510 (2008). 
 596 See supra notes 358–59 and accompanying text.  
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well decide to follow this distinction, generally awarding, say, an 
amount closer to double damages for the former but closer to treble 
damages for the latter.597 To aid in this analysis, a jury could be asked 
to indicate whether the infringement was reckless or intentional on a 
special verdict form, or a judge could decide whether the facts 
supporting a jury’s decision to open the door for enhanced damages 
allow for the conclusion of intentional conduct or that which is merely 
reckless.598 
Still, in keeping with his or her ultimate ability to exercise 
discretion, the trial judge could further modulate the amount of 
enhanced damages to account for the case’s circumstances. Thus, 
when the intentional infringer is an end user of technology rather than 
a manufacturer working in a relevant field, the judge could decide to 
award a relatively small amount of enhanced damages, or even none at 
all, based on the efficiency rationales discussed earlier even if the jury 
happens to find willfulness.599 This result would be consistent with 
Halo because, in the context of the defendant’s intentional conduct, 
the Court refers to “bad-faith infringement,”600 connoting more than 
mere intent. Case law shows that bad faith could evince a desire to 
exploit a disparity in resources or harm a competitor,601 but this 
dynamic is typically not present in the end-user infringer scenario: 
The customer who bought the product and used it as intended, even 
in the face of a demand letter, is no pirate.602 Conversely, an infringer 
adjudged to be willfully blind to its competitor’s patents might have to 
end up paying relatively high damages even though its acts were not 
 
 597 Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 828 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (holding that 
“where the maximum amount is imposed . . . [t]he court’s assessment of the level of 
culpability must be high”); see also Polara Eng’g, Inc. v. Campbell Co., 237 F. Supp. 
3d 956, 994 (C.D. Cal. 2017) (“Trebling damages is reserved for the cases at the most 
egregious end of the spectrum.”), appeal docketed, No. 17-1974 (Fed. Cir. May 1, 
2017). 
 598 See, e.g., Georgetown Rail Equip. Co. v. Holland L.P., 867 F.3d 1229, 1245-46 
(Fed. Cir. 2017) (affirming an award of enhanced damages in the amount of 
$1,000,000 in addition to compensatory damages of $1,541,333 based on “the degree 
of willfulness”).  
 599 See supra notes 524–25, 570–71 and accompanying text; see also Brief of Amici 
Curiae Internet Companies in Support of Respondents at 12, Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse 
Elecs, Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923 (2016) (Nos. 14-1513, 14-1520), 2016 WL 344490, at *12.  
 600 Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1933 n.* (quoting Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top 
Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 508 (1964)). 
 601 See, e.g., Golden Blount, Inc. v. Robert H. Peterson Co., 438 F.3d 1354 (Fed. 
Cir. 2006). 
 602 Cf. Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1932-33; see also Karshtedt, Causal Responsibility and 
Patent Infringement, supra note 15, at 625 n.376. 
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intentional.603 This approach is consistent with Halo, which held that 
“courts should continue to take into account the particular 
circumstances of each case in deciding whether to award damages, and 
in what amount.”604 
IV. OBJECTIONS 
The proposed framework is open to several related objections that I 
have already alluded to in the previous Parts. The objections concern 
increased costs of litigation and adjudication for the expanded 
recklessness inquiry, raise the possibility that — particularly in cases 
of independent invention — the proposed standard will overdeter 
potential infringers, and, finally, question whether harm from patent 
infringement is as worthy of social concern as harm from other torts, 
so that standards for enhanced patent damages should be structured in 
such a way as to make that remedy as difficult to obtain as possible. I 
consider each in turn. 
A. Litigation and Adjudication Costs 
Looking into the adequacy of a patent search, or attempting to argue 
(and decide) whether a non-search was reckless, might consume 
significant resources of courts and litigants. One ready answer to this 
objection, however, is that the Supreme Court’s rejection of the 
Seagate standard in Halo reflects an attitude that the lower courts do 
not get to create standards lacking support in the common law even 
though such standards might reduce litigation costs. The Court 
explained that “respondents’ policy concerns,” including worries 
about increased “threat of litigation,” nonetheless “cannot justify 
imposing an artificial construct such as the Seagate test on the 
 
 603 See supra Section III.A. Professor Gregory Day reached a contrary conclusion, 
contending that infringing use of the patents by the patentee’s competitors might be 
desirable because of the resulting consumer benefits. See Gregory Day, Competition 
and Piracy, 32 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. (forthcoming 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract= 
2904373. Professor Day’s approach is generally difficult to reconcile with Halo. 
Nonetheless, one can imagine circumstances in which the social benefits of infringing 
conduct, even if intentional, so outweigh the value of the enforcement of the 
patentee’s property interests that enhanced damages may not be warranted. See, e.g., 
Idenix Pharm. LLC v. Gilead Scis., Inc., 271 F. Supp. 3d 694, 703-04 (D. Del. 2017), 
further proceedings, 2018 WL 922125 (D. Del. Feb. 16, 2018) (invalidating the patent 
at issue); cf. David Fagundes, Efficient Copyright Infringement, 98 IOWA L. REV. 1791 
(2013). 
 604 136 S. Ct. at 1933. 
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discretion conferred under § 284.”605 Halo is not the only case in 
which the Supreme Court took this position. In SCA Hygiene, again 
reversing the Federal Circuit, the Court sidestepped “policy 
arguments” for preserving the defense of laches against claims for 
damages for past infringement after adopting the general argument 
that “patent law is governed by the same common-law principles, 
methods of statutory interpretation, and procedural rules as other 
areas of civil litigation.”606 Administrative cost savings cannot 
vindicate statutory interpretations that are not correct.607 
Moreover, with time, the costs of the recklessness analysis could be 
controlled, and the new standard could generate dynamic benefits. As 
discussed earlier, judicial decisions may establish recurring patterns of 
acceptable amount of search in specific industries that would make 
subsequent cases cheaper to litigate and adjudicate.608 Ideally, tailored 
standards that encourage cost-effective, reasonable searching would 
also facilitate transfer of technical information usable to industry 
participants, rather that expenditures on patent opinions crafted 
primarily for litigation.609 Another, related benefit of more thorough 
patent searches could be avoidance of costly litigation when a potential 
infringer, after coming across a patent to which it has no plausible 
defense of noninfringement or invalidity, designs out the infringing 
feature or gets a license from the patentee.610 
B. Overdeterrence 
Another (and related) potential set of concerns relates to delay in 
innovative activity, or even potential abandonment of it, based on the 
possibility of increased exposure to enhanced damages.611 The 
 
 605 Id. at 1935.  
 606 SCA Hygiene Prods. Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby Prods., LLC, 137 S. Ct. 
954, 964 (2017) (quoting SCA Hygiene Prods. Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby Prods., 
LLC, 807 F.3d 1311, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc) (Hughes, J., dissenting)). 
 607 Cf. Narechania, supra note 212 (manuscript at 24); see also Lee, supra note 16. 
 608 See supra Section III.B. 
 609 See supra notes 568–69 and accompanying text.  
 610 Abramowicz, supra note 88, at 252, 257-63; see also id. at 250 (“[A] legal 
determination of infringement represents our system’s conclusion that the social costs 
of the unlicensed infringing activity exceed the social benefits, and so there are no 
other factors to take account in the balance.”); Oskar Liivak, Private Law and the 
Future of Patents, 30 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 33, 50-52 (2017). 
 611 See, e.g., Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1936-37 (2016) 
(Breyer, J., concurring). 
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existence of patents of uncertain validity and scope612 exacerbates 
these concerns, raising the prospect of undue holdup of innovation, 
mounting legal expenses, and perhaps nuisance-value settlements.613 
The concerns are weighty but, again, they can be addressed by 
industry-specific rules that would reduce or minimize search 
responsibilities in industries in which such lower-quality patents are 
more likely to be found.614 In contrast, in fields with higher-quality 
patents, deterrence of infringement, or at least attention to the patent 
rights of others, is what we want to see. In those fields, patents play 
their intended role of protecting innovators even against independent, 
but later-arriving, inventors. In this context, patent search could play 
the socially valuable functions reducing duplicative work and, in turn, 
spurring design-arounds or even facilitating bargaining over, and 
eventual licensing of, patent rights.615 The actual knowledge rule, in 
contrast, is much less effective at achieving this sort of tailoring. 
In addition, even under the proposed standard, enhanced damages 
would not be imposed gratuitously. The two layers of review ensure 
that, to be liable for a significant enhancement, the infringer had to — 
consistent with Halo — have done something out of the ordinary.616 
An infringer who can point to the fact that it performed a search and 
analysis at the level close to what is generally expected in the relevant 
industry would be very unlikely to face enhanced monetary liability 
from a reasonable jury or, failing that, a judge. Recklessness, even in 
its more objective forms, is still a demanding standard that requires 
the plaintiff to show some serious misconduct on the losing 
defendant’s part, and there are procedural protections as well. Indeed, 
even if the defendant engaged in intentional conduct that, according 
to the trial judge, should nonetheless not be sanctioned with enhanced 
damages, this form of liability could still be avoided.617 Given the 
 
 612 On overdeterrence due to legal uncertainty, see generally Louis Kaplow, Burden 
of Proof, 121 YALE L.J. 738 (2012). See also John E. Calfee & Richard Craswell, Some 
Effects of Uncertainty on Compliance with Legal Standards, 70 VA. L. REV. 965 (1984); 
Richard Craswell & John E. Calfee, Deterrence and Uncertain Legal Standards, 2 J.L. 
ECON. & ORG. 279 (1986). On this problem in the patent context, see Lemley & 
Shapiro, supra note 574. 
 613 See Means, supra note 386; see also Lemley, supra note 235, at 28.  
 614 See supra Section III.B. 
 615 See Amstar Corp. v. Envirotech Corp., 823 F.2d 1538, 1546-47 (Fed. Cir. 1987) 
(finding no willfulness where the defendant made a good-faith attempt to design 
around the patent). 
 616 Cf. supra note 583 and cases therein (collecting cases where the trial judge 
decided not to enhance damages in spite of the jury finding of willfulness).  
 617 Idenix Pharm. LLC v. Gilead Scis., Inc., 271 F. Supp. 3d 694, 703-04 (D. Del. 
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numerous ways that a defendant can escape liability for enhanced 
damages, the risk of overdeterrence may not be as high as was feared 
in the wake of Halo.618 
C. Harm from Patent Infringement 
The final objection I consider stems from the claim that the harm 
from patent infringement is so different from harm from other kinds 
of torts that arguments for damages enhancements from other areas of 
civil litigation do not apply to patent law. For example, products 
liability torts result in physical injury, trespasses to land could cause 
physical damage to the land and trigger violent self-help, and 
negligence claims, likewise, often stem from harm to person or 
property.619 In contrast, harm from infringement is internal to patent 
law: nothing is actually destroyed by an infringement, and no one is 
hurt. If anything, the infringement can increase social welfare by 
diminishing deadweight loss via increased competition in some 
product market.620 Why then, should we worry about “reckless 
indifference” with respect to patent infringement? 
In responding to this objection, one notes as an initial matter that 
there is not an absolute actual damages or physical injury requirement 
for enhanced damages in civil litigation either. Punitive damages may 
lie even when the trespasser causes no actual harm621 or when only 
nominal damages are awarded under various federal statutory torts.622 
Moreover, punitive damages for trespassory torts have been granted 
even when the possibility of violent self-help was not in the picture.623 
Finally, as discussed earlier, punitive damages can be awarded for torts 
 
2017), further proceedings, 2018 WL 922125 (D. Del. Feb. 16, 2018) (invalidating the 
patent at issue). 
 618 See Puknys & Xu, supra note 284.  
 619 Cf. supra notes 376–88 and accompanying text.  
 620 I thank Dr. Erik Hovenkamp and Professor Stephen Yelderman for discussions 
that crystallized as this objection. For a similar tension in copyright law, see Gordon, 
supra note 296. See also Wendy J. Gordon, Copyright and Tort as Mirror Models: On 
Not Mistaking for the Right Hand What the Left Hand Is Doing, in COMPARATIVE LAW AND 
ECONOMICS 311 (Giovanni B. Ramello & Theodore Eisenberg eds., 2016); Wendy J. 
Gordon, The Concept of “Harm” in Copyright, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE 
COMMON LAW, supra note 261, at 452-83. 
 621 See, e.g., Feld v. Feld, 783 F. Supp. 2d 76 (D.D.C. 2011); Rhodes v. Harwood, 
544 P.2d 147 (Or. 1975). See generally Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, 
Reconceptualizing Trespass, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1823, 1832-35 (2009). 
 622 Abner v. Kan. City S. R.R. Co., 513 F.3d 154, 159-63 (5th Cir. 2008). 
 623 See, e.g., JCB, Inc. v. Union Planters Bank, NA, 539 F.3d 862, 872-73 (8th Cir. 
2008). 
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causing injuries that are strictly financial, such as negligent 
misrepresentation624 or tortious interference with contract — for 
latter, even in the circumstances where the breach itself might 
arguably be “efficient.”625 
By way of another response, the very claim that “actual injury” in 
patent law is not possible is subject to challenge. The remedy of lost 
profits recoverable by a prevailing plaintiff practicing the infringed 
patent is treated as providing for actual damages based on the fact that 
the infringing market entrant interferes with the patentee’s ability to 
charge supracompetitive prices enabled by the patent.626 It is true that 
the claim for a so-called “injury” of lost profits is only possible 
because of the existence of a patent right. But that does not 
differentiate patent law from many other torts: A suit seeking 
compensation for a tortious financial injury associated with a lost 
contract depends on the existence of the tort of interference with 
contract, a claim for damages based on trespass only exists because we 
have trespassory torts, and so on.627 Patent law is not unique in this 
regard. 
Nor is patent law unique in allowing enhanced damages when the 
only compensation for the patentee involves reasonable royalties as 
opposed to lost profits.628 In the intellectual property domain, 
enhanced damages (in the form of elevated statutory damages) are 
awarded without proof of lost profits for copyright infringement 
and,629 as already noted, no actual injury is required to collect 
compensatory or punitive damages for trespass. That is not to say that 
a recklessness or enhancement determination cannot turn on the fact 
that the patentee and infringer are competitors who are both 
practicing the patent — it certainly can.630 But a rule mandating that 
enhanced damages should be very difficult to obtain when the 
compensable injury is the loss of reasonable royalties would make 
patent law an outlier. 
 
 624 See supra notes 409–11 and accompanying text. 
 625 See McChesney, supra note 387. 
 626 Lee & Melamed, supra note 5, at 394. 
 627 See supra note 387 and accompanying text.  
 628 See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2018) (setting “a reasonable royalty” as the floor of 
compensatory damages).  
 629 See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (2018). 
 630 Cf. Dov Greenbaum, In re Seagate: Did it Really Fix the Waiver Issue? A Short 
Review and Analysis of Waiver Resulting from the Use of a Counsel’s Opinion Letter as a 
Defense to Willful Infringement, 12 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 155, 184 (2008) (noting 
treble damages as a motivation for patent trolls). 
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Finally, awards of enhanced damages for harm from patent 
infringement under similar standards as for other torts can be 
generally justified as a matter of policy. Consider the lost profits 
scenario first. Competition between firms, even based on copying, can 
often be good for consumers and worth encouraging,631 but it can also 
be socially harmful — as when, for example, the patent owner ends up 
losing market share to the competitor, is unable to recoup its 
investments through the exclusive right of the patent, and ends up 
having to fold.632 An even less socially desirable scenario could 
eventuate when a larger, well-resourced firm uninterested in doing 
innovative work ignores the patent of a smaller, upstart competitor 
who might not have resources to bring a lawsuit. As with any other 
tort, infringement of a patent can sometimes be socially harmful to the 
extreme, necessitating an award of enhanced damages in reckless 
disregard scenarios. 
The social harm when an infringement does not involve a claim for 
lost profits is more attenuated,633 but it is still possible. The patent 
system exists to encourage innovation and, for its ex ante incentive 
mechanism to work, inventors — who may be prospective patentees 
— need to see that valid and infringed patents can be effectively 
enforced.634 An infringer who just does not want to pay for patent 
licenses even when the costs of patent search, analysis, and 
negotiation are low and the patentee would have been willing to 
engage could, at least in theory, seriously harm innovation via 
negative dynamic effects on future activities of the inventor of the 
asserted patent or of other, future inventors.635 
 
 631 See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 152-53, 156-
57 (1989). 
 632 See supra Section I.C.2. 
 633 Amy L. Landers, Liquid Patents, 84 DENV. U. L. REV. 199, 252-53 (2006) 
(contending that patent remedies should differ for practicing as opposed to non-
practicing entities because each incurs a different kind of harm). 
 634 See, e.g., Sichelman, supra note 6, at 540 (“[T]he exclusionary rights afforded by 
patents promote a more optimal level of innovation by providing greater incentives to 
innovators to invent, market, and sell innovative products, as well as to disclose the 
knowledge underlying those innovations in the form of published patent 
documents.”); see also id. at 532-33 (“[T]he patentholder is more akin to a private 
attorney general, paid via the enforcement of his right as a reward for benefitting the 
public, than a vindicator of his own private rights.”). 
 635 Cf. Hylton, Enhanced Damages for Patent Infringement, supra note 26, at 425; 
Andres Sawicki, Better Mistakes in Patent Law, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 735, 762 & n.107 
(2012) (discussing similar dynamic effects in the context of mistaken patent denials at 
the PTO or invalidation of issued patents). 
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It is true, as Professor Ted Sichelman argued, that patent law’s 
remedial frameworks, which are focused on private harm, are not set 
up to directly serve larger social goals of this sort.636 But enhanced 
damages are, in fact, one remedy for which some consideration of 
societal harms, as opposed to merely private ones, is possible even 
presently in civil litigation.637 Indeed, even Professor Thomas Colby, 
who argued that consideration of societal harms in the calculation of 
punitive damages is foreclosed by the Supreme Court’s constitutional 
precedents, noted that “by punishing the private wrong to the victim, 
punitive damages achieve a deterrent effect that benefits all of 
society.”638 If properly calibrated, treble damages in patent law can 
serve this role just as enhanced damages can in other areas of civil 
litigation. 
CONCLUSION 
The Federal Circuit’s actual knowledge limit on enhanced damages 
in patent law fails to reflect modern common-law developments. 
Moreover, it undermines the goals of economic efficiency and is in 
tension with the goals of the patent system. Finally, the rule arguably 
contradicts Supreme Court precedent. Instead of the actual knowledge 
rule, the recklessness standard for enhanced damages, accepted widely 
in other areas of law, belongs in patent law as well. 
 
 636 See generally Sichelman, supra note 6.  
 637 Cf. Colby, Clearing the Smoke, supra note 31; Sharkey, Economic Analysis of 
Punitive Damages, supra note 3.  
 638 Cf. Colby, Clearing the Smoke, supra note 31, at 462. 
